The OAU and the Problem of African Unity

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It is, today, no longer necessary to advance elaborate arguments to justify the need for African unity. The case has already been eloquently made. All that is needed here is to summarise the major points. It has been rightly pointed out that no African state is large enough to become economically viable and independent at any high level, regardless of the efforts and sacrifices it makes. It is no accident, nor is it a tribute to any special or real characteristic, that the really wealthy nations of the world are the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Neither is it through lack of inter-state suspicion and traditional hostility that the states of Europe, including Britain, are coming together under the European Community. It is because a high standard of living demands a large market, free movement of capital and people, and so on. It is true that the European Community does not have a single government responsible to all its people, but undoubtedly much progress has already been made in this direction. United Africa is one economic unit, it will remain a plaything of the great powers of the world; and the only way for a people to keep control of one economic unit is to have one representative political power covering the whole area.[1]

Indeed, African unity provides the possibility of planning on a bigger and larger scale to meet the many exigencies of the economic and social situations of the modern age. Fifty-one largely non-viable political sovereignties in Africa which are sustained on borrowed resources and insist on subsisting through begging are not laying the sure foundation for their survival. Politically disunited and militarily defenceless in a

ruthless world, Africa with her enormous reserves of natural resources and strategic importance holds out an open invitation to international adventurism—a second Berlin. Undoubtedly, the real need of Africa today is its economic and political unity.

However, many analysts, particularly Western, assert that political unity of Africa is a myth, a 'Utopia'. Africa is far from united. The 51 sovereign member states of the OAU are politically and ideologically deeply divided as between those which have opted for some form of socialism and those which prefer capitalism and those which claim to follow a 'middle of th road 'policy''. Further, Africa is divided racially between the Arabs in the North, the Black Africans in the tropics and the entrenched white minorities in the South. Geographically, the great Sahara Desert divides Africa into the Arab north of the Sahara and the black sub-Saharan or tropical Africa. Linguistic and cultural divisions are legion. Above all, Africa was artificially partitioned in the 19th century among the European powers thereby creating a new British Africa, a French Africa, a Portuguese Africa, a German Africa, a Belgian Africa and an Italian Africa. These divisions continue even today. How can such a continent be united: It is asked. Yet, it is important to note that while most Africa was under colonial rule, the idea of African unity did exercise a strong appeal to African nationalists and emerged as a powerful political weapon in the struggle for independence. Moreover, as Rene Dumond pointed out, "a Utopia certainly, but it is Utopia's or visions of better world that have furthered progress in Greek and Renaissance times as well as our own. Utopia can be defined nowadays as long term planning".[2] We are also reminded of the English Philosopher, John Stuart Mill who wrote: "A people may be unprepared for good institutions, but to kindle a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation".[3] It is against this background that one should examine the role and relevance of the OAU in bringing about African unity. The *raison d' etre* of the OAU is to provide a framework for effective co-operation among African peoples; to help Africans tackle more meaningfully their common problems and achieve results otherwise unattainable in a mutilated continent.

In an analysis of the role of the OAU in bringing about African unity it is pertinent to start with clarifying the concept of African unity itself.

Politically speaking, African unity must mean a union of African states—a transfer of some sovereignty from national units to a new central authority of which the national units will be parts. In other words, it means the existence of some kind of federal government, to which all the state governments have surrendered some of their separate powers. There must be one government which can speak for Africa to the outside world. There must be one organ which is responsible for the defence of Africa against attack or subversion from outside. There must be one representative body which can co-ordinate and facilitate the economic development of Africa as a whole in such a manner as to ensure the well-being of the whole of Africa. This means that there must be one currency, one tariff system and so on, as well as other institutions to promote economic growth.[4]

An analysis of the problem of African unity requires an explanation of the OAU Charter on this important idea. Emperor Haile Selassie's statement that 'the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union' reflects a consensus which never existed at the founding of the OAU. At any rate, the provisions of the charter do not reflect any such consensus. In the Charter of the OAU African leaders pledged themselves to: 'promote the unity and solidarity of African states; to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa—to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international co-operation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (Article II). In the Preamble of the Charter, the leaders showed great awareness of the problems which have militated against the overall development of Africa, particularly the need for "a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences".

It can be seen that the OAU Charter contains no clear or unequivocal interpretation of the idea of African unity. Indeed, the OAU Charter adopted in Addis Ababa as a pivot on which African unity would revolve constitutes a 'curious hotch-potch of principles and purposes which combined very conservative statements designed to protect the *status quo* in intra-African relations with radical commitment to the outside world'.[5] The structure finally agreed was fairly elaborate, with four principal organs—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and

the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. In addition, a number of special commissions were set up to consider various technical aspects of co-operation. Great care was taken, however, to ensure that the Secretariat and the Secretary-General would be administrative only, and that all power would remain with the states. In this way, the organization was virtually prohibited from taking any swift action.

It is significant also to note that the word pan-Africanism' does not appear even once in the whole of the OAU Charter. The Charter is clearly based on the principle of unrestrained national sovereignty which militate against wider unions. Significantly, five out of the seven paramount principles of the organization (Article III) are clearly in defence of sovereign rights of member states and the protection of their Heads of State and Government. The very first principle, "sovereign equality of all member states", is a clear rejection of the pan-Africanist contention that there existed too many unviable and unjustifiably small "sovereign" states in Africa. The political foundation of the OAU, notably the blantantly hypocritical principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of each member state", the toleration extended to all regimes whatever be their nature and credibility, the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of existing states, amounting as it does to absolute recognition of the colonial frontiers, etc. are all fundamental breaks with the pristine principles of pan-Africanism which were, in fact, given a ceremonious burial in Addis Ababa in 1963. It is also pertinent to point here that the principles of anti-imperialism and anti-neo-colonialism, basic to pan-Africanism, never found a place among the seven basic principles of the OAU. The principle of non-alignment, included therein, in any way, has even otherwise been adopted by most African states as best serving their national interests. In the context of growing East-West cold war, the African states probably saw non-alignment as the best course to afford them room for maneuver. It could be argued that the principles of Pan-Africanism and anti-neo-colonialism were deliberately omitted from the OAU Charter. The Charter of the OAU is definitely not a valid basis on which to attempt political unification of Africa. Its spirit and contents do not enunciate an ideological standpoint or philosophy of pan-Africanism.

The role and hitherto, record of the OAU in the matter of achieving the central objective of political and economic unity

in Africa is much doubtful. The very name of the organization itself is questioned, as to whether it should be called the organization 'of' or 'for' African unity. If it is the former, it is argued, it is a misnomer for no unity has been achieved. On the other hand, if it is the latter, then it is a betrayal of the aspirations of those who had laboured for so many years to cure Africa's ills through political unity.

The main difficulty here is that, the exact meaning of the concept of African unity in relation to the OAU has never been clearly worked out. It has remained essentially a 'contest concept'. It has even been argued that its utility lies precisely in this ambiguity: that 'the debate is its life and not a contingent attribute of it'.[6] It is further suggested that it is not a goal against which the performance of the OAU must be judged, but a political myth—an ideology of sorts—used by African leaders to rationalise specific actions or to justify appeals for conformity to certain patterns of behaviour or certain principles. But then, as we have seen, unity is clearly stated in the OAU Charter as one of the main purposes of the Organization (Article II). Besides, although its meaning has been a subject of vigorous debate among African states, the outcome of this debate has had a significant impact on the character of the organization. The victory of one side in the debate is reflected in the nature of the institutional structure of the organization which in turn, has affected its performance and shaped its character. Therefore, an analysis of the accepted interpretation of 'unity' is an essential part of the overall analysis of the nature and performance of the OAU.[7]

On the interpretation of 'African Unity' two schools of thought corresponding to two groups of African states, had emerged at the founding of the OAU in 1963. They were represented by the conservative/moderate Brazzaville/Monrovia and the radical Casablanca bloc. Led by President Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea, the Casablanca powers adopted, what some call a "maximalist" position under which political integration was seen as the only legitimate way of securing African independence and achieving the final liberation of the continent.[8] For the Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc which adopted "minimalist" position, unity meant an alliance among the governing classes for the maintenance of the *status quo*. What they wished to do under the umbrella of the OAU was to build on the common Africanness of the states in the region in order to promote co-

operation and interdependence among them, to co-ordinate their policies and actions in certain areas and to reduce conflicts among them while maintaining their independence and sovereign identities. For them, therefore, the term 'solidarity' (Art. II 1 (a), does not contradict—rather, it expounds—the concept of unity. The idea is to make the African states mutually dependent and to build a 'community of interests' among them. In this sense, there is no contradiction also between the goal of unity and solidarity on the one hand, and that of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states, on the other.

In contrast, for the radical group "the maximalists" African unity meant essentially unity of peoples. The OAU was expected to be if not a mass movement whose goal would be to transform Africa, at least a loose confederation of states aimed at bringing about a higher level of political integration among African states. In other words, unity was interpreted by the radical group as the political unification of the continent, and by implication, the dissolution of the territorial boundaries inherited from colonial powers. Viewed from their perspective, the idea of 'solidarity' (i.e., mere co-operation and inter-dependence) as well as the emphasis on maintaining the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of individual African states, were either in contradiction with, or a complete distortion of, the basic goal of the OAU.

The diverse interpretation of the meaning of African unity was also reflected in the other areas and concerns of the OAU. For example, the phrase, 'all forms of colonialism' (Art. II 1 (d) was also variously interpreted. For the radical group, it was probably understood to mean both 'old colonialism' and 'neo-colonialism'. For the conservative group this meant only 'old' colonialism or formal political control over a state.[9] The important point here is that the differences among the African states concerning both the meaning of African unity and the nature of imperialism are much more important than has often been suggested. It was not a mere disagreement over strategies for African integration. It was a much more fundamental difference. It was a division between those who saw African underdevelopment as the product of imperialism and those who did not; between those who saw imperialism as simple colonialism and those who appreciated the more sinister implications and deeper roots of imperialism; between those who favoured the mobilization of the African

masses against imperialist domination of the continent and those who favoured collaboration with the ruling classes of the capitalist countries against both the progressive African leaders and their socialist allies; between those who favoured a progressive transformation of the continent through institutional integration and those who favoured gradual reform through inter-state collaboration.[10] It is important to point out here that the struggle between the above two groups ended in favour of the conservative/moderate Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc who commanded a vast majority at the founding conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963.

Before and up to the point of the establishment of the OAU there were several experiments in the concrete realization of African unity or pan-Africanism.[11] These experiments at once illustrate the lack of consensus on the concept of African unity and highlight the obstacles to its realization.

Between 1958 and 1960, several attempts were made to bring about African unity at regional and local levels. For example, on 1 May, 1959, Ghana and Guinea announced that the two countries had formed a Union, with a common national flag and anthem, common citizenship with an open invitation to other African states to join. On 30 May, 1959, four Francophone West African countries namely, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, (now Burkina Faso), Niger and Dahomey (now Benin), set up the *Conseil de l'Entente*. This association appeared to be looser than the Ghana-Guinea Union, but it was to live longer.

At the same time, particularly from 1960 onwards, when increasing numbers of African states (17 of them in 1960 itself) became independent and began to assert themselves on the African political scene, the question of leadership of the pan-African movement, ideological and personal rivalries among the leaders etc. came clearly to the forefront. Soon, two groups representing two different approaches and attitudes to pan-Africanism and other political questions came to dominate the African political arena. This led to the formation of the two rival blocs, namely, the radical Casablanca and the conservative—moderate Brazzaville/Monrovia blocs. While the conservative/moderate bloc which included Ivory Coast, Nigeria and most of the Francophone countries, took the "minimalist" position and advocated a gradualist, functionalist approach to African unity and supported the formation of a loose association of states, the radical group

represented by the Casablanca group led by Ghana and Guinea pleaded for a political union and the creation of a strong United States of Africa. These two blocs dominated the political developments in the following years.

The second All African Peoples Conference held in Tunis in January 1960 clearly reflected some of these basic differences.[12] Later, at the second Conference of the Independent African States (CIAS), held in Addis Ababa in June 1960, the incipient ideological cleavages became a violently open split, particularly on the question of political unity and that of leadership.[13] Nevertheless, the majority of African leaders agreed that Pan-Africanism is the only solution to the problems of Africa, even though the groups differed widely as to the methods and the means of achieving the objective. The Nigerian rejection at the Conference of Ghana's radical proposal for a political union of African states as premature and unrealistic accentuated open differences and divisions between the two blocs. The Congo crisis (1960-63) added a new dimension to the raging conflicts. The Algerian question constituted another bone of contention. There existed also differences as regards Mauritania's U.N. membership against Morocco's claim that Mauritania was part of Morocco's territory.

The position of the Brazzaville/Monrovia group on the question of African Unity was made clear at their conference in Monrovia, Liberia, in May 1961. The Conference declared:

> "The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity".[14]

The Monrovia group only accepted the idea of co-operation among African states, but rejected immediate political union.

Thus, during the period immediately preceding the establishment of the OAU in May 1963, the African political scene was dominated by splits, conflicts and cleavages. However, by the end of 1962, the tension between the two opposing blocs had somewhat subsided. The independence of Algeria in 1962 and the admission of Mauritania to the UN removed two specific sources of division. The efforts of some neutral states such as Ethiopia also helped to create an atmosphere favourable to some sort of reconciliation between

the warring blocs. Moreover, the general anxiety to bring all independent African states into a Pan-African forum, and the strong common desire to eradicate imperialism, colonialism, racialism, apartheid and the white minority rule, helped to bring about some agreement between the groups. This facilitated the convening of the historic Summit Conference of 31 independent African States in Addis Ababa, 15-25 May, 1963 which led to the creation of the OAU.

As noted earlier, even the OAU itself does not represent an institutionalization of pan-Africanism in its pristine conception. The compromise hammered out at Addis Ababa sacrificed the ideal for the expedient. In fact, the Charter of the OAU at Addis Ababa embodied a tragic compromise which eminently suited the personal political aspirations of African heads of states and governments.

In a realistic assessment of the OAU Charter and of the achievements of the Addis Ababa Summit, H.M. Basner (Ghana) has rightly noted:

> "Charter or Covenant agreement or oath of unity, the document signed at Addis Ababa is a piece of paper, no matter how sacred its contents, how solemn and sincere the intentions of its signatories. Thirty-one signatories on a piece of paper cannot unite a continent of 250 million people. The inspiration and organizational means provided by th document will become a reality only if the masses of Africa are mobilized into action".[15]

At Addis Ababa, the "maximalist" position advocated by the radical states of the Casablanca group failed to convince the majority, who belonged to the moderate group of the urgent need for immediate political unification of Africa. Nkrumah's total commitment to pan-Africanism and his analysis of the African situation was rejected. The overwhelming preference was for a very loose organization and limited forms of co-operation. Most African states including even some of the radical ones denounced subversion and political assassination as a means of assuming power. The general desire was to protect and preserve national sovereignty. Some even questioned the validity of the Pan-African idea and of an "African personality" describing it as a reflection of an inferiority complex. In fact, far from talking about "African personality" most leaders were talking of "national personality".

In brief, the Charter of the OAU signed at Addis Ababa embodied a tragic compromise which by sacrificing the pan-African ideal of political unification of the continent, eminently suited the personal political aspirations of most African heads of state and government.

As an instrument for the achievement of African unity, the OAU is both constitutionally and structurally defective. The goals as outlined in the Charter are not consistent with one another. Nor are the principles all in consonance with the declared objectives. Moreover, the principal organs of the OAU, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and the Specialized Commissions—either lack adequate powers or are inappropriately structured.[16] Moreover, their powers and functions are not so distributed as to minimise jurisdictional disputes and the institutions are elitist in structure and orientation. Among the major problems of the OAU could be mentioned lack of funds, inadequate number of skilled or trained personnel, the dependence of its member states on external powers and ideological and other divisions among its members.[17]

Besides, there are several obstacles and problems which face the organization in its march to African unity. These problems include: border or territorial disputes between OAU member states; various crises connected with the decolonization process in the continent; and difficulties resulting from interventionist measures by imperialist powers in the continent. Here we may look into some of these problems.

The OAU was barely five months old when a border dispute broke out between Algeria and Morocco. Soon afterwards a similar conflict embittered relations between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. The OAU also inherited the Congo (Zaire) crisis which erupted again in 1964 to become the main preoccupation of the OAU in that year. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the white minority regime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) on 11 November, 1965 proved another major crisis for the OAU and Africa. It appeared to be a serious set-back to the decolonization policy of the OAU which responded by a strongly worded resolution of its Council of Ministers. It warned that if the United Kingdom failed to crush the rebellion

by 15th December, 1965, the member states of the OAU would sever diplomatic relations with Britain from that date. But in the event, only nine of the thirty-six members of the OAU actually did so.

Another major crisis in the OAU that split the Organization in the subsequent years related to the so-called 'dialogue' with racist South Africa. In 1963, at the Addis Ababa Conference, the members of the OAU had committed themselves to a three-pronged programme to deal with the racist regime in South Africa, namely: to give material and financial support to the freedom fighters, to mount an economic boycott against the obnoxious regime; and to isolate the racist minority government culturally and politically. The Western powers including Japan, refused to support economic sanctions on South Africa where they possessed massive investments. Indeed, several members of the OAU, including Ivory Coast, maintained economic links with the Republic. Nor did the proposed political and cultural isolation meet with better luck. The spate of military coups which swept over the continent, the squabbles and intrigues within the liberation movements themselves and the African states fell behind on their contributions to the funds of the liberation movements—all those combined to divert attention from the Southern African situation.

Then came South African Prime Minister, John Vorster's call for a dialogue, for normalization of relations with African states willing to explore the possibilities of peaceful co-existence. Malawi, one of the OAU members had already, in 1967, established full diplomatic relations with South Africa. In Zambia and Tanzania, there were widespread fears of South Africa's plans, with the approval of Portugal, to invade their countries and flush out the freedom fighters operating from them. It was largely against this background that thirteen states in Central and East Africa met in Lusaka, Zambia from 14 to 16 April, 1969 to clarify their stand against colonialism and racism in Southern Africa. At the end of the conference they issued a statement, later known as the Lusaka Manifesto, which among other things declared:

> "On the objective of liberation.... We can neither surrender nor compromise. We have also preferred and still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than kill.... If peaceful progress

> to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistence movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change."[18]

The Lusaka Manifesto was endorsed by the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in September, 1969 and later by the United Nations. In 1970 (November), President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast formally launched the dialogue issue. He was promptly supported by a few OAU members,[19] who contended that African states lacked both the military and economic resources to challenge South Africa successfully, that the trade embargo against South Africa was bound to fail since powerful non-African states such as the U.S.A., Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan have maintained their trading links with South Africa and many African states themselves could not afford not to do so; and that the efforts of the national liberation movements have so far not been encouraging enough to warrant pinning all hope on them. They, therefore, believed that if the independent African states engaged in a dialogue with the South African regime—that is, diplomatic contacts and exchanges, the desired objective of changing apartheid might be achieved.

However, opponents of such a line of action maintained that there could be no meaningful dialogue which was not based on respect for human equality and dignity as stipulated in the Lusaka Manifesto. The dialogue issue nearly split the OAU until it was finally dealt with at the Addis Ababa Summit in June, 1971, where a Declaration on the Dialogue Question[20] was adopted by a majority of twenty-eight states. This Declaration denounced the call for detente as a maneuver by South Africa and its allies to divide Africa, confuse world opinion, rescue South Africa from international ostracism and *status quo* in South Africa.

With the collapse in 1974 of Protuguese colonial rule in Africa, the OAU began to reappraise its policy of Southern Africa. Independence in Mozambique appeared to have achieved what the Lusaka Manifesto could not. South Africa again indicated a willingness to talk on one subject, the basis of how, not whether, majority rule could come about in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In accordance with the Lusaka Manifesto the Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia

agreed to act as intermediaries with the Rhodesian nationalists while Vorster accepted a similar role in relation to the Smith regime. However, it soon became clear that Vorster's real intention was to use *detente* as a cover-up for apartheid. By appearing to be pushing Ian Smith to the conference table, Vorster hoped to win respectability and even gratitude both in and outside Africa. But as South Africans themselves reminded their leader, there was a missing link in his grand design of detente which nullified his efforts at least in Africa. As even a South African newspaper said, 'South Africa is ostracised not for her foreign policy, but for what she does internally. Domestic apartheid and discrimination offer a permanent affront to black people everywhere and the world is not willing to settle for a benign image marked "for export only". Since we must have peace in Southern Africa, we must have a change. It is still as simple as that'.[21]

At first the policy of detente raised high hopes of an early settlement in Rhodesia and of an early withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. There was optimism over changes within South Africa itself. All these hopes died almost as quickly as they were born. Barely six months after its introduction into the vocabulary of African diplomacy the term 'detente' was dismissed by the OAU as nonsense, a politically dirty word.[22]

In Angola the withdrawal of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975 was accompanied by a civil war, thanks to the damage caused by Portugal's colonial policy of divide and rule. The three disunited Angolan liberation movements, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, came together only for long enough to obtain agreement on a date for independence. Each of the warring sides in the struggle for power in Angola used all the various avenues at their disposal trying to bring victory to their own side. From September 1975, to the end of February 1976, the OAU was one of the foci of the struggle, but unfortunately, it proved to be one of the most ineffective organs ever designed to cope with such a crisis.[23] In fact, the Angolan crisis went out of the control of the OAU.

The story of OAU's involvement in Angola is full of contradictions and confusion. In 1964, Holden Roberto's GRAE—Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile—was recognized by the OAU. Seven years later the OAU reversed this verdict when MPLA was able to show active military presence in Angola. By 1972 two nationalist parties, FNLA and MPLA had been recognised each already battling for power.

The third political party, UNITA, was also claiming to be fighting for the liberation of Angola. Finally, in December 1974, OAU also recognized UNITA, maybe for having been ignored it for so long. But as Samora Machel rightly pointed out: 'In Angola, there are two parties in conflict: one on the side of imperialism with its allies and its puppets; on the other side, the progressive popular forces who support MPLA. That is the whole story'.[24] In spite of itself, the OAU had failed to bring unity among the warring factions. At its Kampala Summit in July 1975, the OAU did what was expected of it—making the most significant resolution which was supposed to bind the three parties together in essentially a type of government they had rejected—a government of national unity. The unfortunate selection of Idi Amin as the Chairman of the OAU that year further complicated matters. He came to handle the Angolan crisis; not for the sake of Angola or of "African Unity" but for the sake of the security of his own self. Moreover, in October 1975, the OAU Committee of Enquiry and Conciliation set up by the Kampala Summit, issued a thoroughly biased report. This report stated that UNITA had the support of most Angolans followed by FNLA and MPLA brought up the rear.[25] To the MPLA, this was once again the usual OAU manifestation of unreliability. Obviously, this report was designed to encourage and give false hopes to Savimbi and Roberto who continued to hope to defeat MPLA, and reflected the machinations of "imperialism".

The OAU's attempts at the formation of a Government of national unity was inevitably opposed by MPLA which was after all, in military control of the territory. MPLA was being attacked by South Africa and mercenaries. The United States was giving substantial military assistance to FNLA-UNITA through Zaire. The OAU proposal for a Peace-keeping force never materialised. The Russian and Cuban help to MPLA was well known. Attempts to influence the OAU on one side against the other became more manifest from both the Russians and the United States. Russia no doubt, hoped to forge a solidarity front among the "progressive" states of Africa such as Guinea, Somalia, Congo (Brazzaville) and others, while the Unites States canvassed the "conservatives" states such as Morocco, Ivory Coast, Zambia, Zaire, Senegal and others. The Angolan situation continued to deteriorate and the OAU continued to muddle. The OAU members were sharply split between the "progressives" and the "conservatives".

In the end an emergency session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government was summoned in January 1976 in Addis Ababa to discuss the problem. Half the OAU members insisted that the MPLA, led by Dr. Augustinho Neto, should be the sole ruler of Angola, while the other half demanded a government of national unity comprising all the three liberation movements. Many members also opposed the active support being given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Those who opposed a Marxist-oriented regime in Angola, which they feared might endanger their capitalist systems and connections, surprisingly forgot that Soviet military assistance was secured for Angola with the help of the OAU Liberation Committee. In short nothing was resolved by the OAU in the Angolan crisis. It only confirmed its tradition of ineffectiveness in dealing with political issues on the continent. Admittedly, because of its nature as a multinational organization, it faced problems peculiar to such organizations, but at that time the situation was worse. The OAU Special Summit did not even pass a resolution to condemn South Africa. The failure of the OAU to take a decision on the issue would seem to presage a coming era of ideological conflict and division among African states. The crisis was finally resolved with decisive military victory of MPLA on the battle ground. And the OAU accepted the *fait accompli* when on 11 February, 1976, it finally recognised the MPLA regime as the only legal government in Angola. And the scramble for power in Angola seemed to be over. The point made by an OAU observer would seem to be well justified; he wrote that; "Most organizations value the OAU as ... a remote uncle in the high heaven, the type who brings his blessings after one has adequately solved one's problem".[26]

Another major crisis which rocked the unity of the OAU and Africa in recent years relates to the Western Sahara issue. The deep ideological differences revealed by the Angolan crisis have not subsided over the years but have become even sharper as exemplified in the crisis over Western Sahara, now the 51st member of the OAU.

In the 1950s Morocco (independent in 1956) and Mauritania (independent in 1957), began to put claims over Western Sahara (a former Spanish colony) particularly after the discovery of large reserves of phosphates in the area. In 1967, the movement for the liberation of Sahara was born. From 1972, a more broad-based political organization known

as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqula al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) led the liberation struggle. However, while the Sahrawis were intensifying their armed struggle with the help of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania were reaching an agreement among themselves and with Spain for the partition of the territory on the withdrawal of Spain which occurred in February 1976. Thereupon the Provisional National Council of POLISARIO proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and intensified military operations against the Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation forces in the northern and southern borders respectively. The SADR also established a government-in-exile in Algeria in March, 1976. In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania agreed on the territorial partition of Western Sahara.

The Western Sahara issue was first taken up by the OAU at the 1975 Summit held at Port Louis. The OAU expressed support for the Saharan peoples' right to self-determination and also appealed to the POLISARIO and Morocco for a cessation of hostilities. Later in 1978 at the Khartoum (Sudan) Summit of the OAU an ad hoc committee—later to be known as the 'committee of wise men'—was formed. It included the Heads of State of Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Nigeria. In May, 1979, the committee members and the OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, visited Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria. In August 1979, Morocco's King Hassan proposed a summit conference of the parties involved and the ad hoc committee, which was held in December in Monrovia Liberia, and called for a cease-fire and a UN-supervised referendum.[27] At the 17th Summit of the OAU held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1980, no decision was taken on the issue of Western Sahara. Even when the OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, read out the list of nations which had recognised SADR, and it had become apparent that they had secured a simple majority of OAU members, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Ivory Coast and Senegal threatened to withdraw from the OAU if the POLISARIO were to be admitted. The issue was then referred back to the 'committee of wise men'.

AT the 18th Summit of the OAU held in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 1981, King Hassan of Morocco accepted a proposal for referendum in Western Sahara. However, ostensibly due to dispute over voters list and other issues, no action was taken. Matters came to a crisis at Addis Ababa during the 38th session of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in February

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1982. Prior to the meeting the OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo had written to the SADR confirming her admission to the OAU on the strength of the fact that it had been recognised by a simple majority of 26 OAU member states as stipulated by the OAU Charter. (Article XXVIII). This led to a walk out of 17 members led by Morocco from the meeting of the Council of Ministers. Other countries which joined Morocco included, Senegal, Zaire, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Niger, Tunisia, Mauritius, Gambia, Somalia, the Comoro Islands and Gabon, the "conservative" bloc in the OAU. The crisis spilled over to the proposed 19th Summit of the OAU scheduled for Tripoli, Libya, in August 1982. Despite repeated efforts the Summit could not take off as a result of lack of quorum. The non-attending member states clung on the admission of SADR as their excuse. The row over the representation of the strife-torn Chad also added to the crisis.[28] It was not until June 1983, after a change in venue to Addis Ababa and the 'voluntary and temporary' decision by the SADR not to take its seat, that the OAU was finally able to hold its 19th Summit. This Summit for the first time, named Morocco and POLISARIO as the parties in Western Sahara conflict and urged them to 'undertake direct negotiations' with a view to reaching an agreement on a cease-fire that would create conditions for peaceful and fair referendum in Western Sahara under the auspices of the UN and the OAU. The proposed referendum was to be conducted by December, 1983. King Hassan, however, continued to refuse to negotiate with POLISARIO. Many OAU members, including Nigeria, were indignant over Morocco's intransingence over the issue. It was under this background that the OAU decided to take the bull by the horn by admitting SADR as the 51st member of the organization at its 20th summit held in Addis Ababa in November (12-14), 1984. In protest, Morocco withdrew from the OAU and Zaire suspended its membership from the organization.

It is however, important to emphasise here that the admission of the SADR has not solved the problem of Western Sahara. The war in Western Sahara is still continuing as Morocco has not given up its own claims over the territory. Morocco's attitude can be seen as a form of imperialism, as the decolonisation of Western Sahara led to its recolonization. Until positive support to help the POLISARIO is given by

the OAU and African states against Moroccan Imperialism, the mere recognition or admission of SADR would be meaningless. It is also important to remember here that the force behind Morocco's action is the United Sates in pursuit of its containment policy in Africa. The United States regards POLISARIO as a Soviet-Libyan surrogate and its success may mean the fall of King Hassan II of Morocco, who is a loyal campfollower of Washington. This takes us to the question of imperialism in relation to the OAU and African Unity.

To understand the nature of forces that must be controlled in order to achieve unity in Africa it is important to examine the impact of imperialism on the continent. Western imperialism through its various phases—slavery, colonialism and the present day neo-colonialism, has had a most fundamental divisive effect on Africans. Almost everywhere in Africa, it had deleterian effects on the one hand, forcibly bringing diverse ethnic elements together within the same political unit, and on the other hand, erecting formidable barriers between territories under the control of different colonial powers, where some of the inhabitants on either side of the political boundary were members of the same ethnic group or tribe as in Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togoland, in Kenya, Somalia, Tanganyika, Nigeria and Benin, to mention only few examples.

The most far-reaching consequence of colonial imperialism in Africa, however, has been that, it made it possible for metropolitan powers of Europe to impose the stamp of their culture and civilization in all their various aspects upon the peoples of Africa. This brought about in many cases, serious cultural clashes and contradictions. The political map of Africa itself had been transformed by the imposition of new and alien boundaries. Moreover, with the division of Africa among the various European powers, the various political conflicts which divided these European powers in their own continent came to be projected upon Africa and the Africans. Africans were enlisted to fight European wars and thus, often against each other, while soldiers and police from different parts of the colonial empire or possession were employed to keep order in alien territory, especially during times of civil disorder.

Naturally enough, the metropolitan powers thought that the creation of several weak states in Africa would ensure their continued dependence on the colonizing powers for

economic aid and political support. In fact, the colonial powers prevented the unification process in some states and the consolidation of state system in Africa. The colonial powers were not in favour of any sort of unification or consolidation simply because it was not in their interest to do so. For, a united and homogeneous people would have constituted a threat to their colonial empires. Rather, what was practised was 'divide and rule' in order to prevent a common hostile front against their hegemony. This manifested itself in the infamous indirect rule system in the British colonial territories which laid great emphasis on ethnic or cultural groups, making it difficult for different groups to come together, know themselves and thus forge a unifying bond cutting across ethnic lines, cultural and religious divisions.[29]

The French (and the Portuguese) system of colonialism produced even more dangerous divisions in the African society. Their policy of assimilation which was designed to train very few Africans to become Black Frenchmen, and which invariably cut the assimilated off from the large masses of people who were outside the pale of French citizenship and French laws and education can have no other result than to create a deep division not only as regards status and wealth, but in thought and action between the 'assimilated' and the vast majority who were not. Besides, it ensured for the French that their interests would be well protected after their departure because the assimilated Black Frenchmen would continue to be mentally French and therefore would not be in a position to undertake new initiatives in the re-organization of the states of which they were, by virtue of their education and wealth, leaders.[30]

The colonial partition has also left Africa with intractable problems—problems arising from boundary disputes. The territories that were carved out by the Europeans completely ignored the realities of the situation. They cut across ethnic and cultural groups. In other words, African boundaries are completely artificial. As we have noted earlier, this is the major factor that is creating serious problems for the OAU today. The new African nations are fully conscious of the enormity of problems created by these boundaries and it was for this reason that the OAU in July 1964, at its first Summit in Cairo, passed a resolution that the boundaries as they were at independence should remain, as far as possible, inviolable.

There are two other legacies of European colonialism in

African which have posed and are posing serious problems to African unity. First is the way communication arrangements have been worked out. As would be expected each colonial territory was linked with the metropolitan powers rather than with the neighbouring territory. Also roads and railways were designed for the exclusive exploitation of each territory and to serve administrative conveniences of the colonial powers and nothing more. As a result, various African states continue to remain in solation of one another to a high degree. Contact is easier and cheaper with Europe than with neighbouring African countries and this helps to deepen further Africa's warped mental orientation. Instead of working together to solve common problems, Africans look forward to Europe for that solution. Moreover, lack of contact does not help in promoting unity which is very vital if the OAU is to be made effective and if Africa is to take her rightful place amongst other continents of the world.

Africans were also taught to believe in the inferiority of their culture and traditions. They were only given lower appointments even when they possessed similar (or higher) qualifications with Europeans. Everything came to be judged by the standard of Europe. Development efforts being made are designed to replicate Europe in Africa and not based on Africa's own realities, its history or tradition and its characteristics as a people—all of which constitute the true foundations on which any genuine development can be based. It is this mental colonialization and domination that continue to impel Africa to ceaselessly import ideas from outside; hence the proliferation of Western institutions and dominance of Western ideas and system of thought.[31]

Thus, through colonialism, imperialism has penetrated the fabric of African political, economic, social and cultural life. The multilateral nature of colonialism in Africa gave rise to a divergence of views on the political, economic and social development of African states. Again, as a consequence of colonialism the African states have come to acquire cultural, political and social differences which affected their outlook towards African unity.

The post-colonial period in Africa is characterized by pervasive underdevelopment which has serious implications for African unity. At independence a Westernised *petit bourgeois* class which inherited political power from the departing colonialists, having nó economic power, soon

started using the political power to build an economic base for themselves through the accumulation of wealth using the state apparatus. This drive to accumulate of wealth caused them to undermine the development efforts of the newly independent African states. Most African countries, with little or no resources to finance development projects, turned to their former colonizing powers for economic aid and political support. Through this and other means, the metropolitan powers exercise immense control and influence on the newly independent African states. This also curtailed the ability and political will of the African ruling classes to engage in a meaningful pan-African relationship.

Moreover, by the time of independence the structure of the colonial economy was already set and the new ruling class after independence could not effect a restructuring of the economy.[32] As President Nyerere of Tanzania has rightly pointed out, 'the reality of neo-colonialism quickly becomes obvious to a new African government which tries to act on economic matters in the interest of national development and for the betterment of its own masses. For such a government immediately discovers that it inherited power to make laws, to direct the civil service, to deal with foreign governments and so on, but it did not inherit effective power over economic developments in its own country. Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such thing as a national economy at all. Instead, there exist in its land various economic activities which are owned by people outside its jurisdiction, which are directed at external needs, and which are run in the interests of external economic powers.[33]

Also a close relationship exists between neo-colonialism and balkanization. As Kwame Nkrumah has pointed out, 'neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former larger united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable states which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial powers for defence and even internal security'.[34] The impact of balkanization on OAU's and Africa's search for unity can hardly be exaggerated.

The effect of neo-colonialism in the life of the OAU can be easily illustrated by examining the activities of the OAU in different fields. Perhaps, nowhere else is the imperialist and neo-colonialist domination of the OAU more clearly exposed than in matters relating to peace and security in Africa. In

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fact, it may be said that the question of intra-African conflicts concerns the neo-colonial phase of African struggle against imperialism. Obviously, with the political withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa and the installation of "independent" African governments, even the intra-imperialist conflicts and rivalry can now only be waged through these governments and against these governments. Thus, what may appear at first sight to be a purely a "territorial" dispute between African states (e.g. in Western Sahara) may only be a continuing struggle of the people against imperialism, now in its neo-colonial phase. What may appear to be a case of subversion (as in the Shaba province of Zaire in 1977-78) may again be a continuation of the old story in a new form. Therefore, one has to be careful when analysing intra-African disputes from their outward and formal appearances only.

In recent years Africa has become the main theatre of super power rivalry and competition. The super power intervention in Africa takes many overt and covert forms. The deployment of Moroccan troops to quel the Shaba rebellion is clearly a covert proxy intervention by Western imperialism—that is the use of troops of one African state in another African state, just as in the earlier decade, the United States used Thai and Philippino troops to fight its battles in another Asian state, Vietnam. The installation of a new government in the Comoro Islands by "Colonel Denard" and his band of mercenaries is another case of covert intervention by French imperialism in its neo-colonial phase. The South African mercenary attempt to overthrow the socialist government of President Albert Rene in Seychelles in 1981 also falls into the same category. Even the Nigerian civil war (1967-70) which at first sight appeared to be an ethnic war, was a war in which the super powers fought through proxies to protect or advance their own interests. The same is the case with the on-going war in Chad.

Undoubtedly, the impact of neo-colonialism on the activities of the OAU is more clearly evident in the area of Africa's economic development. Africa's possession of enormous wealth and natural and human resources contrasts sharply with the fact that today it is the poorest continent in the world. As a result of colonial pattern of development, Africa today consumes commodities which it does not produce and produces commodities which it does not consume.

Undoubtedly, one of the root causes of this situation is the development strategies pursued by African countries since independence. These externally derived strategies were aimed at rationalising the colonial patterns of production in Africa. It is clear that the overall conditions of neo-colonialism are the basis of the current underdevelopment and maldevelopment of Africa.

If the establishment of the OAU in 1963 signified a reaction against colonialism, the present crisis and struggle for its very survival is a reaction against the forces of neo-colonialism striving to disintegrate the continent and destroy the organization. The present neo-colonial phase of the struggle in Africa against domination and expolitation of the continent by imperialism is fraught with greater dangers and it is in this area that the bankruptcy ad impotency of the OAU have been more nakedly exposed. The present organisation of Africa into very small and largely non-viable states provides the most suitable climate for neo-colonialism. After over a quarter century of independence, the continent of Africa today finds itself, more than ever before, beset with grave economic and political threats which most seriously challenge the very existence of the OAU, the only existing vehicle of pan-African unity.

If maybe rightly asserted that the tragedy of Africa and the OAU today lies in the defect of pan-Africanism and the triumph of neo-colonialism on the continent. The spirit of pan-Africanism which led to the formation of the OAU in 1963 has disappeared. In a way it can be said that the formation of the OAU based on the unlimited sovereignty of the member states was a negation of genuine pan-Africanism. But perhaps nothing better was possible at the time. Undoubtedly the existing nation states in Africa, diverse as they are in size, resources dependent on external powers for their sustenance and differing much in ideological orientation, are not a suitable basis for a continental government. Besides, with few exceptions perhaps, the present leaders of Africa lack the will, vision, and commitment to achieve political unity. Most African regimes have become so involved in neo-colonial relationships with former metropolitan powers that continuing the relationships poses less immediate danger to the regime than changing the relationships. For some others, the vicious circle of poverty which led them to accept neo-colonial relationship in the first place has not proved amenable to solution.

Moreover, the legacy of European colonialism left Africa's new nations singularly ill-equipped to break out of the clutches of neo-colonialism.

The external relations of African states have also contributed to the situation. The English speaking African states belong to the Commonwealth of Nations while the Francophone AFrican States belong to the French Community. These associations affect both their domestic and external policies. The Lome Conventions (1975, 1980 and 1985) which now associate all the black African states with the European Community, an association which has political implications—also limit the role which the AFrican states can play in bringing about African unity.[35] Such neo-colonial associations render commitment to pan-Africanism ineffective.

For Africa the choice is clear: either to accept the place assigned to it by imperialism, i.e., that of a perpetual supplier of raw materials and labour to Europe and America, or to carve out a place for itself, a tenable and defensible place as one of the foremost world powers. The challenging task before Africa is to build a great, autarkic anti-imperialist continental state, one powerful enough to keep all intruders out, rich enough to bring prosperity to all its citizens, sane enough to restore wholesomeness to her culture and one whose health and brilliance will restore dignity to Africa's down-trodden masses.[36] Like the rest of the Third World, Africa has no other choice but to carry out autonomous development if it wishes to escape present and future subservience to others. As Russia, China and Japan have shown by their successful responses to western encroachments, autonomous development is the way to escape from the humiliations of western imperialism.

In other words, the choice for Africa is between pan-Africanism or neo-colonialism. It is clear that pan-Africanism as an ideal is still potent in order to seek solutions to the basic problems of the continent. When Kwame Nkrumah presented his project for continental unity in 1963, it seemed utopian. But it was a programme which was well suited to the real and long-term needs of the people of Africa. In some sense, the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action (1980)[37] has accepted this in principle. The Lagos Plan of Action rightly emphasises the need for regional and continental integration and the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000. It offers the entire continent an opportunity to seek its welfare through

wider fellowship rather than through the narrow confines of small non-viable communities which cannot of themselves promise much for their masses or undertake individually the task of building a modern society.

The OAU's perennial poor performance in the political, economic and other areas reflect the absence of effective co-operation among African peoples. This is undoubtedly because African leaders are not ready to surrender a little of their sovereignty in favour of a stronger Pan-African organization. The grater need of the day for Africa is to put a fresh soul into what has virtually become a scarecrow of an organization. The OAU is now the moribund victim of an outdated charter which by stressing states rather than the African peoples place self-defeating emphasis on Africa's illogical inheritance from the colonial past. That is the reason why for the past nearly a quarter of a century Africa has lived in contradictions, preaching unity while in reality reinforcing the chaotic absurdity of mini-sovereignties that plague the continent at a time when epoch making moves towards continental unity are taking place in other parts of the globe.

One cannot underestimate the complex problems that will have to be faced in any serious attempts to bring about the effective political and economic integration of Africa, be it on an outright continental scale or through the regional approach. The crucial issue in this respect is that of evolving the proper constitutional relationship between the OAU, as Africa's supreme political organ, and the individual African states, as member units. In other words, it is now a question of what aspect of their sovereignty African governments should surrender to the OAU as a necessary price to be paid to make it a viable instrument for Africa's political and economic integration. Therefore, if the OAU is to survive and prosper, it is essential that African leaders rethink and decide to invest the organization with the necessary means and mechanism. The present Charter and the style of functioning of the OAU need to be changed. As Julius Nyerere has pointed out:

> To wait for the time when there are no local differences, suspicions and hostilities, is to wait for ever. Like mindedness even on major economic and social questions among all African states is not likely to be achieved even after unity; it will never be achieved before. If we wait for that common approach, then Africa will never be united. We have to accept our differences and accommodate them. There is no other way.[38]

NOTES

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2. Rene Dumond, *False Start in Africa*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1966, p. 299.
3. John Stuart Mill, *The Representative Government*, 1961.
4. See J.K. Nyerere, *op. cit.*
5. Catherine Hoskyns, "Pan-Africanism and Integration, in A. Hazlewood, (ed.), *African Integration and Disintegration: Case STudies in Economic and Political Union*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 367.
6. See James Mayall, "African Unity and the OAU: The Place of Political Myth in African Diplomacy", *Yearbook of World Affairs*, London, 1973, pp 110-133.
7. See H.A. Asoble, "The Charter and Institutional Structure of the OAU 1963-1983: A Political Analysis", Nsukka, 1984, mimeo.
8. See James Mayall, op. cit.
9. For details see, K. Mathews, "The OAU and Neo-Colonialism in Africa", *The Non-Aligned World* (New Delhi), Vol. II, No. 2, April-June 1984, pp 222-242.
10. See H.A. Asoble, op. cit.
11. For details see, Ajala Adekunle, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects*, London, 1973; P.O. Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and the Movement*, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1980; Chimelu Chime, *Integration and Politics Among African States*, Uppsala, 1977 and V.B. Thompson, op. cit.
12. See Chimelu Chime, op. cit., pp 140-170.
13. *Ibid.*
14. See *Ibid.*, p. 164.
15. Quoted in Cervenka, Z., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*, London, Africa Books, 1977, p. 11.
16. For details see, H.A. Asoble, op. cit.
17. See *Ibid.*
18. See N.M. Shamuyarira, "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa", *The African Review*, Vol. I, March 1977.
19. They are: Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Swaziland and Upper Volta.

20. CM/st. (XVIII), On the dialogue debate see, Colin Legum, "Dialogue. The Great Debate", In Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 4, 1971-72, Rex Collings, 1972, pp 466-82.
21. Rand Daily Mail (South Africa) Editorial, 25 October 1975, quoted in Z. Cervenka, "The OAU and African Unity 1963-1976", *Tarikh*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1980, p. 51.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
23. For details see Fola Soremekun, *Angola: The Road to Independence*, Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press, 1983, pp 192-210.
24. *Afrique Asie*, 20 October 1975, quoted in Cervenka, op. cit., p. 55.
25. See Colin Legum, op. cit.
26. "OAU—A helpless peace-maker", *Afriscope*, January 1976, p. 46, Quoted in Soremekun, op. cit., p. 206.
27. For details see, Tony Hodges, "The Western Sahara File", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1974, pp 74-116.
28. See, M.A. Vogt, "Chad in Inter-state African Politics", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No, 142, 1981.
29. See G.O. Olusanya, "The Partition of Africa and its Effects on African State System", Paper delivered at the 6th Bi-Annual Conference of the African Association of Political Science, (AAPS), Addis Ababa, 13-15 May, 1985.
30. *Ibid.*
31. See Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us*, Nok Publishers, London, Lagos, 1978, especially pp 292-355.
32. For details see Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa*, London, Longman, 1981, especially pp 88-121.
33. J.K. Nyerere, "The Process of Liberation", Address to the Convocation of Ibadan University (Nigeria), 17 November, 1976. For text see, K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi (eds), *Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader*, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, 1981, pp 246-253.
34. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, London, Panaf, 1965, p. xiii.
35. See, K. Mathews, "A Political Economy of Africa-EEC Relations: A Case Study of the Lome Convention", Paper presented at the 6th Bi-Annual Conference of the AFrican Association of Political Science (AAPS), Africa Hall, ECA, Addis Ababa, 13-15 May, 1985.
36. See Chinweizu, op. cit., pp 491-92.
37. See OAU, *The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000.* Geneva, Institute of Labour Studies, 1981.
38. J.K. Nyerere, "A New Look at Conditions for Unity", in his *Freedom and Socialism*, Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam, London, 1968, p. 292.

Reforming Local Fiscal Apartheid In Zimbabwe*

ABHIJIT DATTA

At Independence In 1980 Zimbabwe inherited the Rhodesian form of apartheid which determined the framework of its local government structure and fiscal arrangements. The formative period of erstwhile Southern Rhodesia's racial seggregation coincides with its development by the British South Africa Company during 1898 to 1922. Once the basic ingredients of the policy of separate development of the separate races—mainly Europeans and Africans—was established, subsequent constitutional developments under the British Crown (1923-64) and under the illegal UDI-regime (1965-80) saw its continuation with lesser or harsher dosages of severity, depending on the political exigencies. After independence some of the overt forms of seggregation in local government have been abolished, but the essential inequities of the system persist. Our focus in the present paper is to highlight specific aspects of local fiscal apartheid in independent Zimbabwe and the manner by which these may be corrected.

The nature of Rhodesian apartheid relevant for local government has been succintly described in the following manner:

> Rhodesia's apartheid consisted in first defining people as belonging to distinct 'races'; secondly, forming laws which give different 'races' and different classes within

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each race, differential access to resources and means of production; thirdly (as an aspect of the differential access to resources), forcing a geographical, spatial differentiation of the races and their internal classes so that different people had different rights of residence, land ownership, house ownership and work, and different duties of tax and other payments according to the area in which they were forced to live; fourthly, adopting the principle that benefits from blacks should be financed by blacks. These aspects of Rhodesia's apartheid were implemented through establishing a multitude of entirely different local authorities each of which had different financial structures.[1]

There are basically two systems of local authorities in Zimbabwe viz., the detached system, originally meant for the European population and covering the urban areas, and the rural commercial areas; and the attached system, created for the native Africans residing in the rural communal land.

Under the *detached system*, there are urban councils created under the Urban Councils Act, 1973, and rural councils created under the Rural Councils Act, 1966. There are different types of urban councils for cities, municipal areas, towns, and townships with differential levels of autonomy in that order. The townships have a partially elected board with an appointed executive. The city and municipal councils enjoy similar powers and have separate personnel system. The town councils and one town board are served by a virtually unified personnel system with respect to its officers' cadre. The rural councils resemble their counterparts in the towns, except that their personnel belong to a separate system.

In both the urban and rural councils there are African townships called "high density areas" which are administered separately from the rest of the "low density areas" with differential system of taxation, application of traditional beer revenue and local community services. Local election is conducted on the basis of restricted franchise with only property owners and "occupiers" having voting rights. Institutional property owners exercise their franchise through their nominees so that a person may have more than one vote, one as an individual property owner and another as a respresentative of an institutional owner. Extension of voting rights to

the "occupiers": but not to lodgers, is a post-independent innovation.

In the *attached system* there are district councils created after independence under the District Councils Act, 1980, covering the former Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), and incorporating some of the African Purchase Areas (APAs) and the resettlement areas (within the large commercial farms). The district councils are in effect school districts for the communal areas; most important local functions, like, roads, cattle dipping, and water supply are provided directly by a central organisation, called the District Development Fund (DDF). The district administrator (DA) is the chief executive of the district council whose officers, including the school teachers, are borne on the central government pay-roll. The only tax leveled and ineffectively collected in the district councils is the development levy—some kind of a poll tax on each ablebodied person.

The urban and rural councils are supervised by the central government directly through its ministry of local government and town planning (LGTP) and these are not related in any way to the central field administration at the provinces and the districts; hence the term 'detached'. The district councils, on the other hand, are 'attached' to the central field administration in an organic sense and these operate only in residuary subjects where field administration does not extend. All its relations with the central government are organised through the field administration set-up, with the DA virtually overshadowing its elected council, formed on the basis of universal adult franchise.

The electoral principle under the detached and the attached systems of local government in Zimbabwe operates in a reverse gear to the degree of local autonomy—this is another manifestation of the continuation of apartheid existing in free Zimbabwe.

The revenue structure of local governments in Zimbabwe is presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Revenue Structure of Local Governments in Zimbabwe, 1981/82
(In Percentages)

	Urban Councils (Excluding Town Board)	*Rural Councils*	*District Councils*
I. *Local Taxes:*	20.3	29.5	0.1
— Rates/Unit Tax	7.9	24.6	—
— Supplementary Charges	12.4	4.9	—
— Poll Tax	—	—	0.1
II. *Non-tax Revenues:*	73.0	23.2	2.8
— Fees	6.4	14.4	1.0
— Licenses	4.0	1.0	0.4
— Rent	12.4	5.0	—
— Water Charges	11.8	0.7	—
— Beer Trading	28.2	0.1	1.4
— Interest	6.8	1.9	(••)
— Others	3.4	0.1	—
III. *Transfers:*	6.7	47.3	97.1
— Vehicle Tax	2.7	11.5	0.3
— Grants	4.0	35.8	96.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0

(••) Denotes Insignificant.

Source: Field data.

It may be seen from Table 1 that the urban councils largely depend on non-tax revenue for financing their services; on the other hand, the district councils rely almost exclusively on central subventions. The rural councils rely somewhat more on tax revenue than on non-tax sources and, contrary to popular belief, rely to a large extent on central transfers. The dependence on non-tax revenue by the European local

authorities is a South African phenomenon, while the African local authorities' dependence on central transfers is a typical British colonial experience in rural local government.

Within the urban councils, the contribution of the "high density" areas comes to about 41% (supplementary rates and beer trading), the rest of the revenue is derived from the "low density" areas and spent there. There situation seems somewhat different in the rural councils, where central grants largely pay for the upkeep of the "high density" areas. The situation in the district councils appears to be hopeless from the point of view of local autonomy. Amalgamation of the rural and district councils is on the reform agenda of the present government. Before we examine the fiscal implications of such a move, it may be useful to look into the local expenditure pattern.

Table 2 summarises the local government revenue expenditure in Zimbabwe.

TABLE 2

Pattern of Local Government Revenue Expenditure in Zimbabwe, 1981/82
(In Percentages)

	Urban Councils City and Municipal		*Towns*		*Rural Councils*		*District Councils*	
I. *General Services:*		17.4		71.2		33.6		4.2
— Administration	8.2		52.0		28.5		4.2	
— Loan Charges	9.2		19.2		5.1		—	
II. *Environmental Services:*		16.2		0.8		30.6		—
— Public Health	13.4		0.8		1.8		—	
— Roads	2.8		—		28.8		—	
III. *Property Services:*		15.3		8.2		4.7		0.4

Building	8.5		—		4.7		0.4	
— Parks & Gardens	1.4		—		—		—	
— Protection Force	1.6		—		—		—	
— Fire Services	0.8		—		—		—	
— Street Lighting	0.4		3.9		—		—	
— Refuse Removal	1.0		3.5		—		—	
— Other Property Services	1.6		0.8		—		—	
IV. *Social Services:*		44.3		9.4		29.3		95.4
— Education	0.2		—		15.5		91.5	
— Health	5.1		1.2		1.0		3.9	
— Amenities & Welfare	1.5		—		—		—	
to Institutions	0.1		0.4		(••)		(••)	
— Other Social Services	37.4		7.8		12.8		—	
V. *Water Services:*		6.8		10.4		1.8		—
— Water Supply	4.4		10.4		1.8		—	
— Sewerage	2.4		—		—		—	
		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0

(••) Denotes insignificant.

Source: Field data.

It will be seen from Table 2 that the urban councils perform a variety of local services, while the district councils are primarily concerned with education and some degree of health services financed from grants. Functionally speaking, the town councils and the rural councils are on the same footing, except for road expenditure for the latter; in both

these authorities the proportion of administrative expenditure seems very high. The urban councils have hardly any responsibility for education, in sharp contrast to the activities of the rural and district councils in this regard. Absence of most of the conventional local functions in the district councils is a reflection of direct central provision of these services through its field agencies or the DDF within the communal areas. Any amalgamation effort between the rural and the district councils must, therefore, affect central provision of local services in the communal and resettlement areas.

About 41% of the total African population lives within so-called European local authorities, viz. the urban and the rural councils. Here the dominant principle of local finance is the concept of self-financing whereby benefits for the Africans are recovered from them through supplementary charges and income from traditional beer. We have already seen that the African contribution comes to about 41% of the urban councils' revenue and the corresponding percentage for the rural councils is about 5%, with the central government providing the balance through grants. The self-financing principle works through the creation of a separate account called, "Housing Account: Local Government Areas" (LGA). This account relates to the revenue receipts and payments of the local authority with respect to its high-density areas (African townships) and in effect receives virtually no support from the general rates account.

> It accentuates the racial division in local government and puts the financial burden of housing on those least able to afford it, the African residents. A local authority is permitted to use its general funds to make up a deficit in the account, but this is not the practice. The remedy for a deficit is to raise the rents and charges.[2]

The main items of expenditure in the Housing Account: LGA are on water, electricity, refuse disposal, road, and sewerage services; while the main revenues are in the form of charges for these services and profits (or levy revenue) from traditional beer monopoly. Income from beer for financing welfare costs in the high density area is

> one of the most curious anachronisms thrown up by colonial history—the idea that the extent to which the state provides welfare services should depend to a great extent upon the consumption of beer by the people who

are to receive the services.[3]

While The European local authorities made sure that the African population paid their way, there was no corresponding effort to develop property taxation in the urban and rural councils. The urban authorities deliberately kept their tax rates low (around 2% of capital value in the cities) and opted for a composite system of valuation (separately valuing land and improvements), following the South African practice. The valuation itself is being infrequently revised and conducted by private valuers without any overall supervision by the central valuation office (CVO). The rural councils, by and large, have a flat area-based land tax, called "unit tax", with different rates for farming and ranching land. The incidence of such a crude land tax is extremely low and it does not promote efficient utilisation of agricultural land. Three of the 56 rural authorities have opted for rural rating, but the rates are deliberately pegged at a low level to yield revenue comparable to the unit tax.

The rate revenue, therefore, is not buoyant and is a declining proportion of local authority expenditure. On this evidence a suggestion has been made to replace it by an assured degree of central subvention on the Dutch pattern.

> The real reason for the inadequacy of the rate system in Rhodesia was in its political determinants. The absence of regular increases in rates arose not from the technical aspects of the system but from the fact that the politically dominant whites were determined not to increase their contributions.[4]

The 16 urban councils adopted two methods to make up the deficits in domestic rating: (a) by zoning commercial and industrial properties within the low-density areas and imposing a higher rate of tax on these properties, and (b) resorting to the levy of a wide range of fees and charges to pay for urban services, thus virtually preventing the access of the African population even to those services which are not property-related.

The 56 rural councils, on the other hand, had no such opportunity to make-up for the inadequacy of the land tax and they, therefore, pressurised the central government to give them a unit tax make-up grant (80%) upto a unit value of Z$ 40. Both the urban and rural councils are clamouring for revision of the base of an assigned tax on motor vehicle licensing. Extension of existing social services or assumption of new

social services, like primary education and primary health, by the European local authorities have always been through central assistance.

By and large, the refusal of these authorities to tax themselves is a continuation of the privileged status that the Europeans enjoyed by virtue of their control of these authorities through restricted franchise and their refusal to pay for any service to which the Africans would have access. After independence there is a 'one city' concept professed in the urban councils to bring about functional and areal integration among the races (now density patterns), but actual progress in this direction is inhibited by existing legal, accounting, and procedural obstacles built during the colonial regime.

Nearly 58% of the African population lives in areas within the 55 district councils comprising of the TTLs and APAs. These councils have virtually no domestic revenue, apart from income from traditional beer, and their only function seems to be extension of primary education at the behest of the central government. Important local functions within these communal and resettlement areas are provided directly by the central government, or through its agency, the DDF. Land is owned communally and it is difficult to introduce any land tax on a household basis. The existing poll tax for meeting development project costs within these areas is not collected regularly or in full. There is a possibility to introduce indirect taxes on grain and meat through the state-operated marketing boards, but these taxes must not discriminate the produce of the communal areas, as happened in the past. Dipping of cattle could be privatised where practicable, as in the rural councils; where this is not possible, the fee should be modest.

There is no escape from the fact that for quite some time to come the district councils need to be subsidised by the central government. However, the continuation of a dual system of local government in the rural areas must now end so that similar local services are available to everyone irrespective of racial and land-use considerations. In effect, therefore, a 'one district' concept has to be promoted through the amalgamation of the existing rural and district councils into a unified system of rural district councils. In the process there has to be substantial functional devolution to the new form of rural local government from the central government's field administration and by the abolition of the DDF. Also, the

existing unit tax in the rural councils needs to be replaced by rural rates to ensure a modicum of local revenue base. The grant system also needs rationalisation so that this is progressively reduced. The composition of general to specific grants also needs modification from the angle of a balanced distribution of local and central priorities in local services. In Table 3 we present the budget of an illustrative rural district council by combining the budgets of a rural council and its adjoining district council as it would look now and after five years of their amalgamation.

During the heyday of the UDI-regime a reorganisation of the greater Salisbury (now Harare) urban region took place in 1978 to incorporate several African townships within an expanded city jurisdiction. At the same time, an existing African township (St. Mary's) of the Salisbury city council was separated and joined with a suburban African township (Seke), its overspill industrial area in Salisbury (Seki Industrial area), and a communal area (Zengeza) within the Salisbury administrative district to the Chitungwiza town board (now council). Chitungwiza is the third largest urban centre in Zimbabwe, but for all practical purposes it is a low-income suburb of Harare, with 80% of its working population commuting to the city for employment. The town consists of only high-density residential population with a small industrial area, having little prospect of extension of rating. It has no rateable revenue and has to rely on beer income, supplementary charges, and general subvention to meet the cost of local services. Most of its revenue is spent on administration, loan charges, and water subsidy.

Chitungwiza's fiscal problem is structural in nature and arises out of its separation from its economic and geographical linkages with the core city. A rating equalisation between Harare and Chitungwiza is not practicable due to under-taxation of the low-density areas in Harare. Chitungwiza has to rely on central subventions till its rateable base is strengthened through central action in industrial relocation and provision of a rail link with Harare for goods transportation.

After-Independence, a major power house was located near the Wankie colliery by the Central Electricity Commission (CEC)—a central parastatal. In order to provide for residential accommodation for the power house staff and to develop the area on a planned basis, the Hwange township

was created with two African townships in its midst. Hwange has the sixth largest urban concentration in the country with no rateable area to sustain itself. Like Chitungwiza, it relies on supplementary tax, beer profits and central subventions to meet its expenditure needs. A long-term solution to Hwange's fiscal problem lies in its incorporation of the private township of the Wankie colliery and the power house properties.

Local authorities in Zimbabwe have wide discretion in the matter of choice of tax base and rate fixation in property taxes. There are five permissible methods of rating: (i) on unimproved or improved value of land, (ii) on value of improvements, (iii) flat rating (on combined value of land and improvements), (iv) composite rating (involving separate rates on land and buildings, with usually a higher rate on land), and (v) differential rating (with rate levels relating to a classification of property). In Zimbabwe, the urban councils have adopted the composite, but differential, rating; while only three rural councils have chosen to tax the unimproved value of land. No other country, except South Africa, permits such a wide choice for rating exercised by the local authorities. There is a need for adoption of flat rating for the urban councils for revenue reasons. Also the differentiation between urban and rural district councils needs to be based on precise indicators of urbanisation which will permit uniformity of rating practices among the urban and rural district authorities respectively.

The second area where somewhat drastic reforms are called for concerns valuation. There is a strong case for strengthening the existing CVO to emerge as the valuation authority for real property in respect of all taxes (local and central) and compensation matters for land acquisition. CVO could function under the LGTP instead of the ministry of construction as at present. For the time being rural rating could be done on the basis of valuation by the CVO by replacing the existing unit tax. Urban rating could still be allowed on private valuations provided the CVO approves the panel of valuers and cross-checks their work. There is also a need to prepare a manual on valuation by the CVO so that different valuers function within a prescribed central guideline.

The third area where property tax needs improvement is the level of rating. There are wide variations in rating levels with the cities having very low rate (2%) and the towns with high rates (9%). On the other hand, there does not seem to be

investors' preference for land in the cities and distress selling of land in the towns. The differences in rating level thus reflect differential valuation standards adopted. With improvements in valuation a minimum rating level, say 5%, may be prescribed to force the local authorities to utilise the only available tax base.

Supplementary charges are analogous to rates in the high density areas. The amount payable is not related to property value, but to the deficit in local expenditure in these areas and apportioned among the occupiers on the basis of floor area. The water levy, sewerage charges, and refuse removal charges in the high density areas are also apportioned in the same manner instead of relating these to indicators of use. In effect, therefore, the supplementary charges and service charges in the high density areas are analogous to a hut tax in the high density areas and their total per capita incidence appears to be higher than normal rating in the low density areas. The reason for desisting from rating property in the high density areas is the fear of loss of revenue, although from an equity angle such a move seems urgently called for.

The low density areas are subjected to separate service charges for water, sewerage, and refusal removal. Universal metering may not be worthwhile, from an economic angle, in Zimbabwe so that with universalisation of rating the service charges also could be linked with property valuation as proxies for user-indicators.

As for other types of fees, there is a need for the adoption of the principle of *quid pro quo* so that fees are not used as disguised taxes. Many of the minor fees may be abolished in the process; this will not only simplify the administration of the fee-linked services, but also ensure their improved access to all the local inhabitants. Unlike other third world countries, in Zimbabwe local-level fee income needs reduction, not perpetuation or encouragement.

As indicated earlier, in Zimbabwe local authorities enjoy monopoly on the sale of traditional beer. In practice, most of the local authorities have contracted out the right to private producers on payment of a beer levy. Since 1982, however, the central government has imposed excise and sale taxes on traditional beer and, at the same time, imposed control over its retail sale price. The combined effect of these moves has been that the local revenue on this account has been drastically reduced. While application of beer revenue for the

welfare of high-density areas needs to end, central appropriation of beer revenue would ultimately create transfer problems to the local authorities to unmanageable proportions. Also *inter se* allocation of such transfers would complicate the existing fiscal relations, especially for the urban authorities. The sensible option here seems to be to freeze central taxation on traditional beer and abolition of price control on its retail price.

As indicated earlier, the existing grants system—both general and specific—needs rationalisation such that: (a) the future rural districts receive a deficiency grant, (b) the total volume of transfers to the rural districts to be aimed at may be put at 2:3; and (d) the urban councils should expect only assigned revenue and function-specific grants from the central government.

All local authorities must accept conditionalities with respect to their tax targets and expenditure commitments when these are recipients of deficiency grant. Apart from the future rural districts, a few urban authorities, with structurally deficient revenue bases, would come under this category. For the rest, the control mechanisms have to be somewhat general and broad-based, like valuation control, fixation of minimum tax rate, guideline on service charges, maintenance of a minimum closing balance etc.

With the onset of planning there is bound to be closer fiscal integration between the local and central government. Rationalisation and specification of development assistance also have to be related to an agreed level of local tax efforts and expenditure obligations. Financing of non-remunerative projects would call for increased allocation of capital grants-cum-soft loan packages. Many of these issues lie in the future when the current 5-Year Plan comes into operation. but advance thinking needs to be initiated now so that there is a relationship between current operations and development activities by the local authorities. A properly designed transfer system to the local authorities needs to be installed and periodically reviewed through an independent body, like a Local Government Finance Commission.

The foegoing account of the system of local government and its financing in Zimbabwe suggests that the central government has to initiate a bold and sustained policy of integration of local government across density and areal boundaries such that the majority of the African population (96%

of the total) is in a position to take decisions on raising of local revenue and its allocation among the local population equitably and adequately.

Unlike most countries in the third world, local government in Zimbabwe is fairly important in relation to the central government. In 1981/82 local government handled about 29% of the total government expenditure and about 24% of total government capital formation. Most of it was generated within the socalled European local government. Future central policy in this context has to be designed in such a way that the management of this vital government sector passes into African hands. In the process, the rural local government system would be strengthened first to increase its relative importance. On the other hand, the urban local government would have to be subjected to far greater control and supervision to ensure intra-local equity. In both these efforts the relative balance of power would shift towards the centre at the cost of "autonomy" of the European local government system. There are indications that the central government is keen to bring about reorganisation to the rural local government through a unified system of rural district councils, but so far there is no indication that the equally urgent urban local government issues are included in the reform agenda of the central government.

References

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TABLE 3

Revenue Budget of an Illustrative Rural District Council: 1985/86 and 1990/91
(Z$ Thousands)

Income				*Expenditure*			
Items	*1985/86 (%)*	*1990/91 (%)*	*Increase (%)*	*Items (%)*	*1985/86 (%)*	*1990/91 (%)*	*Increase (%)*
1. Unit Tax/Rural Rates	50(2.3)	300(7.1)	600	1. Administrtion	107(4.9)	378(9.0)	353
2. Fees & Licenses	302(13.6)	350(8.3)	116	2. Loan Charges	3(0.1)	38(0.9)	127
3. Other Domestic Revenue	29(1.3)	30(0.7)	103	3. Building Maintenance	72(3.3)	150(3.5)	208
4. Vehicle Fee	40(1.8)	50(1.2)	125	4. Roads	8(0.4)	400(9.5)	5000
5. Specific Grants	1732(78.0)	2600(61.7)	150	5. Education	1608(73.8)	2200(52.2)	137
6. General/Deficiency Grant	66(3.0)	886(21.0)	1342	6. Health	60(2.8)	450(10.7)	750
				7. Water Supply	3(0.1)	250(5.9)	8333
				8. Others	318(14.6)	350(8.3)	110
	2219(100)	4216(100)	190		2179(100)	4216(100)	193

Source: Field data.

Assumptions: (1) Until tax will be replaced by rates; valuation will improve, rate level will increase resulting in higher revenues. (2) No changes are expected in non-tax revenues and vehicle fees. (3) Specific grants will be available for education and health; deficiency grant will cover increased expenditure on roads, water supply and loan charges fully, and the net increase in expenditure on administration substantially. (4) Net increase in central transfer for deficiency grant will be small (20%), as this will include DDF allocations. (5) Education expenditure will be pegged at current per capita level, but will have to accommodate increased envolvement due to population increase. (6) Roads and water supply will be introduced in the communal areas by taking over the DDF functions. (7) Health services will be introduced. (8) Building maintenance expenditure and loan charges will increase to cater to new functional responsibilities and new works programmes.

Population and Economic Growth and Welfare in Africa[1]

JAMES D. TARVER

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between population and economic growth and welfare in the African countries since 1950, recognizing that associations between population change and economic development cannot be stated simply. For example, there are demographic impacts upon economic development as well as the effects of economic growth upon population change, resulting in various complex interactions (Cassen, 1976 and McNicoll, 1982).

A review of the literature reveals no systematic, uniform relationship of population growth and economic growth as studies have generally reported inconclusive, inconsistent findings (United Nations, 1973). Robinson, for instance, states that historically it is impossible to make any generalizations as to whether economic growth stimulates population growth or whether population growth stimulates the growth of wealth (Robinson, 1960). Previous investigations of African countries indicated taht high rates of population growth were likely to hinder economic growth in the short run (UN, LCA, 1968, 1969, 1971). Kuznets found no significant effect of population growth on the rate of increase of per capita income in developing countries (Kuznets, 1967). Easterlin, in a study of developing countries, found little evidence of any significant association between the growth rates of per capita income and population (Easterlin, 1967).

Obviously, population and economic growth are not independent of each other and their relationship varies over time and place. Therefore, it was considered worthwhile to test their association throughout the 30-year period for which rather reliable data were available for most African countries.

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In this study nonagricultural income at constant prices in each country's currency was selected as the measure of economic growth. Income from agriculture was excluded because the majority of the farms in Africa are traditional subsistence enterprises and agricultural income estimates are rather tenuous.[2] The concept of nonagricultural economic growth employed is the Gross Domestic Product at factor cost in constant figures. This measure includes all production within the country, it excludes inflation, net indirect taxes, and it also excludes the entire agricultural subsistence sector. Apparently, its only weakness is that it excludes economic growth from within the agricultural sector which has been negligible for subsistence farms which constitute by far the largest number.

Private consumption in constant prices was employed as the measure of economic welfare as it is an indicator of people's spending power and reflects their personal disposable income. The concept of economic welfare used in the study is that of private consumption expressed in the Gross National Product at factor cost in constant prices. The Gross National Product includes payments from abroad to residents, such as migrant worker's remittances. However, it excludes payments to foreigners such as profits earned by foreign companies and the earnings of short-term expatriates.

The population estimates for each African country as well as the nonagricultural income and private consumption estimates employed in the analysis were prepared by the World Bank (The World Bank, 1983). The period studied was from 1950 through 1981. Nonagricultural income estimates were available for 44 of the 55 African countries and private consumption estimates were available for 47 countries every fifth year from 1950 to 1970, then for each year thereafter. Reported income and private consumption data of each country were used for each year between 1950 and 1981 in this study.

The procedure followed in this study to test for the significance of the relationship between population and economic growth and population and economic welfare was to compute simple coefficients of correlation for the time series for which data were reported for each country. Specifically, the correlation between population and both total and per capita nonagricultural income each year for which the data were reported for each country was calculated.

Every correlation coefficient large enough to be significant at the five per cent level was considered statistically significant.

The population of Africa and most of the 55 individual countries more than doubled between 1950 and 1980 despite the unstable political, social, and economic climate that prevailed (Tarver and Miller, 1986). It was during this period that the African nations obtained their independence from the European colonial powers. Libya, under British and French military rule, was the first colony to obtain its independence in 1951. Morocco and Tunisia followed with their independence from France in 1956 and most other Francophone colonies achieved their independence in the 1960's. After more than 300 years European colonialism finally ended in Africa in 1980 when Zimbabwe obtained its independence from Great Britain.

After independence most African countries experienced periods of instability and hardship. For example, the Congo practically disintegrated shortly after its independence and was saved only by United Nations military intervention. In Uganda, General Idi Amin came to power in 1971 by a coup, established a dictatorship, and was responsible for the death of an estimated 100,000 persons (Fieldhouse, 1982). Equatorial Guinea was also quite bloody. There, an estimated 50,000 persons were murdered during President Francisco Macias Nguema's 11 years in office (Lamb, 1985). In fact, there are but few African countries that have not suffered political coups in their short post-independence days (McGowan and Johnson, 1984). Obviously, political oppression forced millions from their homes in Africa, for in 1975 there was an estimated 1.2 million refugees outside their home country, with 460,000 Angolans in Zaire (Heisel, 1982). By 1980 Africa had more refugees than any other major region of the world, over 3 million. More than a million Ethiopian refugees were in Somalia and half a million in Sudan. By the beginning of 1981 the number of refugees and displaced persons had risen to well over 6 million (UN, 1982). These patterns of political struggles for power, violence, and oppression were certainly not conducive to population and economic growth, even though exceptionally large increases in the number of inhabitants occurred as a result of high birth rates and marked declines in mortality, especially infant mortality.

The large population gains in Africa during 1950-80 were not the result of a demographic transition associated with an

Industrial Revolution like that which began in England in the late eighteenth century. Rather, they were due mainly to the application of bio-medical and scientific agricultural discoveries in the industrialized nations to combat disease and famine. With birth rates remaining high, the sudden declines in mortality led to rapid population growth. Obviously, such large population increases had many significant impacts upon economic development in the different countries of Africa.

Growth rates of the total Gross Domestic Product in Africa have steadily declined since 1960. During 1960-73 the estimated average annual percentage change in the total GDP was 3.5, which fell to 2.1 per cent in 1973-1979, to 1.3 per cent in 1980, then to 1.2 per cent in 1981 (The World Bank, 1984). Similarly, the rate of growth in the per capita GDP declined from an average annual percentage change of 1.0 per cent in 1960-73 to—1.0 per cent in 1973-79, then to—1.6 per cent in 1980-85. These estimates, of course, apply to the total GDP, not to the nonagricultural GDP which is employed as the measure of economic growth in this study.

In examining the relationship of population change and economic growth the association of population and total nonagricultural income will be considered first followed by a consideration of the association of population and per capita nonagricultural income.

Generally, the total nonagricultural income in constant prices of most African countries rose during this period although there are exceptions. For example, the nonagricultural income of Angola peaked in 1973, fell to less than half in 1975, and has remained somewhat constant since due to instability and unrest. Chad's nonagricultural income reached its highest value in 1977, then fell sharply to less than 40 per cent of its peak. Obviously, unsettled conditions in that country is one of the major reasons for the decline. Other countries such as Zaire, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana, Gambia, the Central African Republic, Mali, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal have generally experienced irregular declines in nonagricultural income since the mid or late 1970's. And in a few countries like Madagascar and Zambia nonagricultural income in constant prices remained at about the same level throughout the period. Nevertheless, on the whole, the prevailing pattern was an increase in total nonagricultural income in constant prices in the ma-

jority of the countries.

In 39 of the 44 African countries with reported nonagricultural income population growth and nonagricultural income were positively related, with 33 of the simple correlation coefficients significant at the five per cent level (Table 1). Moreover, these relationships are very strong or high as 24 of the coefficients of correlation were .90 or higher. Thus, on the whole, population growth was highly related to growth in total GDP nonagricultural income during this period.

In Angola, Chad, Uganda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire population growth was accompanied by declining nonagricultural income. However, none of the coefficients of correlation were large enough to be significant at the five per cent level. During this time generally the population increased very slowly in each of these countries. Nevertheless, Angola differs from the others in that both its agricultural and nonagricultural income declined about half since 1973 due, in part, to political unrest and instability. In Chad, Uganda, and Zaire income from agriculture was somewhat constant but nonagricultural income dropped, especially in Chad where the 1981 figure was less than 40 per cent of the 1977 peak value The decline in nonagricultural income in Uganda since 1971 When General Amin came to power and in Zaire since 1974 has been less drastic. Both agricultural and nonagricultural income fell rather steadily in Sao Tome and Principe until the mid 1970's, then increased thereafter.

In 30 of the 44 countries population growth and per capita nonagricultural income were positively associated, with 27 of the simple correlation coefficients significant at the five per cent level (Table 1). Only in Malawi, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe were the relationships statistically insignificant. In 11 of these 30 countries the simple correlation coefficients were quite high, being .90 and over.

On the other hand, average nonagricultural income was negatively related to population growth in 14 of Africa's 44 countries, with eight of the 14 simple correlation coefficients being significant at the five per cent level. Population growth was associated with substantial declines in per capital nonagricultural income in Ghana, Zambia, Madagascar, Uganda, and Zaire.

The trends in private consumption in constant prices of the African countries resemble those for nonagricultural income in many respects. Most countries experienced in-

creases although a few did not. The total value of private consumption fluctuated in Cape Verde, Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe but remained practically constant throughout. Since 1973 private consumption fell about 40 per cent in Angola and after 1978 it dropped over a third in Chad. Somewhat irregular declines occurred in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, The Republic of South Africa, Zaire, and Zimbabwe beginning around the mid 1970's and declines starting in the late 1970's took place in Uganda, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Lesotho, Gambia, and Senegal.

In 44 of the 47 countries in Africa with reported private consumption figures population growth and total private consumption were positively related with 39 of the simple correlation coefficients being significant at the five per cent level (Table 2). For twenty of the countries the simple correlation coefficients were at least .95 and for seven other countries the simple correlation coefficients were .90 and over. Hence, population growth was highly related to growth in GNP private consumption.

Only in Angola, Chad, and Guinea-Bissau did population growth occur while total private consumption in constant prices declined, with Guinea-Bissau being the only country in which the simple correlation coefficient was significant at the five per cent level. Angola experiences the most drastic decline in private consumption of all countries, dropping almost 50 per cent between 1974 and 1975 and its GDP nonagricultural income dropped about the same way. Both nonagricultural income and private consumption have remained somewhat constant since 1975. Chad's decline in both economic growth and economic welfare occurred in 1979 and has continued since. However, nonagricultural income dropped more sharply than did private consumption. In Guinea-Bissau the peak value of private consumption occurred in 1974 and declind each successive year until 1980 when an upturn took place.

The total value of private consumption in constant prices was closely related to population growth in the countries of Africa during the period of the study. Although there is generally a positive relationship between per capita private consumption and population growth it is not as high as with the total value of private consumption. For example, in 32 of the 47 countries with reported private consumption figures population growth and per capita private consumption were

positively associated, with 22 of the simple correlation coefficients being significant at the five per cent level (Table 2). In the other 15 countries there was a negative relationship between population growth and per capita private consumption with six of the correlation coefficients being significant at the five per cent level. Therefore, the average personal disposable income of the 15 countries declined as the population increased and the declines in six countries were significant.

Of the 32 countries in which per capita private consumption was positively related to population, the simple correlation coefficients were .80 or over in half of these countries (Table 2). For example, in Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malawi, Tanzania, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Lesotho the correlation coefficients were .90 or greater. And, the simple coefficients of correlation were .80 or more in Libya, Togo, Tunisia, Nigeria, Mali, Burundi, and Swaziland.

In the other 15 African countries, per capita private consumption fell as population growth occurred. The negative correlation coefficients were significant for Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, and the Congo (Table 2).

The major objective of this paper was to determine the relationship of population change and economic growth and population change and growth in economic welfare in the African countries since 1950. Simple correlation coefficients were computed for the time series of data reported for each country to test the relationships statistically.

During the approximately 30-year period the population of most African countries doubled. This rapid population growth not only increased the total size of the population but greatly enlarged the number of relatively young children who require large expenditures for education, health, and other costs of rearing. However, in most countries relatively large increases also occurred in the total value of nonagricultural income and in private consumption to offset the rapid population gains. As a result, there tended to be a positive association between population growth and per capita economic growth and between population growth and per capita growth in economic welfare, with the relationship between population and economic growth being somewhat stronger than that for population growth and growth in economic welfare. Overall, about two-thirds of the countries had positive relationships and about a third negative relationships on a per capita basis.

In 27 of the 44 countries there was a significant positive relationship between population growth and growth in per capita nonagricultural income. For eight other countries there was a significant negative association. Accordingly, these results show that economic growth was accompanied by population growth in about 60 per cent of the countries during the period of study.

For per capita private consumption or average personal disposable income, the association with population was not as high, for in 22 of the 47 countries or about 45 per cent of them, there was a significant positive relationship between population and per capita economic welfare. On the other hand, there were significant negative relationships in six of the countries.

Clearly, many factors stimulated economic growth in different African countries and other factors led to stagnation in some countries. The policies of individual governments obviously played crucial roles. In addition, this study highlights the underlying importance of political stability in economic development. For example, Botswana, Morocco, and Egypt had rather stable political and social conditions throughout the thirty years and economic growth as well as growth in economic welfare were very closely related to population growth. In contrast, Ghana, Angola, and Chad, particularly, have experienced marked instability and unrest. In each of these three countries, population growth was accompanied by declining per capita nonagricultural income as well as declining per capita private consumption. Each of these three countries, along with a number of others, have a long history of political strife which definitely has hindered economic development and resulted in actual declines in per capita personal disposable income.

1. The research undertaken in this study was supported by the Research and Publications Committee, University of Botswana, under grant number 10-10-00-179.

2. Since it is practically impossible to estimate subsistence production usually an estimate of subsistence income per capita is multiplied by the number of persons enumerated or estimated in a country to obtain an estimate of its total value. When a large majority of the population lives in subsistence agriculture like in the African countries, population data enter for a substantial proportion to the Gross Domestic Product. For this reason nonagricultural income was selected as the index of economic growth and not the total Gross Doemstic Product.

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TABLE 1

Correlation Coefficients of Population and Nonagricultural Income For African Countries for all Years in which Data were available during 1950-81

	Simple Correlation Coefficients	
Country	*Population and Total Nonagricultural Income*	*Population and Per Capita Nonagricultural Income*
Algeria	.87	.68
Angola	−.27[1]	−.56
Benin	.97	.77
Botswana	.98	.99
Burundi	.95	.88
Cameroon	.93	.90
Central Afr. Rep.	.84	−.00[1]
Chad	−.52[1]	−.70
Congo	.95	.85
Egypt	.98	.92
Ethiopia	.88	.60
Gambia	.94	.99
Ghana	.41[1]	−.93
Guinea	.99	.98
Guinea-Bissau	.97	.91
Ivory Coast	.99	.76
Kenya	.98	.88
Lesotho	.87	.79
Liberia	.27[1]	−.72

Table 1. (Contd.)

Country	*Population and Total Nonagricultural Income*	*Population and Per Capita Nonagricultural Income*
Libya	.73	−.11[1]
Madagascar	.30[1]	−.87
Malawi	.99	.00[1]
Mali	.74	.57
Mauritania	.85	.51
Mauritius	.95	.92
Morocco	.97	.93
Mozambique	.15[1]	−.46[1]
Niger	.91	.69
Nigeria	.96	.93
Rwanda	.26[1]	.22[1]
Sao Tome & Principe	−.38	−.54
Senegal	.90	−.38[1]
Sierra Leone	.89	−.16[1]
Somalia	.96	.79
Sudan	.93	.84
Swaziland	.98	.89
Tanzania	.97	.79
Togo	.97	.86
Tunisia	.99	.99
Uganda	−.38[1]	−.86
Upper Volta[2]	.98	.98
Zaire	−.36[1]	−.81

Table 1. (Contd.)

Country	*Population and Total Nonagricultural Income*	*Population and Per Capita Nonagricultural Income*
Zambia	.07[1]	−.89
Zimbabwe	.78	.15[1]

[1] Not significant at the five per cent level.

[2] Name of this country has been changed to Burkina Faso.

TABLE 2

Correlation Coefficients of Population and Private Consumption, For African Countries for all Years in which Data were available during 1950-81

	Simple Correlation Coefficients	
Country	*Population and Total Private Consumption*	*Population and Per Capita Private Consumption*
Algeria	.95	.92
Angola	−.27[1]	−.68
Benin	.94	−.30[1]
Botswana	.98	.97
Burundi	.96	.83
Cameroon	.93	.11[1]
Cape Verda	.58[1]	−.07[1]
Central Afr. Rep.	.77	−.18[1]
Chad	−.01[1]	−.08[1]
Congo	.68	−.60
Egypt	.96	.95
Ethiopia	.99	.97
Gabon	.96	.97
Gambia	.80	.39[1]
Ghana	.78[1]	−.79
Guinea	.33[1]	−.36[1]
Guinea-Bissau	−.73	−.96
Ivory Coast	.98	.23[1]
Kenya	.97	.68
Lesotho	.95	.92

Table 2. (Contd.)

Country	*Population and Total Private Consumption*	*Population and Per Capita Private Consumption*
Liberia	.76	−.29[1]
Libya	.99	−.89
Madagascar	.61	−.86
Malawi	.99	.97
Mali	.97	.84
Mauritania	.94	.42[1]
Mauritius	.85	.73
Morocco	.99	.95
Mozambique	.37[1]	−.61
Niger	.54	−.48[1]
Nigeria	.95	.85
Rwanda	.96	.52
Sao Tome & Principe	.17[1]	.11
Senegal	.93	.15[1]
Sierra Leone	.98	−.75
Somalia	.96	−.24[1]
South Africa	.98	.50
Sudan	.93	.24[1]
Swaziland	.89	.81
Tanzania	.99	.97
Togo	.89	.87
Tunisia	.99	.86
Uganda	.89	.26[1]

Table 2. (Contd.)

Country	*Population and Total Private Consumption*	*Population and Per Capita Private Consumption*
Upper Volta[2]	.92	.76
Zaire	.11[1]	−.21[1]
Zambia	.93	.24[1]
Zimbabwe	.61	−.14[1]

[1] Not significant at the five per cent level.

[2] Name of this country has been changed to Burkina Faso.

Western Sahara: Suffering A Stalemate

SURINDER K. DATTA

At the fag-end of 1985 the Saharawis had called an international conference in Paris to draw urgent attention, especially European, to their cause and to the need for a lasting and honourable peace in the Maghreb which is only possible if Morocco, the other party to the dispute—rather the occupational power—were to honourably stick to its commitment to hold a fair and just referendum under UN and OAU auspices.

But the question arises: Will there be a referendum? All parties to the 11-year-old war for the western Sahara have agreed that the best way to settle the dispute is by a referendum in the territory. The Polisario should welcome it. But the Moroccan King does not seem to be serious in submitting the territory's fate to a vote of its people. As for the referendum, the king declared recently "The people do not want one".

Possibly the stalemate brought about on the war front by the construction of a 900-mile sandwall suits the king who can now hold what matters of the desert waste he tucked to his kingdom when Spain left the territory in 1975.

Moreover, there are obvious attempts on the part of Morocco to thoroughly confuse the issue. Not only by bringing in new 'facts', now a well-known ploy of occupation, but raising 'elementary' confusion like who is a western Saharan?

The only time the western Saharans were counted was in 1974, when a Spanish census came up with a figure of 73,420. But these were mostly people who worked with the Spanish and carried Spanish identity cards. Around 1960 Spain claimed that the Sahrawis numbered only 45,000—a ridiculously

falling progression. Algeria and the Polisario say that in the refugee camps of Tindouf alone, the Algerian town near the border, there are 165,000 Saharans. The Moroccans accept that there are 125,000 people in camps in Algeria but allege that most of them are nomads who fled from the drought in Mali and Mauritania and were press-ganged into Polisario.

The king has brought a lot of immigrants into the Western Sahara from Morocco proper. Most of the 100,000 inhabitants of the territory's capital, El Ayoun are probably newcomers. So are most of Dakhla's 25,000. Should they be allowed to vote?

It may be pointed out that most of the people brought in by Morocco are Spanish-speaking and none of them able to speak the Sahrawi dialect—*Hassaniya*. In fact a reason for lack of consensus on the actual number of Sahrawis is that because of the war, disappearances, migrations and the resistance against Spanish colonialism, the Sahrawis migrated or rather fanned out in different directions—north of Mauritania, south of Morocco and east of Algeria. According to a Polisario estimate in 1974, the Sahrawis numbered 700,000. Today nobody can give the exact figure.

The conference which lasted for two days, 23-24 November '85, drew the world's attention to Morocco's dangerous precedent for rescheduling the map of Africa. Peace was an imperative need lest the African continent fell back in a state of chaos and destabilisation. The choice before Europe and the world was simple as rightly pointed out by SADR's (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) then foreign minister Mr. Ibrahim Hakim. The choice was between a stable Maghreb or a Maghreb on fire. He appealed to the European countries to follow the Yugoslavian lead and give recognition to SADR. Though 60 odd countries had recognised SADR they are mostly from Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, there was substantial evidence of unofficial European support to the Sahrawi people in their struggle towards full independence. Diplomats, journalists, members of parliament including European parliament, party leaders from almsot all European countries were present to express their solidarity with the Sahrawi people.

The Conference also drew attention to the need to stop the flow of arms to Morocco and to stop economic investment in Sahara. There was call to the Moroccan government to come to the negotiating table.

There could be little doubt in fact, on that score, for the

Sahrawi people have an independent cultural identity of their own. This writer was part of the Indian delegation that visited the Sahrawi refugee camps near the Tindouf region of Algeria and made his own direct acquaintance with the world of the Saharawis—their women and children. They have now a total of four provinces—Samara, El Ayoun, Dakhla and Auserd—named after towns under Moroccan occupation. This is perhaps to keep their memory green and to ensure that their children grow up nurturing the same urges. It is remarkable to see familiar motifs in their art and craft. The emphasis throughout is on peace and utility. Objects of war captured from the Moroccans become transformed as objects of peace in the deft hands of the Sahrawi people. Ash trays from mortar shells, stoves from parts of landrovers are impressive expression of a people committed to peace. In colour and theme their art often bears strong resemblance to the Palestinian art. Whatever structure one visited in and around Tindouf—a strong symbol of Sahrawi *diaspora*—had similar architectural design. The emphasis is clearly on utility.

On the military front, the Sahrawis once controlled as much as 80 per cent of the area; today they do not control more than half of the area. This was partly due to the changed situation after Morocco constructed 2,000 kms of sandwall and equipped it with the most sophisticated gadget supplied by its western friends. It is a series of six-foot-tall earthworks interspersed with firing positions 4,000-5,000 yards apart and protected by minefields on the outside. Electronic devices pick up movement as much as 12 miles away across the flat emptiness of the Sahara desert. Mostly from inside it, some 80,000 Moroccan soldiers keep watch. Polisario units, usually consisting of a trio of jeeps, drive along outside the wall, occasionally firing rockets and mortars at the Moroccans.

The series of earthworks walls are not only designed for military purposes, but also to effectively isolate the Sahrawis from the rest of the world.

Mariem Salem—a prominent Sahrawi woman and member of the National Union of Women—guided us throughout the tour. While being driven though the desert, this writer, learnt of her touching story. Mariem's six uncles are in the war. Her mother and father live in the occupied town of El Ayoun. But Mariem cannot communicate with them for fear of any harm to her people from the Moroccan authorities. This is

what the wall has done to the people.

There is this human side to the conflict which should not be lost sight of. And it is this aspect that makes Moroccan occupation of Sahrawi land repugnant.

It has been a well-documented fact that Morocco attempted a genocide in western Sahara by dropping napalm, phosphorous and fragmentation bombs on Sahrawi civilians. Thousands died at Oum Dreiga and other internal camps in the early years of the war. The Sahrawis, it maybe recalled, used to say "The napalm can burn our skin, the tanks can destroy our homes, but neither the napalm nor the tanks can destroy our will to fight for a homeland".

One of the most outreageous violations of human rights in western Sahara is disappearance. Since 1975 there has been a consistent pattern of individuals disappearing from Moroccan-occupied western Sahara and southern Morocco. The kingdom of Morocco has employed the practice to eliminate political activists, dissidents, or other perceived enemies of the government.

With more than 100,000 troops and tens of thousands of administrative personnel in western Sahara, Morocco's promise to organise a referendum must be dismissed as a ploy to gain time. The withdrawal of Moroccan occupation forces is the imperative condition for the celebration of a genuine, free and democratic referendum of self-determination for the Sahrawi people in keeping with resolutions 40-50 of the General Assembly of the United Nations which establishes ways and means for a just and definite solution of the conflict, and resolution AHG/104 of the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of OAU.

Returning to the wall, it has in a way forced the guerrillas to resort to classical tactics of war. The Polisario guerrilla, it seems, is well on his way to adapt to the new situation. About 10 military operations a day take place and upto 260 operations a month. Two things clearly emerge. The Moroccans, whatever the equipment at their disposal, would never be able to make an all-out victory against the Polisario. The Polisario guerrillas are so determined as never to give up. The acronym 'desert fox' rightly applies to the Polisario who can literally sniff their way through the desert unlike the Moroccans who often need a Sahrawi to direct them. It seems part of the Polisario strategy to wear out the Moroccan morale, to let the cost of the war—a million dollars a day—to have its telling ef-

fect on the none-too-happy Moroccan economy and to continue making diplomatic advances towards their goal. The Paris conference was a step in the same direction.

By now as stated before more than 60 countries, including non-aligned heavyweights such as India and Yugoslavia, have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Morocco has left the Organisation of African Unity and boycotts the Saharan debates in the United Nations. This "empty-seat" policy has not won Morocco many friends.

The Moroccan king has in the meantime been consolidating his position. On the military front it is the wall that has helped him maintain a stalemate. On the diplomatic front he has made friends again with America which began cold-shouldering him after he made an alliance with Col. Qadhafi of Libya. That he could achieve both needs elaboration.

The "marriage" with Libya—August '84—transformed the political climate in Morocco, and changed the balance of power in North Africa.

Already irritated at failing to get Tripoli chosen as a venue for the 1982 OAU summit, Colonel Muamar Qadhafi became increasingly disgruntled with the Algerian ally, which he claimed, had prevented him becoming the OAU president the following year in Addis Ababa by getting Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam elected instead.

Qadhafi's view was that Algeria was trying to exert an exclusive political influence on the Polisario Front, whereas Libya had provided the Front with 80 per cent of the aid it needed, and, moreover, that with its Sahelian policy of rapprochement with Niger, Mali amd Mauritana, Algeria had frustrated his own plans for a United States of the Sahara. Finally it was hostile to Libya's annexation of the Aouzou strip in northern Chad.

King Hassan was also disgruntled. he had persuaded the Arab summit in Fez to adopt a peace plan implicity recognising the state of Israel, and took the risk of welcoming the World Jewish Congress to Morocco, in the hope that Washington would in return, hasten a solution to the Middle East conflict.

His efforts were in vain. He was also disappointed when the 19th summit of the OAU "exhorted" Morocco to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario Front.

The two men had other points in common. Ever since their twin diplomatic setback at the 19th OAU summit they had

been suffering from a kind of isolation complex, for which they blamed Algeria. Qadhafi, believing Chad to be part of Libya's "living space", had annexed the Aouzou strip. Hassan, keen to go down in history as the "unifier" felt that once having sacrificed Mauritania he could not let go of western Sahara-Morocco's link with Black Africa and a counterweight to the Algerian Sahara.

The union enabled the king to neutralise Libya, the Polisario Front's main supplier of arms, with the result that his army was able to build a third defence "wall" in record time. The union meant that Hassan could send the message to the Americans: if a monarchy can go into partnership with a Soviet ally, it may also be able to lure it into the western fold as long as the West displays a minimum respect for Arab aspirations. Finally, Hassan hoped that some of Libya's great, even if somewhat diminished, wealth would rub off to Morocco.

The union also enabled Qadhafi to deal a deadly blow to internal Libyan dissidents, who had previously received enormous help from Rabat. The union made it possible for Qadhafi to withdraw his troops from Chad without losing face.

King Hassan, in return for acting as an honest broker in the Chadian affair, possibly tried to get Mitterand to show a more understanding attitude over the Saharan conflict when the latter went on a "private" visit to Fez.

The Algerians, convinced that this was the case, even accused France of being only "nominally neutral", since its military aid to Morocco, as per newspaper reports was three times greater than that coming from the United States (which totals $ 77 million). They alleged that France was encouraging Morocco to seek a military solution. It may be mentioned here that close on the heels of the Paris Peace Conference Hassan had come to ask for more arms from France.

Morocco, sensing the hostile reaction to its union with Libya has since striven to reassure all those concerned, especially the Americans who went sour after the king formed a "political union" with Libya. The Americans began to court Algeria as an alternative North African friend. Mr. Chadli Bendjedid, Algeria's President and Tunisia's Habib Borguiba were received at the White House last year. But Algeria's socialist and non-aligned status keeps its safely insulated from such opportunistic overtures. That country has kept its distance from America. The latter had little alternative but to

receive back Hassan in its fold after the 'union' deviation. To Morocco's king such deviational behaviour was astute politics having ended Libya's support for Polisario and hampered Algeria's attempts to isolate Morocco from the rest of the Maghreb. But as one observer put it, the union between Libya and Morocco is like mixing oil and water. The car won't work.

A word or two here about America's role in the region before coming to Morocco's and Libya's isolation complex.

In respect to Africa, the US does not want to abandon this continent to the Africans. For years, the public was told that the United States had no Africa policy—while American corporations were investing billions of dollars in South Africa, while the US Government was supporting Portuguese colonial wars and while the CIA was roaming in several African countries. Under Reagan, the US concentrated in consolidating its front on the eastern border of northern Africa. To this end, President Reagan continued to work actively at destabilizing those regimes opposed to the aims of the US. Within this context, Libyan foreign and domestic policies became subject of frequent debate in the United States during the Reagan Administration. However, it is generally conceded that much of the debate on Libya took place with little or no appreciation of the historical context. Differences in world outlook and interest are at the heart of the sharp differences between the US and Libya. After all, the new Libyan regime had dismantled American bases, nationalised oil companies and pursued a policy of non-alignment. Non-aligned Libya has considered itself as part of the Middle East and Africa. In Africa, early Libyan policy concentrated on opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism and on the undermining of the Israeli presence.

In the Middle East, the United States in categorically committed to the preservation and the defence of Israel and its interests. The question of Palestinian rights, on the other hand, is central to the quest of Arab unity. In the eyes of the Libyan Government, Palestine is part of the Arab lands, and Zionism is a foreign political movement; the creators of Israel were motivated by hatred for Islam and a desire to exploit Arab resources.

Attacks on countries of the Middle East and Africa and subversive operations have become standard actions of the Reagan Administration. As recent events demonstrated, US Administration has been openly resorting to the use of force.

Libya, which is "radical" in its support of forces seeking

change in the world system, has no need of US "aid". Other "radical" Arab countries such as Syria or South Yemen, do not have the economic independence to challenge the US. Hence, Libya is the *bete noire* of the American Government.

To an extent Morocco's isolation complex has historical roots. Morocco spent several centuries in a state of relative isolation from the rest of the Arab world, which was partly self-imposed and partly due to the fact that unlike the rest of the Maghreb, it was never incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. But this very isolation ensured the preservation of its Arab-Islamic culture. Morocco's present Alawite dynasty has ruled Morocco for three hundred years. In modern times this has given the Moroccan royal house one unmatched advantage over other Arab monarchies, such as the Sanussis of Libya or the Hashemites of Iraq who were British creations, the deys of Tunis who were relics of the Ottoman Empire, King Farouk of Egypt who was the great-great grandson of an adventurous Albanian officer.

Libya's isolation too has explanation in history of that country. On 1 September 1969 a group of young Libyan army officers carried out a successful coup to depose the seventy-nine-year-old King Idris and declared a republic. Qadhafi then an army captain and promoted to Colonel and commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces became at once a formidable force in Arab politics. The first steps taken by the young Libyan revolutionaries were to be expected. They secured the agreement of the US and the British governments to close their military bases and withdraw. They offered financial help to the Palestinian guerrilla organization Al Fatah and established regular contacts with the Egyptian regime. Before the overthrow of the monarchy, Libya had always been regarded as belonging more to the Maghreb, than the Mashrek. The government had been involved in discussions of Maghreb unity with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Several reasons combined to make Colonel Qadhafi turn his country round to face eastwards. Apart from his admiration for President Nasser, he looked upon Egypt as the essential nucleus of a union of Arab States. Moreover, the cause of Palestinians was the focus of Arab interest despite the growing stature of Algeria in the Arab world. The Maghreb was too remote from the Arab heartlands to absorb Qadhafi's attention. Nasser had responded to Qadhafi's overtures and after the collapse of the Arab summit meeting in Rabat, he flew to Tripoli to sign with

Qadhafi and Sudan's Col. Nimeiry a tripartite pact known as the Tripoli Charter, uniting the three regimes in an Arab Revolutionary Front.

Nasser's death in September 1970 was a severe blow to Col. Qadhafi, but it did not stop him from pursuing the cause of pan-Arabism. But he was soon on bad terms with nearly every Arab regime as he found cause to criticize their behaviour. For instance, he refused to forgive King Hussein for his treatment of the Palestinian guerrillas and he denounced Sudan for withdrawing from Arab federation plans and the Iraqis for signing a treaty with the Soviet Union. In international affairs, Col. Qadhafi's behaviour was deemed 'provocative' mainly for his support to guerrilla organizations. But then he wanted Libya to be an example to all the other Arab and Muslim states. In mid-April 1973 he announced his cultural revolution aimed at purging the Libyan revolution of all anti-Islamic and anti-Arab elements and principles. At about the same time Qadhafi announced his theory of the Third Way between capitalism and communism.

One of the objectives of the cultural revolution was to prepare the Libyans for a union with Egypt. But the union never came about as President Sadat dithered after initial announcement by both Sadat and Qadhafi (after frequent consultations) that there would be a complete merger of their two countries by September 1973.

The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 left Libya isolated. It became a virtual outsider among the Arabs. (Qadhafi had made it clear that he was against the timing and the limited aims of the Syrians and Egyptians who were conducting the war). Relations with Egypt never recovered. The latter was then intent on pursuing a policy of moderation and cooperation with the United States with which the other Arab states were in broad agreement.

Libyan or other Arab attempts to merge should be viewed in a historical recurring context. For instance, in the 1940s, the Syrian Ba'th Party called for Arab unity stretching from Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. Similarly, the Pan-Arab ideal became a goal of Nasser, who believed that different Arab countries shared a culture on which they could build their own system of cooperation and defence. In contrast to the American view that the Middle East was a land mass defenseless in front of the Soviet Union, Nasser considered Israel, the United States and the Soviets as foreigners in the region.

With the collapse of the United Arab Republic In 1961, however, the Arabs were less optimistic about the immediate prospects of the Arab unity. In spite of this, Libya made repeated attempts at Arab unity even after the idea became less and less popular elsewhere among the Arabs. That country has called for unity, at different times, with Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Chad, Syria and Morocco. Libya believed that the present weakness of the Arabs and Israel's triumph over them was due to their disintegration into several entities, a process sustained by the colonial powers to dominate the Arab world and exploit their resources.

A united Arab State in the Middle East and North Africa would probably have the veto right in the UN Security Council. This was another secret of the enmity existing between Libya and the US.

Several of Libya's attempts have indeed been failures. The Western countries probably suspect that stronger Arab world will undermine American influence in the region. Western media frequently uses reports which give the reader the impression that quite a few of the Arab governments are suspicious of merger proposals. But there are official statements from Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tunisia, South Yemen and the PLO, revealing support to the idea.

Libya and Syria (which has also been party to several unification schemes) proclaimed a merger in September 1980. In late August 1984, union with Morocco, in spite of the differences in the political and the economic systems, has become a reality.

Libya's differences even with the progressive Arab regimes on issues of lesser importance, notwithstanding (for instance, Libyan support of one of the factions of Polisario, damaged its relations not only with Morocco but also with Algeria, which supported another faction) that country gave good relations with every country in the region. It has united with the Moroccan monarchy, cultivated good relations with the United Arab Emirates and frequently expressed the desire to improve relations with Tunisia.

Returning to the Sahrawi problem, this bleak land on the western edge of the great Saharan desert has been the theatre of one of Africa's most bitter wars since 1975-76. Morocco (supported initially by Mauritania which later cried off) has been wanting to annex the territory. It is bitterly opposed by the highly motivated nationalist movement—POLISARIO (the

Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamara y Rio de Oro). Moroccan occupation of western Sahara is not just a lust for phosphate but based on an ideal of recreating a supposed "Greater Morocco"—a dream that keeps the Moroccan monarchy going and that has full domestic support cutting across party lines despite the economic hardships it has brought the Moroccans in fighting a costly and protracted war.

The Sahrawis in a broad cultural sense regard themselves as very different and distinct people. There used to be a national council of forty tribes with representatives from each tribe also called 'the hand of forty' that had the responsibility of solving intra-tribal problems and defending the borders. When Spain came and took over, they tried to follow a similar pattern but with the difference tha the *djeema* now constituted 100-members plus a Spanish governor. Also the members were no more truly representative but mostly handpicked. In the late fifties, western Sahara experienced belated but rapid changes, due to sudden awakening of interest in its mineral resources. The growth of employment and educational opportunities in the towns had encouraged a large part of the Sahrawi population to abandon its precarious nomadic life and settle in the urban areas.

A series of political changes followed. The western Sahrawis were now living a distinct and unique colonial experience. Neighbouring Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria had all gained independence. And despite the Moroccan and Mautiranian territorial claims, neither the Rabat nor the Nouakchott regime played any significant role in assisting the birth of a new anti-colonial struggle against Spanish rule in the territory. Ironically, the Spanish government's oft-repeated yet void commitment to self-determination and its paternalist defense of Sahrawi's rights against the designs of neighbouring governments played a significant part in forging a nationalist consciousness that was later to rebound against the Spanish.

The Sahrawis have made enormous strides under difficult circumstances ever since. It was in 1976 that many of the Sahrawis people left their homes in western Sahara after Spain, which had colonised the country since 1884, repartitioned the land between itself, Morocco and Mauritania. After the Madrid Accord of 1975, many of the people rallied behind the Polisario Front which was formed in 1973.

While the men fought a war of resistance against Morocco and Mauritania, many women, children and old people fled their homes to live in various refugee camps set up near Tindouf in Algeria. The refugees had first settled in an area liberated by Polisario in Western Sahara but were bombed and driven out by the Moroccans. Today, the army remains in the liberated by Polisario in western Sahara but were bombed and driven out by the Moroccans. Today, the army remains in the liberated areas only. Women, children and old people, because of inhuman bombings by Moroccan aggressors, have SADR, was proclaimed on February 27, 1976.

Thanks to the war, Morocco's economy is in a mess. But two main threats to the king, that from Islamic fundamentalists and the political left at least appear to be under control.

Islamic fundamentalism which helped set off riots against increased food prices some years ago has since then failed to become the menace in Morocco that it might be to Maghreb's other countries—Algeria and Tunisia.

Much of the sting of the political left has been drawn by its members' participation in parliament which exercises only limited powers. The point to be emphasized is that even the communists and socialists have proven nationalistic over the issue of western Sahara. The army seems smug because of the stalemate situation. The generals are also enjoying the fruits of a $ 1 billion re-equipment programme which began last year. This is expected to put Morocco's army well ahead of that of Algeria, its rival in the Maghreb and the principal supporter of Sahrawis' struggle. The consequences are likely to be felt on the battlefield too, though it must also be added that the Polisario's determination far outweighs its antiquated arms. This writer was witness to an impressive display of captured Moroccan armament including downed planes and tanks during his visit to the Saharan land.

Inside Morocco today, apart from the Union Constitutionnelle, which was set up in 1983 as the "king's party", the other major parties, whether the long established USFP (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires) Istiqlal, the Movement Populair, or new Reassemblement National de Independants, Parti national Democratique, all carry more or less the same weight, meaning that the king can enlarge the government majority as he wishes depending on what kind of policy he wishes to pursue in future.

Underground protest movements, it seems, have no

charismatic leaders or proper organisation. The Islamic groups are divided, and the "leftists" who broke away from the USFP and the PPS, because they found them too moderate, are not numerous enough to matter. (But it may be mentioned here that for the first time in the history of Morocco some Islamic youths have started resorting to the use of arms where earlier it was just demonstrations).

The economic situation, however, is a serious one as is evidenced by the kind of rioting that took place in Casablanca in 1981 and in several cities of Morocco in early '84.

Morocco's debt burden represents almost 90 per cent of gross domestic product. Income per head of population at about $ 900 a year is considerably lower than in Algeria, Tunisia or Libya. Morocco's population of about 25 million inhabitants (including emigrants), 60 per cent of whom are under 20, is expected to double by the year 2000 and what with social inequalities and unemployment on the rise it could lead to a serious economic and social crisis.

Leaving aside the private sector, in the semi-public sector salaries vary by as much as 300 times, compared to only 10 in the United States and 12 in Switzerland. In the public sector wages are extremely low.

Morocco also suffers from lack of oil and insufficient production of cereals—factors which seriously affect the trade balance. Foreign currency revenues derive from wages of emigrant workers, phosphates, agriculture and tourism. Prospects are hardly any more encouraging for several industrial sectors. In particular textiles.

The IMF has been urging Morocco to aim for self-sufficiency in food by increasing cereal yields and phasing out the growing of citrus fruit (which in fact would mean a drop in foreign currency earnings). The IMF is also pushing for greater privatisation. Basic commodities are still heavily subsidised for fear of social unrest.

The year 1986, in fact, might become a testing time for Morocco's economy. 1986 is the deadline for Morocco's debt repayments and the year when the effect of Spanish entry into EEC will begin to bite.

On paper, at least, if statistics are accurate, the whole country should be about to go bust. Matters have worsened since 1979 the year that saw a slump in the prices of phosphate of which Morocco is the world's third largest producer and leading exporter. (Morocco is the third largest pro-

ducer of phosphate provided we compute the phosphate reserves of western Sahara. The Polisario, however, is determined not to let a single gram of phosphate leave the territory. During the last ten years major multinational companies like the Krupp (German) and Boskales (Dutch) reportedly backed out after signing agreements with Morocco.)

The union with Libya was thus a badly needed shot in the arm for Moroccan economy. The Moroccans, as one observer put it, have only potatoes and tomatoes. Who is giving them the money then, he asked. The same observer pointed the finger at Saudi Arabia. But the cash flow must have diminished as there are now two claimants—Iraq (against Iran) and Morocco (against Polisario).

The Polisario Front has been hoping, not without reason, that an economic mishap would bring Morocco to the negotiating table. The situation for Morocan economy has been worsening every year. In 1978, Mauritania, crippled by the expense of three years' fighting in the Sahara cried off from the conflict following the overthrow of President Ould Daddah by the army in a bloodless coup, making a peace agreement with Polisario in 1979 and subsequently recognizing the SADR.

The Moroccan king himself has narrowly survived two coup attempts in 1971-72. But the military situation has gradually been brought back to normal since 1981, and as about 100,000 men are pinned down in the desert, there is little risk of a military coup. The death on January 25, 1983 of General Ahmed Dlimi, who combined responsibility for the royal palace and the command of the southern armed forces, removed a potential threat.

Dlimi, it is said, was either working for the CIA or the French and was in any case reportedly attempting a *coup d' etat*—an information which the king had somehow received.

Both the US and France are trying to dominate Morocco. When the Socialists came to power what with the party's stand known vis-a-vis the Sahrawis, Morocco opened the door wider for the Americans. In a dilemma the French tried to outbid the Americans by continuing their arms supply to the Moroccans and as already said their military aid exceeds three times the American aid to Morocco. In fact, it is felt that if the Socialist French government had put in all its potentialities and all its possibilities at the service of a solution of this problem in the region the results would have been much

more positive and could have better served the relations of France with the region and with the whole African countries. The Socialists' position, when they were in the opposition, was for a peaceful solution. They supported the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. The Socialt government proclaimed on many different occasions that they were for the United Nations' and OAU's resolutions but it has been observed that France does not vote for the same resolutions. France says she is for peace yet she provides Morocco the means to continue an expensive and colonial war against the Sahrawi people. Near 50% of the material provided to Morocco in its war came from France.

A reason, Morocco can continue the war despite a shattered economy, it may be mentioned in passing, is that there is also Morocco's reportedly hidden economy said to account for between 30 and 40 per cent of GDP which does not feature either in international statistics or official government literature.

Also Moroccans have a great sense of social solidarity whereby the poorest also somehow manage to survive. The sad plight of the poor in no way mars royal celebrations. Last March the king celebrated his quarter century on Morocco's throne. Jamborees such as the lavish festivities organised by the king for Princess Leila Mariam's wedding in no way clash with the fact that an estimated eight million Moroccans (about one third of the population) live below the poverty line. In a way the war in Sahara keeps the Moroccans united in so far as it takes the blame for the people's ills and allows the king to play the symbolic role of "unifier" keeping the Moroccans and his kingdom together.

The war in Western Sahara has regional as well as geopolitical ramifications. King Hassan has long been an ally of the West. A number of countries have ambiguous policies concerning Polisario and Morocco. For example, while France supports Polisaro's right to self-determination, it is still supplying arms to Morocco. The USSR has also publicly supported Polisario. While many of Polisario's weapons are of Soviet-bloc manufacture, they have rather been supplied by Algeria or Libya (before it withdrew support in 1984 on signing an agreement with Morocco). The USSR values its growing economic relationship with Morocco, and has secured long-term access to Moroccan phosphates.

The Hassan regime has always been of great value to the

US, particularly because of its stragetic location at the entrance of the Mediterranean. An agreement in 1982 with Hassan meant the US could use transit facilities at Moroccan air bases en-route to the Middle East, and Hassan has always allowed port calls by US warships. US military aid between 1975 and 1984 amounted to no less than $ 880m in sales agreement, $ 352m in military sales credits and $ 55m in outright grants to finance military sales, as well as $ 84m in licensed commercial arms exports and $ 10.5m in the provision of military training.

In the meantime, the all-round stalemate merges with the stillness of the Sahara. Its eerie silence is uninterrupted. There are no cases in this blighted land. An occasional acacia is the only point of relief or focus amidst rocks and stones, stretching interminably over monotonous plains. Despite the hostile climate and terrain this land is very very dear to the Sahrawis. These tough ones of the earth have survived by migrating over vast distances in search of water or pasture for their camels and goats. Living in honour and peace here is their birthright and no kings could take it away from them. No walls could arrest their forward march. They are on the right side of history.

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BOOK REVIEW

The African City: ANTHONY O'CONNOR

HUTCHINSON & CO. LONGON
1983

Rapid urbanisation is undoubtedly one of the most important changes taking place in Africa today, with multifarious implications for the economy, society and politics of the African people. O'Connor has presented here a study of the diversity of urban form and urban experience found in the major cities in tropical Africa extending south from the Sahara to Zimbabwe. The characteristics of the cities or groups of cities have been discussed in terms of urban growth, rural-urban migration, ethnic groups, urban economy, urban-rural relationships. The cities of tropical Africa have been seen basically as urban settlements and as foci of economic activity. The nature of urban politics, labour relations and emerging class structures have been left out. The author's attempt has been to build up a synthesis of a large number of specific studies on African cities.

Compared to the cities in Europe, North America, and even in some Asian and Latin American countries, African cities are small in size. The two giant cities of Africa, namely Lagos (Nigeria) and Kinshasa (Zaire), have population of just over two million. The *level* of urbanisation in tropical Africa is really low, but the recent *rate* of urbanisation there has been much higher than in most parts of Asia. This high *rate* of urbanisation has been contributing greatly to the social and economic tensions in the context of extended family system in Africa. The cities there exert all kinds. of influence out of all proportion to their modest size: they are the epicentres of polity, society, economy and culture.

The features common to all cities of tropical Africa are the past experience of colonial rule, dire poverty, and sharp



divisions between racial groups. In attempting a simple typology of the African cities which differ among themselves in age, tradition, economy and cultural make-up, O'Connor has divided them into six types, viz. (i) indigenous city, (e.g. Katsina, Oyo, Ilesha in Nigeria), (ii) Islamic city, to which the urban tradition has been brought from across the Sahara (e.g. Katsina in Nigeria), (iii) colonial city (e.g. great majority of tropical Africa's urban centres, including most of the capital cities), (iv) "European" city established by the Europeans (e.g. Harare or Salisbury in Zimbabwe or Nairobi in Kenya), (v) dual city, combining the characteristics of two or more of the types (e.g. Kano in Nigeria or Greater Khartoum in Sudan), and (vi) hybrid city, combining indigenous and alien elements in roughly equal proportions (e.g. Lagos in Nigeria or Ouagadougou in Upper Volta). Today increasing convergence of these different types can be seen in the African cities, as indigenisation takes place in the colonial cities while westernisation proceeds in those of indigenous origin.

The author has also discussed the linkages and interactions among cities in Africa, the 'urban system' as he has called it. The interactions among the urban centres of Africa are found, in different degrees, at four levels local; national, international and intercontinental. All the urban systems are changing constantly and sometimes dramatically in tropical Africa. Pre-colonial systems were changed by colonial systems which, again, are being changed by post-colonial, nationalist systems. The linkages between different cities involve diverse elements ranging from migration and flow of goods to spread of ideas from one city to another. In this connection the concept of urban hierarchy has been examined in the African context. Africa's dependency in political, economic and military matters on Europe and North America still remains substantial. No African countries have yet opted out of the world capitalist system. The inter-continental linkages work through the cities. Within the national boundaries the movement of people, goods, and ideas also takes place through the urban centres. That is to say, Africa's international relations are relevant to the extent and rate of urbanisation within each country.

The inter-continental links are, however, much weaker. The efforts to extend their urban systems into the countryside started in colonial period with a variety of motives, but its progress is still limited. The local levels of urban hierarchy are

not much developed except perhaps in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana. Everywhere the dominance of the capital city is overwhelming in terms of linkages, flows and relationships. Thus the national urban systems in Africa show a high degree of integration in the 'centre-periphery' model with strong centres and weak periphery. The urban system of the colonial period is undergoing a change with the recent emphasis on the building of new capital cities. Because of its problem of ethnicity, primacy of urban centres in Africa usually result in social injustice and greater inequality: an experience which is the opposite of urban primacy in other parts of the world.

It is the towns which are sometimes viewed as agents of underdevelopment of rural areas in African countries. The problems or urban planning in the African contest has, therefore, to take into account the possible effects of linkages with rural areas and regional development disparities, and alienation of ethnic groups in large cities where mass of people go without employment or housing. Recently there has been some policy shift for diverting urban growth from the primate cities to smaller centres. The author has rightly included an analysis of urban-rural relationships in his presentation. The African cities basically represent alien culture and their interactions with rural areas have both beneficial and harmful impact on the ideas and attitudes of the rural people. Unlike in the Middle East, southern and eastern Europe and Latin America, the distruction between rural and urban people is fast getting blurred in tropical Africa. hence an understanding of Africa's cities requires not only an understanding of its rural societies but also of the role of the cities in the total national, international and intercontinental contexts. Most cities in tropical Africa differ substantially not only from those of Europe and North America but also those of the Middle East and Latin America; they have more in common with those of South Asia, although most African economies have stronger European orientation. The African urban elites have largely come from outside the cities. Because of their rural-based extended families and regular contacts with rural economy, these people are likely to ensure that urbanisation does benefit the nation as a whole.

O'Connor's account of African cities includes a general review of vast number of specialised studies on African and other Third World cities. The merit of the book lies in its clear grasp of the issues involved and a thorough examination of

comparable data pertaining to the cities of tropical Africa. Being basically a geographer, the author has prudently avoided discussions about politics and class structure in African cities. This cannot be regarded as a shortcoming of the book, because a thorough treatment of this important aspect of urban living would require another full-length study. The author has not attempted to build up any grand theory, but his explanations of the empirical reality of the African cities are quite illuminating, although not always comprehensive. He has mainly concerned himself with the growth, distribution, character and relationships of the cities in tropical Africa. Considering the diversity of the cities in tropical Africa, which is one of the least urbanised regions in the world, a question may legitimately be raised whether there is really such a thing as "the African city". The analysis presented here gives the answer in the affirmative.

Asok Mukhopadhyay

Islam, Christianity and African Identity:

SULAYMAN S. NYANG; AMANA BOOKS, VERMONT; 1984

In this publication an analysis of philosophical and historical African responses to Islam & Christianity which clubbed together alongwith Judaism as Abrahamic traditions, has been given. It describes African cosmological understanding of man, his nature and destiny in the cosmos; examines the intrusion of Islam into African's consciousness; and an analysis of western colonialism and its impact on African religious life. Though Islam, Christianity and Judaism have been clubbed together as Abrahamic traditions, yet no effort has been made to trace the effect of Judaism or Christianity which had considerable following in North Africa before being swamped by the wave of Arab crusaders of Islam. Even now there is a significant minority belonging to Coptic Church in Egypt. Ethiopia has been Christian much before the advent of Islam in North Africa. The Ethiopian church is able to trace origin as far back as the ancient kingdom of Axum in the third and fourth centuries A.D. No other African state has institutions with such a long and continuous history.

After describing the traditional African cosmology Prof. Nyang has concluded that African cosmology sees history not as a series of discontinulties, but as an ever growing chain of being whose beginning is the act of Divine creation and whose end is the recession of the dead man's spirit into the realm of immorality. To the traditional African man, an act is historically significant only when it prepetuates his line of descent and immortalizes memories about his earthly life.

The African's concept of the triangular relationship between God, man and the non-human elements in the universe is

the key to the understanding of traditional African philosophy. This view does not only shed light on the self-image of African man, but it also provides us with an intellectual map of the metaphysical world of the traditional African man.

The chapter on 'The Islamic Invasion of the African World' describes the Islamic view of life and the Islamic Penetration of Africa. The successful adaption of the Sufi brothershood in West Sudan contributed to the growth of Muslim solidarity and cohesiveness at the elite level. In fact the author is inclined to believe that the growing acculturation of African Muslims in the Islamic culture together with their desire to play more active role in the political system of their times might have led many of them to agitate for reform and change in the lives of their non-Muslim peoples. Another contribution of Islam discussed is the successful adaption of the Arabic script for the reduction of African languages into writing.

The impact of Christianity on African Society after the advent of Christian Mission in the 15th century and after alongwith the western European naval superiority has been given. This has been discussed under the heading "The Western Conquest and African Society" which covers 'the Christian view of life', 'the Christian Missionary and the Diffusion of Christianity in the Africa' and 'the impact of Euro-Christian on the African World View'.

Both the chapters on Islam and Christianity describe in detail the spread of the two religions in Africa. A surprising ommission is the Christian influence before the North African conquest by Islam. Neither has any mention been made of the the only Christian kingdom, Ethiopia, which has a long history and has remained Christian for centuries before Portuguese entered Africa. Islam was also known in Ethiopia earlier than the Arab invasion of North Africa. It was to Ethiopia where Prophet Muhammed sent some of his followers to save them from persecution in Mecca. Perhaps it is the constraint of space and the belief that these early foreign intrusions into Africa did not lead to identity crisis and alienation led to exclusion of earlier phases of Islam and Christianity in the paper.

Christianity no doubt expanded after the advent of Christian Missions in the fifteenth century when they were able to convert even the royalty in Congo. But there was decline in their fortune because of the slave trade indulged in

by the colonial powers. It was in the nineteenth century after the abolition of the slave trade, that saw the expansion of Christianity in Africa. The century also saw accrution to the strength of Islam. It is an interesting phenomenon that Muslim communities have increased manifold during colonialism. Both Christianity and Islam spread at the expense of African traditional religion and Christianity had failed to gain converts from Islam.

Islam and Christianity have given African culture a new dimension. They have, however, not succeeded in doing away completely with the essential characteristic of old African culture base. Professor E.A. Ayandele, Principal, University of Ibadan in his address on 31 August 1975, to the meeting of acadamacians and churchmen held at Jos Campus of the Univerty of Ibadan to review the findings of a two year research programme to asses the role of Christianity in independent Africa, stated "Indeed, for those who care to investigate, African traditional religion remains an instinctive part of most African professors of Christianity. Scratch the African pastor and you would discover that he has greater faith in the charms and amulets he wears surreptitiously and in the 'witch-doctor' to whom he pays nocturnal visit than in the Holy Bible and Jesus Christ: scratch the Christian medical doctor and you would discover that he pays greater attention to the diviner and the psychical fears instilled by his village milieu than his scalpel and the white man's tablets: scratch the prominent layman politician and you discover that his public bold face and animal courage are against the background of his secret endless grovelling before masters of supernatural forces in traditional society".

The author has rightly concluded that the African man has undergone a radical change since the arrival of the missionary in Africa. This transformation has taken many forms and each of these forms is a symbol of Christian break through in Africa. Though there is a growing body of African opinion that the Euro-Christian influence in Africa is superficial, there is reason to believe that Christianity as exported by Europe will survive the post-colonial surgery of the African revolutionaries and reformers. What, however, is going to be the form such a Christianity will take will remain a moot point until the forces of change in the African drama work themselves out.

The author has also made a study of solutions to Africa's

identity problem offered by two major leaders of African thought—Nkrumah of Ghana and Senghor of Senegal—and examined Nkrumah's Consciencism as an ideological remedy and Senghor's Negritude as a solution to Africa's identity problem. The author has argued, "Whatever may happen in the future, the fact remains that Nkrumah's solution is a contradictory one, and its fragility will become evident as Africa's industrial base develops and African political consciousness drives African man to demand for more political and economic goods. There and then, it will become crystal clear that the religious component must exercise a dominant influence over and above society, if African man is not to lose that important spiritual link in the chain of African ontology. About Senghor the author concludes "Inspite of his strong emphasis of African cultural values Senghor has, however, tended to be an advocate of universalism.... He maintains that Europe and Africa each has her own tradition of civilization development and each must make the contribution for which she is best equipped. This complimentarity of civilizations, Senghor adds, is the basis for the gradual emergence of the true humanity".

Professor Nyang states that Abrahamic tradition has taken three distinct forms in history; namely, the Jewish, the Christian and the Islamic and in modern Africa the latter two are relevant. He concludes, 'African man, like all other men, is born to wonder about his life, his thoughts, and his world; but if he is to wonder more, while working on how to wander less in the realm of speculation, he must embrace the Abrahamic tradition and act upon it within the framework of religious tolerance developed by his ancestors. Indeed, if there is ever going to be a structure of world peace, its creators must know the secret lagnuage which traditional African man has evolved over several millennia to deal with fellow men as well as nature. This language is that of tolerance and social harmony, a medium of communication which was best symbolized in the old Africa by the drum. Such a human instrument does not stimulate and excite the mind; rather it coaxes and subdues it to join the body of man in the rhythmical dance of nature. The Abrahamic religions, therefore, must cultivate this language of Africa if they are to fulfill their mission in both Africa and the modern world'.

The author appears to be convinced that the mantle of leadership of the world falls on the inheritors of Abrahamic

traditions. One may not agree with the conclusions of the author. The paper, gives valuable information on African culture, society, value and contemporary thought and impact of Islam and Christianity on the African thought. A selected bibliography appended, will be useful to serious students.

Virendra Nath

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The Movement of Nonaligned Countries

RAJIV GANDHI

Twenty five years ago, at Belgrade, the leaders of the Nonaligned Movement declared:

> "Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression... are gradually disappearing from the stage of history."

Our gathering today reflects the truth of that perception. We meet in a nation younger than the Movement itself. In congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on assuming the leadership of our Movement we felicitate your nation and the ancient, resurgent continent you represent.

We are deeply touched by the tribute paid to the memory of Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi was a child of the Indian Revolution. Her love for her country did not limit her love for the world. She said at the New Delhi Summit: "Nationalism does not detach us from our common humanity."

The causes of common humanity are the causes of Nonalignment. We seek human dignity and human rights. We work for survival in this nuclear age. We believe in peaceful coexistence. We are pledged to equality and democracy among nations. Our goal is independence and security for all. We strive to alleviate poverty and suffering.

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* This is the full text of the statement by Shri Rajiv Gandhi as Chairman of the Movement of Nonaligned countries in Harare (Zimbabawe) on 2 September 1986.

South Africa is a cauldron coming to the boil. Ever since Belgrade, the Nonaligned Movement has urged the immediate dismantling of apartheid. Racism cannot last. A people's aspirations cannot be encaged in a prison. Nelson Mandela and his people will be free.

Pretoria remains obstinate,intransigent, obdurate. They think apartheid can be given an acceptable face. It cannot. Their legislative amendments and administrative changes do not end racial domination. They prolong it. Freedom in South Africa will brook no further delay. The question starkly is: liberty now, with innocent lives saved, or liberty later, in a welter of blood?

At the initiative of the Movement and the Organization of African Unity, an International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa was held last June. Its recommendations are clear, the will of those who must implement them is not. Outside economic sustenance only reinforces Pretoria's intransigence. Sanctions will compel Pretoria to relent.

Sanctions can yet secure a relatively peaceful transition to racial equality and majority rule. Else, unprecedented violence will mow down a multitude of the finest flowers of South Africa.

We the Nonaligned should press ahead with sanctions whether others are prepared to do so or not. Three of our member-States, including two of the Frontline—Zambia and our host, Zimbabwe—participated in the Commonwealth initiate which agreed on sanctions now.

Pretoria retaliated—swiftly and immediately. The Frontline States have been subjected to subversion, economic aggression and armed attack. Their security is jeopardised by a regime which suborns their stability, arms and finances mercenaries, abets puppet rebels, bombs neighbours with impunity, and even invades them with its troops. It is guilty of interference, intervention, subversion and outright aggression. The actions of the Pretoria regime constitute a clear and present threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter-VII of the United Nations Charter.

Legally and morally, the imperatives of international order impose on the international community the obligation to cllectively enforce comprehensive, mandatory sanctions.

The Frontline States and some others will be bearing the brunt of Pretoria's retaliation. Our colleagues will be among the most seriously affected. Therefore, our solidarity should find practical expression in a package of measures which will buttress their

courageous commitment to the cause. The Movement must help them. India will. We shall be holding discussions with our brothers here on specific areas, ways and means of our standing together against the dying whiplash of apartheid.

The other great issue before this assembly—an issue which has been with us since Belgrade and before—is the survival of humankind. The world bristles with sixty thousand nuclear warheads. The New Delhi Message adopted at our Seventh Summit, urged the nuclear weapon powers to negotiate an international convention precluding the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit recognized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. That perception must be translated into a treaty.

The New Delhi Message also called for a halt to all production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Three of our Members—Argentina, Tanzania and India—have participated in the Six-Nation/Five-Continent Initiative. We have urged an immediate moratorium on all nuclear tests. The problem of verification has been raised. We have, therefore, placed our extensive technical expertise and global geographic reach at the disposal of the international community to verify a cessation of all nuclear testing. The Soviet Union responded with a unilateral moratorium, extended three times, most recently in the wake of the Mexico Declaration. We seek a similar response from the other nuclear weapon powers. Meanwhile, allegedly impenetrable defences are sought to be placed in outer space. No shield is impervious. Nuclear suicide is fostered by such dangerous delusions. The pursuit of technological chimeras only takes the decision over life or death out of human hands. It devours resources which could be put to infinitely more humane use. Nothing but nuclear disarmament and peaceful coexistence can guarantee our survival.

Nonalignment is, in essence, the assertion of our right as independent countries to make up our minds on international issues free from the preoccupations and prejudices of the power blocs. We believe in a democracy of nations. Each of us, irrespective of size or wealth or military strength, is the equal of every other nation. We speak with an equal voice and are heard with equal respect. The Nonaligned Movement has shown the world the alternative to disastrous confrontation and destructive rivalry. Because we have kept out of the scramble for allies, the balance of terror has not yet tipped towards collective death. Just by being ourselves—Nonaligned—we have probably preserved the peace of the world.

As our influence has grown in world councils, we come under greater pressure from those who believe their prosperity or power gives them a presumptive right to dominance. The United Nations was founded on the sovereign equality of all member-States. Its Charter is a constitutional guarantee of international democracy. The three and a half years since New Delhi have seen an attempt to undermine the system of international order so painstakingly built over four decades. The danger is the attitude of mind which says that if we cannot prevail, we will withdraw. How can the penalizing of countries for speaking their minds be reconciled with the sovereign right of nations to express themselves freely? An international democracy rests on an agreed code of conduct. If some powerful countries arrogate to themselves the right to unilateral action which transgresses international law, how can international order be preserved?

Where we seek consensus, others seek to browbeat us. We are prepared to consider, deliberate, negotiate. But we shall not submit. We cannot allow the foundations of international order to be eroded from within. It was the anarchy of power over principle which led to fifty million deaths in the fifty years that preceded the establishment of the United Nations. Recourse to unilateral actions can guarantee neither peace nor security, only the danger of total annihilation. The Nonaligned must pool together their resources—of manpower, money and determination—to keep alive and vibrant the principles and purposes of the Charter, and the United Nations system.

Representing two-thirds of the international community—recently liberated from colonialism and domination—we rejoice in the contribution we have made to freedom. We rededicate ourselves to ridding the world of the vestiges of oppression which remain.

First and foremost is our pledge to Namibia. Eight long years ago, Namibia was on the doorstep of freedom. It was eight years ago that the Security Council unanimously agreed on a Plan for freeing Namibia. Power bloc rivalries and vested interests brought extraneous issues to the fore. The Security Council was placed in the tragic predicament of failing to execute its own will. Pretoria has thwarted in Namibia the will of the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, the General Assembly and the Security Council. This outrage has been possible only because imported rivalries have been given preference over human dignity and the right of the Namibian people to self-determination.

Since the last Summit, India has had the proud privilege of according full diplomatic status to the representative of SWAPO in

New Delhi. The Nonaligned Solidarity Fund for Namibia is the earnest of our commitment to freedom for our comrades in that beleagured land. Two international conferences have been held to promote Namibian independence. A Special Session of the General Assembly is scheduled to take place shortly. Our Movement has sponsored in the Security Council draft resolutions which commanded the support of all Members save those with strong economic interests in South Africa. As Chairman of the Movement, I have written to the UN Secretary General and discussed with him our anguish and anger at the delay in granting immediate, unconditional independence to Namibia.

Elsewhere, the forces of oppression operate more insidiously but with no less effect. The valiant Palestinians, bloodied but unbowed, are denied an independent State in their homeland. We met in New Delhi in 1983 in the shadow of the invasion of Lebanon and genocide in the refugee camps of Beirut. Israel's responsibility and complicity were clear, as was the undeterred resolve of the dispersed and heroic people of Palestine to preserve their identity and their future. The Nonaligned Movement piloted the passage of the UN General Assembly resolution which called for an international peace conference on the Middle East, with the participation of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO. Israel and its friends refuse to participate. The agony is prolonged. We shall stand by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the sole, authentic representative of Palestine, in their struggle to secure for their people their inalienable national rights—as inevitably they will.

Unhappily, Cyprus still remains divided with part of its territory under foreign occupation. We reiterate our support to its people and affirm our determination to work for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nonaligned and unified Republic.

In Central America and the Caribbean the right of nations to follow national policies of their choice is being challenged. There is outside intimidation and interference. Sovereignty is encroached upon, national independence abridged. The Nonaligned Movement has extended its full support to the Contadora process. The forces of change are not inspired by alien powers or ideologies. Their aim is to dismantle oppressive, obsolete social structures. These are problems of the region. They must be looked at in a regional perspective. They must be resolved in a regional framework, through dialogue and negotiation. We stand by the people of Nicaragua whose unflinching bravery and passionate commitment to freedom is an inspiration to all.

Our clear and unambiguous position on the situation in South-West Asia was stated in 1981, reiterated at New Delhi in 1983 and again in Luanda last year. We endorse and support the initiative taken by the UN Secretary-General.

Conflict and tension persist in South-East Asia. Members of our Movement have, over the past few years, had their individual perceptions and assessment of the situation in the region. The position of our Movement has been enunciated in our documents. India has urged all the States in the region to undertake a dialogue which would resolve their differences, establish a durable peace and eliminate the involvement or threats of intervention by outside powers.

Fifteen years ago, the United Nations declared the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. Fifteen years later, the Ocean has been transformed into a theatre of heightened tension and potential conflict. This has not happened at the behest of the littoral or hinterland States. Nor is it in their interests. It is outside powers who are polluting the waters of the Indian Ocean with warships and nuclear submarines, erecting new command structures and establishing naval bases. Meanwhile, the Conference to implement the United Nations Declaration remains a distant harbour light. The Indian Ocean must be saved from the depredations of those whose military presence detracts from our security. Why should we be dragged into rivalries which are not of our making to which we are not party? The convening of the Conference is an imperative necessity. It is being blocked only by the recalcitrance of some of those who have inducted their forces into the Indian Ocean.

Let us also look within. Nothing has so saddened us as the tragic six-year old conflict between two of our Members. It has affected our Movement. Death, destruction, suffering and misery have fallen on so many. As Chairman of the Movement, and as a country enjoying the friendliest of ties with Iran and Iraq, we had said at New Delhi that we would continue consultations with both countries. We have done so on numerous occasions. Tragically, we have not met with success — nor have the efforts of others.

It must also give us cause for concern that we have achieved so little in our efforts at South-South cooperation. The dialogue between the North and the South is at a standstill. Meanwhile, should we not be revolutionizing the existing international economic order by tangible, broad-based cooperation among ourselves? We comprise nearly two billion of some of the most talen-

ted people in the world. We are inheritors of great civilizations which made pioneering contributions to humankind's knowledge of the universe, science and technology. It is to our countries that the colonialists came ferreting out natural resources which their own countries lacked. We possess skills aplenty, vast indigenous experience, and a reservoir of technology that has hardly been tapped. Finances too are available.

Why then has progress in mutual cooperation among developing countries been so slow? Perhaps it is because we still know so little about each other. At no professional level — be it engineers or doctors, architects or townplanners, industrialists or traders, economists or administrators — is there any widespread knowledge of what other developing countries are doing or what they can contribute. Our information antennae are oriented to the Occident. We should organise an effective information grid along which information about ourselves flows quickly and efficiently.

And while the information grid is being put in place, let us form groups of countries with pronounced complementarities to demonstrate the feasibility and advantages of cooperation among ourselves. This might set the pace and act as an example for the hesitant North. Meaningful economic cooperation among developing countries would also impart greater significance to multilateral schemes of cooperation such as the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). Finally, strengthened cooperation among ourselves would strengthen our negotiating power in parleys with the North.

The emphasis I am placing, as outgoing Chairman, on South-South cooperation must not be construed as downgrading or devaluing the need for resumption with verve of international cooperation for development. If the dialogue is in an impasse, it avails us little to reiterate well-worn positions. There must be imagination and flexibility in bringing the North to the negotiating table.

This is not an invitation to compromise on principles or to lower our sights. The world economic order is unjust, iniquitous. Governments which profess a doctrinal adherence to free trade retreat into protection in the face of our exports. New rounds of liberalization are pursued while the unfinished business of a decade is neglected. Not surprisingly, the unfinished business is our business. They seek to widen the ambit of GATT. But when it comes to our products, GATT rules are bypassed and "temporary

derogations" are sought to be made quasi-permanent. Technology is withheld or transferred not in response to development requirements but at the behest of ulterior motives.

The monetary system is devised to the advantage of those with economic power — and weighted against those in real difficulty. Official development assistance is down to a trickle. Aid is in danger of becoming a *quid pro quo* for political complicity. Meanwhile, austerity measures conceived in narrow perspectives, ignoring social compulsions and political reality, place intolerable strains on recipient countries.

Development was once recognized as the common concern of humankind. Institutions were fashioned to give expression to this concern. These are now in neglect. Bilateral programmes are promoted as a substitute for international cooperation.

A New International Economic Order will remove the irrationality and constraints which keep the developing countries poor and inflict instability, unemployment and bankruptcies on the North. Yet, for want of a bold vision, the North-South dialogue remains frustrated. Businessmen, intellectuals and workers in developed countries know better. Ours is an interdependent world. Continued prosperity in the developed countries is contingent on growth in the developing. Our prospects for development hinge crucially on stability in the advanced economies. Realization will dawn. Eventually, the dialogue will commence. We must keep ourselves in readiness for that day.

The debt problem of the developing countries has been particularly onerous in Latin America and Africa. We can only regret that the developed countries seem, by and large, to have opted for bilateral political persuasion and pressure. We place much greater faith in multilateral options based on harmonised thinking and concerted effort.

Famine and adverse trade circumstances have combined to aggravate an already critical situation in Africa. Tremendous efrorts are being made by African governments and the people to overcome these adversities. We in the Nonaligned Movement have already extended to Africa, our fullest cooperation. We will continue to make available to them our experience, our expertise and our technologies.

It is with satisfaction in the progress made and pride in our achievement that I lay down the office of Chairman of the Move-

ment. The relevance and influence of the Nonaligned Movement have grown with the years. Our role in the world derives not only from our numbers — although there is no denying that our numbers make us, as my mother said, "history's biggest peace movement". Nonalignment matters to the world because we are the conscience keepers of humanity. We are the voice of sanity. We are the refuge of the small State in an insecure world. We are the custodians of freedom and human dignity. We offer co-existence not co-destruction. We offer consensus not confrontation. We reject all domination and seek none ourselves. We are pledged to a world free from fear, free from hatred, free from want.

This gauge for humankind I pass on to Your Excellency. The courage and tenacity of Zimbabwe's fight for freedom was thrilling proof of the will to prevail. We are sure that under your leadership the unity, cohesion and solidarity of the Nonaligned Movement will grow from strength to strength. □

British Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Nineteenth Century Zanzibar

J.S. GUNDARA

Extraterritorial jurisdiction as a concept in international law was used in exercising control over the nationals of western powers in the so-called "semi-civilized" and "barbarous" states. This jurisdiction was exercised over British subjects in the dominions of the Sultan of Oman, amongst other countries. The British subjects were not traders from the metropole but from India. British jurisdiction, while making them dependent upon British power, did not necessarily enhance their interest in the Indian Ocean area. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over this important commercial group resulted in undermining the sovereign powers of the Sultanate in Zanzibar and East Africa. Hitherto, scholars have not thoroughly examined the complex nature of British control over the Indians and the East African countries prior to the period, when colonial and protectorate status was declared. In fact, extraterritorial jurisdiction in the nineteenth century laid the foundations for formal British control.

Two fundamental points need to be made at the outset. Firstly, that it was the inequity of the exploitative Omani slave trade, in which the Indians participated, which provided Britain with the pretext to intervene in these dominions. East Africans suffered from the dual yoke of the exploitative Omani slave trade as well as the long term implications of British imperial intervention. Secondly, the Indian trading community in Zanzibar had neither demanded nor required the privileges of extraterritoriality. Since they were an Indian Ocean trading community the benefits they received from this system were also of questionable value, as it was

primarily designed to protect and enhance the interest of the traders from the metrople. The effect of this jurisdiction was in fact complex and contradictory, because the disadvantages tended to outweigh the advantages. The Indian trading class was reduced from being a major trading class in the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century to being an intermediary trading class between the British trading system and the East African markets. This Indo-Omani collaboration with the British detracted from the collective resistance which they and the African kingdoms on the mainland could have mounted against British imperialism.

Extraterritoriality was achieved by negotiating advantageous treaties with the Zanzibar Sultanate. The treaties were implemented by the Political Agents of the Bombay and Indian Governments acting as Consuls of the Foreign Office. Subsequently, the consular role was assumed totally by the Foreign Office in London. The extraterritorial rights were exercised by the consuls using various treaties, Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, Orders in Council and Indian Penal Codes.

The Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said, attempted to establish political control over his East African dominions through his governors (*Walis*) from 1829 to 1845. The Omani Arabs and Indians had succeeded in establishing a commercial network of trade in East Africa and on Zanzibar. During this period, while Sultan Said was asserting his political control over the area, the United States of America, Britain and France were also attempting to strengthen their commercial relations through treaties which granted extraterritorial jurisdiction over their respective citizens. The Indians, as an Indian Ocean trading community, had settled in the Omani state independently of the British and had not requested British intervention to safeguard their interests[1].

During the nineteenth century, extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised as a result of the conclusion of treaties between stronger and weaker powers. These treaties did not grant reciprocal privileges to the weaker nations.

A treaty between Oman and the East India Company in 1798 led to the establishment of a Political Agency at Muscat in 1800. Further treaties in 1822 for the suppression of the slave trade, and the Convention of Commerce in 1839, were the beginnings of a complex process whereby both the Omani state in East Africa and the Indian community were made dependent upon the British.

The important effect of the extraterritorial clauses in the treaties was that they impinged on the territorial sovereignty of Zanzibar by controlling the legal and commercial activities of the subjects of the metropolitan state. The basic principle of extraterritoriality was that the British consular court adjudicated upon all crimes committed by British subjects and all civil actions brought against them. Conversely, all crimes committed by the nationals against British subjects and all civil actions against nationals by British subjects were to be ajudicated upon by national courts.

The 1822 engagements allowed Britain to suppress the slave trade in Oman; British cruisers gained the right to exercise certain controls over Omani-flag vessels on the high seas as well as in territorial waters. While the 1822 Treaty allowed the Sultan to continue the slave trade with Muslim countries, the 1845 Treaty placed further restrictions on the slave trade with these states. The right to seize and destroy slave-carrying vessels granted Britain enough powers to immobilise a large segment of Omani shipping, since the slave trade was one of the major Omani institutions. Hence, by 1862, when Oman and Zanzibar were finally separated into different states, shipping links between them had been weakened. After the death of Sultan Said in 1856, his son, Thuwaini, succeeded as the Sultan of Oman and his other son, Majid, became the ruler of Zanzibar. Majid declared his right to become independent from Muscat, and Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, arbitrated in this dispute, allowing Zanzibar to become independent, provided that an annual tribute was paid to Oman. The French and the British, in the Declaration of 1862, recognised the arbitral award and jointly agreed to respect the independence of Oman and Zanzibar.

The treaties with the United States of America (1833), Britain (1839) and France (1844) provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the citizens of these countries in Zanzibar[2]. The extraterritorial clauses in these treaties were not reciprocal and consequently created an inequitable situation whereby the weaker state graned extraterritorial privileges to the citizens and officials of the stronger states but did not in turn receive similar privileges. This process is viewed differently by different scholars. Keeton maintains that the treaties did not grant reciprocal rights to the Chinese or Turks because these traders never visited Europe. However, it was precisely this non-reciprocal aspect of the treaties which made them unequal. The Chinese scholar, Shih Shun Liu,

however, saw this from a different perspective. He wanted

> to get rid of the yoke of extraterritoriality ... Those countries which are still beneficiaries of this system may realise that it is a decadent institution and that reasonable demand for its progressive abrogation should be countenanced and granted[3]

The grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction to Christian nations by Zanzibar detracted from its sovereignty and only "when the power of European civilisation became responsible for the administration of justice, the necessity of extraterritorial rights disappeared'.[4] Keeton's claim indicates that states were to be accepted into the family of nations through international law, as regulated by the powerful European states.

Extraterritoriality as it existed in Zanzibar in the nineteenth century was nothing more than a legacy of a vaguely defined status of aliens in the ancient world, and a survival of the medieval theory of personal laws once prevalent everywhere in western Europe. The very same European states in the nineteenth century, however, would not have tolerated any incursion upon their own territorial sovereignty. One of the reasons advanced for the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Keeton was that Chinese and Muslim laws were too severe. This is questionable, since as late as 1827 an Act of Parliament enacted the death sentence for many common crimes. In Zanzibar, the Ibadhi sect of Islam used the *Shariah* as applied by the *qadis*. The Sultan from time to time issued decrees to legislate on various civil and commercial issues. According to the Koran, the infidel was outside the pale of Islamic law. Hence, foreigners were allowed to live under their own laws. European states, however, exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in countries like China, where they were not welcome, and the application of extraterritoriality allowing for the exercise of personal laws was only accepted by the Chinese after it was forced upon them treaty.[5]

The grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction to various European states created a judicial Babel in Zanzibar, and each consulate had a separate court which contributed immeasurably to the legal problems faced by the Sultan. Zanzibari citizens had no reciprocal 'most favoured nation' trading rights with Britain, and treaties with extraterritorial clauses were a heavy burden on the state. Keeton argues that these treaties were freely negotiated, mostly as normal incidences of commercial intercourse.

Even if they were not, it is an unquestioned international law

that a treaty obtained by the exercise of pressure by one state upon another, even at the end of a war, is nonetheless binding.[6]

The weaker nations found it difficult to terminate these treaties. Sheikh Mansur, an adviser to Sultan Said, had warned him that "when two nations, the one powerful, the other weak, entered into a lasting alliance, the latter, in the course of time, became subject to the former".[7] Mansur particularly warned Sultain Said about the weakness of Oman in relation to England, but the Sultanate had already signed the *Qualnamah* in 1798, since he needed the assistance of Britain to fight off the Qawasim, the Wahhabi incursions and pirate raids. Keeton argued that the unilateral advantages conferred by these treaties and the incompatibility of these treaties with sovereignty, did not present any bar to their being instruments of international law. For instance, the fact that Turkey found the unilateral provisions of these treaties incompatible with the modern conception of a state, and the lack of reciprocity a heavy burden upon it, did not entitle Turkey to annul or abrogate the treaty. Keeton found extraterritoriality to be a "normal mode of regulating commercial relations where the laws and institutions of a country did not conform to western standards".[8] The implications of this were that international commercial relations were derived from the West and conformed to western standards. The Zanzibari economy followed this pattern.

One of the worst features of Zanzibari trade was slavery. The abolition of the slave trade was one of the reasons given by the British for the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Zanzibar. F.H. Maddock, the Secretary of the Government of India, stressed that "the delay of a few years in the final extinction of this traffic is far less evil than the annihilation of British influence which the British Government may fairly hope to effect".[9] Lord Palmerston therefore weakened the anti-slavery measures and allowed the Sultan to hold on to his monopolies at Mirima, so that he could be cultivated as a political ally. The Indians were involved in some aspects of this trade but were accorded no such consideration because they were not an important political community. On the contrary, they were susceptible to stern legal control by the Consultate, which proved to be a successful method of establishing a British economic presence.

Treaties were made with foreign powers at international level by territorial sovereigns, although the jurisdiction acquired

through such treaties was exercised as a matter of municipal law with the authority of the Crown. Once the Crown had acquired powers over its subjects through the treaties, the Consuls relied on the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, Orders in Council and Indian codes to regulate the affairs of British subjects resident in Zanzibar. The Consuls perceived the interests of British Indian subjects and the Omani Empire in East Africa from a British standpoint. They could not conceive of Omani and Indian interests in terms of the communities based around the Indian Ocean.

The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 94) was enacted because there had been doubts about the exercise of consular jurisdiction. It did not confer territorial or any other jurisdiction, but facilitiated the exercise of it. The Act of 1878 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 67) was passed to give powers to the Crown to extend its application to any place where the Crown exercised foreign jurisdiction. The FJA of 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 37) amended and consolidated all the previous acts rule under the guise of protection".[10] While the FJA of 1843 in its preamble stated "While doubts have arisen...", the Act of 1890 stated more assertively, "It is and shall be lawful..." These Acts conferred powers which the Crown did not possess before and the legal powers so acquired by Britain increased its control over eastern Africa. The political and economic powers of the Zanzibar Sultanate and the Indians were curtailed. The Crown finally established a protectorate status based on various treaties and the FJA of 1890.

The Orders in Council were the warrants for the proceedings of the Consuls and were part of the superstructure based on the foundations of the FJAs. The earlier Orders in Council were enalarged and developed on the basis of previous experience. In the earlier stages the Consuls implemented provisions of these Orders in Council, but subsequently officials with legal experience were appointed as judges in the Consular Court. The Order in Council of 1866 was an immediate source from which the Consul could draw his powers.

The Order in Council of 1877 laid down that British subjects committing offeneces in Oman and Zanzibar under sections 367, 370 and 371 of the Indian Penal Code were to be dealt with as if any such abetment or offence was committed in any place in India.[11]

On the basis of Western Pacific Order in Council (Art. 25), the Foreign Office formulated an Order in Council "to empower

the Consul-General to remove from Zanzibar for a limited period a British subject or a protected persons".[12]

The 1884 Order in Council stated that if any British subject or protected person conducted himself in a manner dangerous to peace and good order on the East African mainland, he could be excluded from the Zanzibar dominions for a term not exceeding two years. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy and probate administration was vested in the Consular Court by Articles 83, 23 and 26.[13]

The 1884 Order in Council was also amended in 1888 to extend the powers of the Consul and provide that the promulgated legislation known as the Queen's Regulations would be binding on all those subject to the Order. The extension of the 1884 Order in Council and the 1889 Order in Council (Africa) covered not only consular jurisdiction, but also provided the legal basis for wider powers assumed by governmental activity imposed by the General Acts of the Berlin and Brussels Conference. Since the Foreign Office had enacted the Africa Order in Council (1889) after the Imperial British East Africa Comapny (IBEAC) had begun its work as a chartered compay, the British Government had incurred responsibilities on the African mainland. While the Order in Council of 1884 had applied to the coastal strip and Zanzibar island, the 1889 Order in Council

> was a more ambitious piece of legislation: it created a comprehensive framework of administration, including the power to hold courts and promulgate regulations, to be exercised usually by consuls and over British subjects, British protected persons and certain classes of indigenous inhabitants and foreigners.[14]

The introduction of Anglo-Indian Codes replaced some of the local and personal laws. These Indian codes imposed the moral underpinnings of the British legal system, while recognising Indian conditions. The Indian Penal Code of 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 were mainly used in Zanzibar, which was considered to be a district of the Bombay Presidency in these matters. The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure was applied in Zanzibar because it accepted the principle of personal and not territorial jurisdiction.[15]

The Order in Council of 1889 applied to East Africa but not to Zanzibar, and stressed the application of English laws on the mainland. Nevertheless, the appellate jurisdiction vested in the

Bombay High Court by the Order in Council of (Africa) 1892, empowered the Secretary of State to declare that any Indian enactment would have effect within the jurisdiction established under the Order of 1889.[16] By the time the Protectorate was declared in 1890, the British Consulate had been operating and Admiralty jurisdiction had been exercised for fifty years. The civil and crimial jurisdiction based on Indian law had been used for thirty years.

The imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction over British subjects in Zanzibar led to various other problems. The Consular Court could not exercise control over witnesses or plaintiffs of another nationality.[17] Prisoners, however, could be transported to Bombay for prosecution at the Bombay High Court.[18] The Consul-General held the powers of a sessions judge of the Bombay High Court and his judicial assistant held the powers of a magistrate at district level.

The British Consulate faced the problem of policing the activities of its subjects. The Consular Court had attempted to persuade the Sultan to grant it local policing powers as far as criminal matters were concerned, but Sultan Barghash promised to improve his own police rather than allow the Consulate to have a police force. Justice under such circumstances was arbitrary. During 1883, the incidence of murders and robberies against Indians in Marka and Mombasa had increased, but no criminals were apprehended and the Royal Navy punished whole communities. This action was unjust because innocent members of the community were victimised, since there was no proper policing agancy to arrest criminals as such. Such reprisals further alienated the British Indian community from the coastal African and Arab communities. This was particularly damaging because the British Indian subjects received partial rather than comprehensive protection in return for total loyalty to the Crown. British protection was neither systematic nor reasonable, because they had no police force and the Sultan was unable to provide adequate security.[19] Hence, while the Indians lost their local commercial domicile and police protection, they received inadequate protection as British nationals.

The Indian commercial community did not systematically protest against the dubious advantages of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Zanzibar dominions. The effect of this jurisdiction was illustrated by Consul Elton during his visit to the coast. He wrote

that increased British control over the Indians placed them "more completely under our protection, their only links with the Arab Government being broken".[20] Consul-General Kirk stated that Indians residing in Zanzibar could not exempt themselves from British law by taking service with the Sultan and that those Indians who administered the affairs of the Customs House on behalf of the Sultan would be brought to trial if they were implicated in the slave trade issue, even if they were "acting under the Sultan's order".[21]

It was the punitive rather than the protective aspect of control which affected the Indians. The divergence in the application of law extended to anti-slavery provisions. For example, English planters in the Caribbean had been compensated for the release of slaves, but the Indians, as British subjects, received no such consideration. The political functions of the Consulate involved a certain amount of conflict with its judicial functions. In 1860-61, Consul Rigby had imposed a fine of £100 for every slave not released and imprisoned the wealthiest Indian at the fort. Rigby's rigorous actions against the British protected persons, without any operative Order in Council, were legally questionable. He justified his position by maintaining that slavery was "prohibited by Britain as a superior power".[22] although members of the Indian community went on strike (*hartal*) in protest against his actions. While Indian participation in the slave trade remains indefensible, their objections to differential treatment from English subjects remains valid. This difference in the treatment of Indians continued, even when the Imperial British East African Company was established. Seventy-five Indians resident on the mainland later rebelled against the IBEAC's decision to ask Indians to register with it and pay a registration fee to carry on business, stating that they were subjects of the Crown and not the Company. The British Consulate, while recognising that the Indians were correct in their assumptions, supported the IBEAC lest the Comapny's interests be jeopardised.[23] The Consular Court in Zanzibar heard more civil cases than criminal cases, although during 1873 only sixty-eight civil cases were heard because of paramount political claims on Consul-General Kirk's time. In addition to the paramount political interests of the Consulate, there were certain disadvantages arising from the uncertainty of laws which applied to civil actions. For example, in a case involving a British subject and an American, the case would be heard in the consular court of whoever filed the suit first. This necessarily involved different rights and liabilities.

The Political Agent for the Bombay Government (1841-73) in Zanzibar was also commissioned as the Consul for the Foreign Office in London. The work connected with the slave trade augmented the functions of the consular court and the Foreign Office became increasingly involved in Zanzibar. This expanded importance of commercial and political relations led to the Bombay Governments' handing over the Agency to the Indian Government on 23 January 1873, because of questions of a "purely imperial character, such as on 23 January 1873, because of questions of a "purely imperial character, such as no authoirty but the highest in India could venture to decide".[24] European interests in the area were growing very rapidly and by 1881 Lord Harrington of the India Office noted this increased interest of Europe in Zanzibar and that "the interests of the Government of India in Zanzibar had proportionatey decreased".[25]

The British consuls were salaried officials and as such were preferable to the American trading consuls, whose personal commercial interests conflicted with their judicial duties. However, the consuls were mainly English, while the British subjects settled in Zanzibar were mainly Indians. The English consuls were very conscious of furthering metropolitan interest, sometimes even when they were in conflict with those of the British Indian community, whose interests they were supposed to be protecting. Consul Churchill had "overstepped the limits of (his) power",[26] by placing British protected persons from Kutch under British jurisdiction. Because he did not want Britain to lose any influence in Zanzibar, he justified his authoritarian position towards the British protected persons. Hence, the question of the legality of his actions as a consul and the question of protecting British Indian interests were not uppermost in his mind. Bartle Frere, on his fact-finding mission about slavery, scarcely paid any attention to the views of Kazi Shahubbudin, who was supposed to represent the Indian communicty.[27] Frere's findings, therefore, took no account of the Indian community.

Despite the all-encompassing jurisdiction of the British Consulate, the Indians were subject to discrimination by consular officials. Indian consular officials were not appointed to protect Indian interests in Zanzibar. While English consuls were considered to be adequate for purposes of defending Indian interests, Indian officials were not considered to be capable of performing the same function for Englishmen in India or under extraterritorial jurisdiction in Zanzibar. The Ilbert Bill was



introduced in India in 1883 by Viceroy Rippon, to give Indian magistrates and sessions judges the same powers as their English counterparts to try Europeans. This Bill was defeated. The very same English officers who had powers to provide extraterritorial privileges to Indians in Zanzibar were not able to accept equality with Indian officials in India.

Consul General Euan-Smith's ability to protect the interests of Indians in Zanzibar was highly questionable. He was opposed to the appointment of any senior Indian official in the Consulate, even if they had professional skills.[28] Kirk and Euan-Smith had fairly close relations with William Mackinnon, the Chairman of IBEAC. Kirk joined the IBEAC as a director after relinquishing his post in Zanzibar. Euan-Smith's personal relationship with Mackinnon included loaning of sums of money to the former. This happened during the period when IBEAC was establishing itself on the East African coast. At the some time, an Indian courtier of the Sultan, Peera Dewji, was deported for opposing IBEAC's interests.[29] The deportation was not carried out according to the law and demonstrated the overtly political nature of some of the Consulate's judicial functions.

In view of the fact that Indian businesses operated separately from Zanzibar commerce because of extraterritoriality, both commercial communities became subject to manipulation. It is therefore not surprising that at the turn of the century the Omani and Indian commercial elite of Zanzibar had become divided and completely disappeared. They were replaced by an Indian trading class who played an intermediary role between the British corporate structures and the East African markets in the East African colonial regimes during the twentieth century.

In commercial terms there were two dimensions to the Zanzibari and Indian commerce. The first was the detrimental effect on the economy because of the implementation of the 'most favoured nation' clauses in the treaties. The second was that the economy and Indian commercial interests were defined and protected only in as much as they conformed to the wider British interests. The biggest losses were inflicted upon the East African populations on the mainland, who initially suffered as a result of slavery and eventually under direct colonial rule.

The British Indian subjects were not only subject to the punitive aspects of extraterritoriality but also enjoyed certain commercial privileges or tax exemptions which allowed them "to compete

unfairly against native merchants. Protected by their own laws and subject to a few local restrictions, the westerners built up economic monopolies in such foreign states".[30] The commercial treaty of 1839 brought an increasingly large segment of British subjects' life within the circumspection of the British Consulate. This treaty and treaties generally (Capitulations in Turkey) made with Eastern countries granted British subjects exemptions regarding their person, houses and property from arrest, entry and taxation. Bartle Frere, in 1875, assessed the impact of American, German, French and British commercial treaties. He asserted that while Sultan Said, by means of treaties with the above powers had wished to promote trade and induce foreign allies to settle in Zanzibar, the "terms... have since seriously fettered the action and limited the fiscal resources of the ruler of the state".[31] The Sultan had limited the customs duties to a very low level and bound himself to abstain from monopolising articles of trade through a 'most favoured nation' clause. Therefore, each power demanded for is own subjects the same privileges and exemptios which had been granted to another power.

> The foreign consuls were rarely inclined to diminish, even in appearance, the importance of privileges secured to subjects of their own government, so that Seyyid's power to tax trade for fiscal purposes was limited to those few traders who could claim no protection from a foreign consul.[32]

Bartle Frere further maintained that Britain had a "greater special interest" than any of the other powers with similar treaty rights because of her help to the Sultanate. He did not, however, discuss the effects of this "greater special interest" on the sovereignty of the Sultanate, or on the freedom of the Indian merchant class who had not demanded this protection.

The treaty signed after the 1873 Frere Mission restricted the Sultan's power even further and the 1886 Treaty confirmed the jurisdiction granted in 1839 and reaffirmed extraterritorial rights of porperty and person of those under British jurisdiction. The Sultan's subjects paradoxically did not enjoy any of these exemptions and were not kindly disposed towards the Indian business community with whom they had dificulty in competing because of their commercial privileges. These traders therefore found it difficult to compete with those who enjoyed the unfair advantages through extraterritorial commercial jurisdiction. Sultans Said,

Majid and Barghash were not able to transform their empire into a cohesive political unit. Even as a commercial empire, the extrateritorial treaty privileges enjoyed by foreign nationals had negated the financial intrests of the Aab trading and land-owning class. In commercial terms, the Indians were further alienated from the regime of the Sultan since they could not own land either directly or through mortgage. However, ownership for land through fore-closure of mortgages continued. Captain Colomb, while visiting Zanzibar, remarked:

> I understand that the Arabs were themselves conscious that in consequence of this process and of general incidence of British policy, Zanzibar island was in the course of absorbtion by England.[33]

The Indians who had acquired land through foreclosures further needed British consular protection, which was not forthcoming, to safeguard their estates and became even further alienated from the Arab commercial community.

The Customs House was the major centralising institution of the Zanzibari economy and the Customs Master played an important role both in narrow commercial terms and the wider political perspective. During the early years of the Consulate, the links between the Customs Master Sewji and the American trader-cum-consul had impelled Consul Hamerton to intervene in Zanzibar lest the Americans became a major power in this area. British links with the Sewji firm became closer and Consul-General Kirk was directly able to intervene with the Sultan to support the continuation of Sewji's contract as the lessee of the Customs House. As a result, the Sultan lost a great deal of revenue since he could not accept a higher offer.[34] Kirk was then able to intervene more easily in commercial matters through the Customs Master.

Extraterritoriality was generally used to secure the interests of the foreigners subject to its jurisdiction. In the case of the Indian community extraterritoriality had dual and contradictory functions. In as much as the Indians were legally nationals of a foreign and superior power and had commercial connections with British India, their interests in the short term were secure in Zanzibar. The jurisdiction was imposed in matters of probate and administration by denying them domicile in Zanzibar. This jurisdiction raised "a fundamental problem since a British subject could not acquire a domicile in a country in which he had

extraterritorial privileges".[35] In as much as the Indians were part of the Indian Ocean trade system and an integral part of the Omani Empire, the jurisdiction was inimical to their long term interests. The Consulate provided only partial protection in a foreign sovereign state. The Indians' inability to acquire domicile as "British subjects in Oriental countries though they had their fixed abode there"[36] was contrary to their interests. Their freedoms within the commercial framework of the Sultan's regime were negated, while simultaneously the powers of the Sultan were also eroded.

The Indians, Omanis and the Zanzibari elite had been partners in the field of maritime commerce. An American researcher had written:

> Before the European manufacturers and traders finally captured the economic supremacy of the region during the 19th century, Indian manufacturing, distributing and marketing activities were the key elements in the economic life of the great expanse of Asia and Africa.[37]

The legitimate Indo-Omani ocean-going vessels suffered during the anti-slavery campaigns because the Royal Navy and the Indian Navy ignored various circulars, Acts of Parliament, treaties and conventions (because they were tedious or inaccurate) and they destroyed Indian and Arab vessels on the slightest suspicion of slave trading. Indisputable proof was required before Arab craft could be detained and "if their approach had been one of technical obedience to the law very few Arab craft would have been condemned or destroyed".[38] Arab and Indian masters of vessels were not familiar with the treaty engagements and there was a dearth of interpreters. Thus they paid undue penalties if they "overstepped the legal mark by a hair's breadth".[39] The coming of steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further reduced the role of the Indo-Omani mercantile trade in the Indian Ocean. William MacKinnon's British India Steam Navigation Company began to play a prominent role in the Indian Ocean after it started a monthly mail service between Aden and Zanzibar in 1872.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, British firms found it very difficult to compete with local traders. In the 1840s, a small English firm of Newman, Hunt and Christopher had closed down in Zanzibar since they were not competitive. In the last few decades of the nineteenth century, large English firms, assisted by better communications, began to increase their operations. The IBEAC started its operations on the East African mainland with a

Royal Charter and their interests did not always complement those of the Indian merchants. Mackinnon disagreed with the views of Consuls Holmwood and Macdonald that the bulk of the trade was virtually in British hands: "I hardly admit that the trade done by *native* Indian subjects can be described as in British hands, nor do I think Manchester would hold different view from mine".[40]

Mackinnon's attitudes were noteworthy: despite the wealth he made in the British Indian Empire, he did not see fit to acknowledge the rights of Indians as British subjects; secondly, the IBEAC was actively involved in using the commercial base cultivated by the Indians to entrench its own interests. However, Mackinnon wanted to stress to the Foreign Office the paramount importance of his company for British interest by negating the importance of Indians in East Africa.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction enhanced the interest of the metropolitan powers. The British Consulate did not consult or allow British subjects a democratic choice on the issue of domicile, nationality or protection. Indo-Omani commerce and shipping suffered grave losses during the anti-slavery campaign. Towards the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the IBEAC and the German East Africa Company were easily able to incorporate the Sultan's East African dominions into their respective areas of influence.[41] The direct economic power of the Indians had grown with the strength of the Zanzibari Sultanate. As the British involvement increased, the Indo-Omani power decreased and Indo-Omani energies were directed towards the establishment of British imperialism in the region.

The intensification of the dependence of Indians on Britain reflected the similar overwhelming dependence of Zanzibar on Britain. After 1890, when protectorate status was declared, the Indians as a commercial class had become more divided on sectarian lines as Ismailis, Bohras, Parsees and Memons because of their weak commercial and political position. They had become politically isolated from the enfeebled Sultanate of Zanzibar, from the marginal interest of the Indian Government and from the British Government whose legal subjects they were acclaimed to be, but which treated them differently than it did the English-born Briton.

The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the Indian community in nineteenth century Zanzibar illustrated that this community had no protection against the abuse of power by their extraterritorial protectors. This onesided aspect of legal control

resulted in this small country becoming malleable and their observance of extraterritorial jurisdiction was used as an element in laying the groundwork for the establishment of the colonial and protectorate the interests of the weak against the strong but used them to entrench the interest of Britain as a stronger power.

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1 The first solitary intervention was in 1811, when Captain Smee and Lieutenant Hardy disallowed Governor Yacout from levying exorbitant taxes on Indians. *See Transactions of Bombay Geographical Society*, Vol. VI (Bombay: 1844), pp. 23-61.

2 D.C.M. Platt: *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825* (London: 1971) Initial gratuitous grants were made by stronger powers as capitulations to weak trading communities in the Levant. However, during the nineteenth century the situation had reversed, since the grants under the treaties made by weaker states derogated from their sovereignty.

3 Shih Shun Liu: *Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline* (New York: 1925) pp 234-5

4 G.W. Keeton: *Extraterritoriality in International and Comparative*: Law Academie do Droit International (Paris: 1948) p 307

5 Wellington Ku: *The Status of Aliens in China* (New York: 1912) p 47

6 Keeton: *op. cit.* p 350

7 Sheikh Mansur: *History of Said Seyyid, Sultan of Muscat* (London: 1919) p 73

8 Keeton: *op. cit.* p 353

9 P.R.O. F.O. 54.5 No. 268, enc. 18, sub. enc. 1, Maddock to Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, 28-2-1843

10 C.P. Lucas: *The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise* (Oxford: 1917) p 152 The FJA of 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 116) provided that the term "British Colony" in the previous Act included any of Her Majesty's possessions outside of the United Kingdom.

11 C.J. Tarring: *British Consular Jurisdiction in the East* (London: 1887) p 11 FJA 39 & 40 Vict. c. 76

12 P.R.O. F.O., 84.1883, No. 54 enc., F.O. to Euan-Smith, 6-3-1889; R.S. Wright, Note, 22-2-1889

13 C. Tanning: *op. cit.* p 99

14 Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan: *Public Law and Political Change in Kenya* (Nairobi: 1970) pp 15-16

15 Holland: *Jurisprudence* (Oxford: 1882) p 319

[16] H.F. Morris and J.S. Read : *Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice* (Oxford : 1972) p 113

[17] The Foreign Office warned Consul Hamerton that witnesses could not be compelled to leave Zanzibar. P.R.O. F.O. 54.5, F.O. to India Board, 9-2-1843.

[18] In 1878, the Bombay High Court had acquitted Gulamhusain on a murder charge, despite overwhelming evidence, because an Arab witness could not be sent to Bombay. See P.R.O. F.O., 84.1515, No. 125, Kirk to F.O. 7-10-1878. Case No. 50 enc. 1, (1878)

[19] P.R.O. F.O., 84.1417, Kirk to F.O. 2-12-1875. At Barawa HMS 'Thetis' threatened to bombard the town because of threats against the Indians. At Lamu, 50 Indians welcomed British assistance, although the Foreign Office warned Consul-General Kirk against taking such measures.

[20] P.P. Vol LXII (1874) No. 5, Enc. 1. Elton to Capt. Prideaux 4-4-1874, p 24

[21] PRO FO 89.1376, No. 113, Sub-enc. 2, Kirk to FO 7-10-1872.

[22] P.O. Vol. XII Report of the Committee on Slave Trade (1870), p 50

[23] PRO FO 84.2230, No. 67, Portal to F.O., 24-3-1893

[24] NAI Foreign Dept. (Secret) File No. 101, June 1872, India Govt. to India Office, 1-3-1873

[25] P.R.O. F.O. 84.1694, Kirk to F.O. 28-11-1882

[26] P.R.O. F.O. 84.1307, Churchill to Secretary of Bombay Govt. 26-3-1869

[27] John Martineau : *The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere*, Vol. II (London : 1895) p 89

[28] P.R.O. F.O. 84,2062, No. 175, Euan-Smith to F.O., 20-4-1890

[29] P.R.O. F.O. 84.1976, NO. 49, Euan-Smith to F.O., 1-2-1889

[30] L.C. Langham : *The Imperialist Reader* (New York & London : 1973) p 57

[31] B. Frere : "Zanzibar as a Commercial Power," *Macmillans Magazine*, Vol xxxii. July 1875, p 280

[32] Ibid.

[33] Captain Colomb : *Slave Catching in the Indian Ocean* (London : 1873) p 378

[34] NAI, Foreign Department, No. 11-15, NO. 1, Bombay Govt. to Foreign Dept., Govt. of India, 18-11-1871.

[35] F. Piggot : *Extraterritoriality : The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and Residence in Oriental Countries* (London : 1872) p 127

[36] Ibid.

[37] R.G. Landen : *Oman since 1856* (Princeton : 1967) p 82

[38] G.S. Graham : *Britain and the Indian Ocean : A Study of Maritime Enterprise 1810-1850* (London : 1967) p 137

[39] *Ibid.* p 146

[40] P.R.O. F.O. 84.1854, Mackinnon to F.O., 25-1-1888 Mackinnon deleted the word "British" and inserted "native" (his emphasis).

[41] Leonard Woolf : *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (London : 1920) pp 242-302

Exploitation of Seabed Resources of the 'Area': The Institutional and Legal Framework

*H.P. RAJAN**

The first and the second UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva 1958 and 1960 respectively did not deal with this subject. In the earlier conferences the participation of the third world countries especially Asia, Africa and Latina America was also limited. On the other hand, the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea witnessed very wide and substantial participation from the third world States. The African states have been particularly active, and has contributed immensely in the negotiations. Some important concepts such as the Exclusive Economic Zone contained in the Convention are result of the initiative of the African states. The African states had organised several regional seminars to undertake indepth discussions on some of the crucial issues concerning the Law of the Sea. Mention should be made of the seminar held at Yaounde in 1972, the OAU Conferences of 1973, 1974 and 1975, the meeting of the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states held at Kampala in 1974, the non-aligned countries meetings held in Lusaka in 1970, Georgetown in 1972, Algiers in 1973 etc. In addition, the African states had discussed the Law of the Sea and evolved various propositions in the several meetings of the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee.

The Law of the Sea Convention will come into force 12 months after 60 States ratify or accede to it. As of date, 29 States have ratified the Convention of which 13 countries are from Africa, including the Council of Namibia.[1]

* The views expressed in this article are my personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India.

Exploitation of Seabed resources of the 'Area' (i.e. the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction) is governed by the provisions of the new Convention on the Law of the Sea [Part XI of the Convention Articles 133 to 191 and Annex III and IV]. The term 'Area' refers to the Seabed and subsoil outside the exclusive economic zone and continental margin where the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastline. The outer limits of the continental margin is determined by the provisions of Article 76 of the Convention. This article stipulates that the boundary shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2500 metre isobath. Given the scope for disagreement about the precise location of the junction of the slope and the rise, and the precise thickness of sediments on the rise, it is logical to assume that selected lines will be very close to the maximum limits permitted. It is also natural that countries will attempt to determine whether a boundary 350 nautical miles distant from the baselines or 100 nautical miles seaward of the 2500 metre isobath is furthest from the coast and then to search for justification for adopting the mere distant line. The exploitation of the resources of the Area thus determined, in effect means exploitation at depths ranging from 2000 to 6000 metres in the high seas. The traditional international law, both customary and codified, did not contemplate that such exploitation is possible in the forseeable future.[2] The rules and regulations governing the Area has been the subject matter of most intense, and controversial negotiations between the developing and the developed world at the Third United Nations Conference on at Law of the Sea, III UNCLOS. The provisions of the Convention reflects a compromise arrived through numerous packages and consensus.

The technological revolution of the sixties coupled with the emergence of new nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America made it imperative that exploitation of seabed resources of the Area be regulated. The consequences of unregulated exploitation of seabed resources, it was felt, would be grave. In a historic statement before the General Assembly on 1 November 1967, Ambassador Pardo of Malta vehemently emphasized that current and future technological breakthrough making the seabed and ocean floor more accessible and exploitable would "lead to a competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the land underlying the world's seas and oceans, surpassing in magnitude and in its implication last century's colonial scramble for territory in Asia and Africa".[3] This process of national appropriation, he said, would result *inter alia*, in the following:

(a) inequitable allocation of food, fuel and mineral resources;
(b) have a negative impact on land-based mineral resources;
(c) include the increased use of seabed and ocean floor for military purposes, accompanied by an intensified arms race in the deep ocean area; and
(d) result in increased pollution of the marine environment, including radioactive pollution.

The General Assembly responded to Pardo's call by creating an adhoc committee of 35 nations to study the scope and various aspects of "the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the uses of their resources in the interests of mankind."[4] This committee met in three sessions during 1968. It established two working groups to deal with the economic and technical matters, and the legal aspects. Its report to the General Assembly in 1968 stressed the need for more study including the military aspects. The General Assembly made the adhoc committee into a Standing Committee of 42 members to study the various aspects, including the establishment of an appropriate international machinery.

In 1969 the General Assembly adopted a resolution which declared that pending the establishment of an international regime, states and persons were bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdication.[5] This resolution, commonly known as the moratorium resolution was voted by 62 States in favour with 28 votes against and 28 abstentions. In 1970, the twentyfifth session of the General Assembly, by a vote of 108 in favour, none against and 14 abstentions adopted the Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction.[6] This 15-point Declaration recognised *inter alia* that the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (known as the Area), as well as the resources of the Area are the common heritage of mankind. This is the cardinal principle of the new Law of the Sea.[7] This principle replaces the traditional concept of the freedom of the seas. The freedom of the seas doctrine is not viable at a time when the increasing value of marine resources and the growing intensity and diversity of the uses of the sea makes recognised authority and management imperative. The Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle has five major implications, viz;

(a) non-appropriation, the Common Heritage can be used but not owned; it is an area where there is no property;
(b) a system of management in which all users share;
(c) an active sharing not only of financial benefits but also of the benefits derived from shared management and transfer of technologies;
(d) the reservation of the ocean space for peaceful purposes;
(e) reservation for future generations.

The CHM Declaration envisaged the creation of an appropriate international machinery and the establishment of an international treaty of a universal character.[8]

The new Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises that the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.[9] In the section dealing with the principles governing the Area, all the elements of the CHM resolution have been incorporated.[10]

As an essential part of the 'common heritage' concept, an administrative organisation, namely an International Seabed Authority has been established.[11] All states Parties to the Convention are *ipso facto* members of the Authority.[12] The Authority is an organisation through which states Parties shall "organise and control activities in the Area".[13] The Authority is to conduct its activities through its organs, and comprises of an Assembly, the Council, a Secretariat and the Enterprise.

The Assembly is the most representative organ of the Authority. Each member shall have one representative in the Assembly, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.[14] A majority of the members of the Assembly shall constitute the quorum. Each member of the Assembly has one vote. Decision on questions of procedure including decisions to convene special sessions are to be taken by the majority of the members present and voting.[15] Decisions on questions of substance are to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the members participating in that session.[16] When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, it shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Assembly by a majority required for decisions on questions of substance.[17] The voting on a question of substance may be deferred for 5 days if requested by one-fifth of the membership.[18]

The Assembly being the sole organ of the Authority consisting of all members is considered to be the supreme organ of the Authority, to which all other organs are made accountable.[19] A

detailed list of the powers and functions of the Assembly is set out in Article 160 para 2 of the Convention. The real dominance of the Assembly lies in its ultimate control of the budget and through its power to elect the members of the Council and the Secretary General. It may also be mentioned here that certain powers have been conferred on the Assembly in other parts of the Convention too. These are as follows :

(a) payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (Article 82 paragraph 4);
(b) functions relating to marine scientific research (Article 143);
(c) powers relating to transfer of technology (Article 144);
(d) protection of the marine environment (Article 145);
(e) protection of human life (Article 146);
(f) funding of the Enterprise and related repayment schedules (Annex IV, Article 10);
(g) selection of members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Annex VI, Article 36);
(h) request for advisory opinions from Seabed Disputes Chamber (Article 191);
(i) Amendments to the provisions of the Convention relating exclusively to activities in the Area (Article 314);
(j) power to establish subsidiary organs (Article 160 (2) d) but none are specifically provided for in the Convention.

The Council is the executive organ of the Authority. It consists of 36 members. Its limited membership is meant to reflect economic, political and geographic interests and act in a business-like and efficient manner. The composition and voting procedure in the Council has been one of the most difficult issues before the III UNCLOS. Article 161 provides that the Assembly shall elect the members of the Council in the following manner :

(i) Four of the world's largest consumers or importers of minerals to be derived the Area, including one from the Eastern European (Socialist) region.
(ii) Four from among the eight of the world with the largest investment in seabed mining, including one from the Eastern European (Socialist) region.
(iii) Four of the world's largest exporters of metals; and
(iv) six from the category of developing states representing special interests viz. large populations, land-locked and geographi-

cally disadvantaged states, major importers, potential produceres and least developed states.

The rest of the 18 members are to be elected from five specified regions, at least one being from each region: Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe (Socialist), Western Europe and others. This election must ensure, taking into account regional representation already achieved in the election of the first 18 members, that these categories are equitably represented (numerically) on the Council as a whole.

It may be mentioned here, that the Nordic countires and a few other medium-sized industrialized countries had insisted at the Conference that their representation in the Council was not adequate. Similarly, the African group of States which number around 50 were disturbed by the fact that under the proposed scheme their representation would be very small. The industrialized countries of Western Europe, on the other hand, insisted that their representation in the category of substantial investors should be increased to six. USA continued to emphasize that whilst certain seats have been guaranteed to the Socialist bloc, no such guarantee existed in favour of the West.

The question of decision-making in the Council has been one of the most controversial issues and continued to be so even during the final sessions of the Conference. It may be recalled that Articles 161 (7) of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text drafted during the sixth session of the Conference, (ICNT/Rev.1) provided that all decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the members present and voting, provided that such majority included a majority of the members participating in that Session. When the issue arose as to whether the question was one of substance or not, the question was to be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for questions of substance. Decisions on matters of procedure were to be decided by a majority of the members present and voting. This provision was not acceptable to many states who felt that the requirement of three-fourths majority was too high and preferred that decisions on matters of substance should be taken by a two-thirds majority. It may be recalled that the original position of the *Group of 77* also advocated a two-third majority on matters of substance and the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) drafted during the fourth session of the Conference had provided for a two-thirds plus one majority on such questions. The crux of the problem, however, was in regard to the

role of the special interest groups in the decision-making process. Some countries insisted that in addition to a two-thirds majority, the decisions should also require approval by a majority of the interest-groups concerned. In that connection, *a Norwegian* proposal suggested that decisions on substantive matters should be taken by a two-thirds majority *plus* a simple majority in three out of four, or four out of five, interest groups. The *Western industrialised countries*, on the other hand, demanded "adequate protection of their interests" which in effect involved granting of a blocking vote. They proposed a concurrent majority system in which an overall majority (which some of them were prepared to accept as simple majority) must be coupled with qualified majorities in at least each of the categories of substantial investors and major importers. They proposed as "compromise" an overall two-thirds majority which included a two-thirds majority of members present and voting in *each* of the two categories contained in the ICNT, namely, special interests and general/geographical group. The developing countries viewed this system as little different from the collective veto or weighted vote system and were totally proposed to it. The *Jamaican* proposal in this regard contemplated a three-tier system of voting: a simple majority for procedural matters; a two-third majority of those present and voting in respect of substantive matters; and for four or five identifiable critical matters, a vote of two-third of those present and voting provided there were less than nine negative votes cast. The main difficulty in that proposal, was the identification of four, five or six matters which could be regarded as more important than the rest. As regards blocking minority, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries preferred the number to be either 3 or 10 whilst the USA, EEC and Latin American countries were prepared to accept the number as 5. The final position that has emerged through many informal working groups and negotiating groups, and contained in the Convention is that the decision on questions of procedure will be taken by a simple majority whilst on question of substance, for specific matters, a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting are required, and on certain other questions, a three-fourth majority of the members present and voting is necessary (See Table 1). For yet another set of categories the decision has to be by consensus, which means absence of any formal objection.

Table 1

Voting Procedure in the Council

Simple majority of those present and voting.	On questions of procedure.
Two-thirds majority of those present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the member of the council.	On questions of substance arising out of the following: i) entering into agreements with UN or other international organisations of behalf of the Authority (Article 162 (2) (f)); ii) consideration of the reports of the enterprise (Article 162 (2) (g)); iii) presentation of annual reports and special reports to the Assembly (Article 162 (2) (h)); (iv) issuing of directives to the enterprise (Article 162)2) (i)); (v) recommendations to the Assembly regrading the system of compensation or other measures of economic adjustment (Article 162 (2) (n). (vi) review regarding payments (Article 162 (2) (p). (vii) action following a decision by the Seabed Disputes Chamber on any proceedings (Article 162 (2) (v). (viii) seeking of advisory opinions on legal questions from the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Article 191).
Three-fourths majority of those present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the members of the council.	On questions of substance arising out of the following: (i) powers of the Council regarding specific policies to be pursued by the Authority (Article 162 (1)). (ii) Supervision and implementation by the Council (Article 162 (2) (a). (iii) proposal on candidates for the election of the Secretary-General (Article 162 (2) (b). (iv) recommendations of candidates for the election of the members of the Governing Board of the Enterprise and Director-General of the Enterprise

(Article 162 (2) (c).
(v) establishment and composition of subsidiary organs of the Council (Article 162 (2) (d).
(vi) adoption of the rules of procedure of the Council including the method of selecting its President (Article 162 (2) (e)
(vii) control of activities in the Area (Article 162 (2) (1))
(viii) selection of applicants for production authorisation (Article 162 (2) (q)).
(ix) proposal of annual budget of the Authority to the Assembly (Article 162 (2) (r)).
(x) recommendations to the Assembly on policies (Article 162 (2) (s)).
(xi) recommendation regarding suspension of rights and privileges of membership (Article 162 (2) (t)).
(xii) institution of proceedings on behalf of the Authority before the Seabed Disputes Chamber in cases of non-compliance by a contractor or a sponsor (Article 161 (8) (c) read with Article 162 (2) (u)).
(xiii) issue of emergency orders, including suspension or adjustment of operations to prevent serious harm to the marine environment provided that orders issued thereunder may be binding for not more than 30 days unless confirmed by a decision taken by consensus. (Article 161 (8) (c) read with Article 162 (2) (w)).
(xiv) disapprove areas for exploitation by contractors or enterprise on the ground of risk to marine environment (Article 162 (2) (x)).
(xv) establishment of subsidiary organs regarding certain financial matters (Article 162 (2) (y)).
(xvi) inspection mechanisms for the staff of inspectors (Article 162 (2) (z)).
(xvii) increase of the composition of the Economic Planning Commission or Legal and Technical Commission (Article 163 (2)).
(xviii) borrowing powers of the Authority (Article 174 (3))
(xix) finances of the Enterprise (Annex IV, Article II).

By consensus. On questions of substance arising out of the following:
(i) regarding measures for protection from adverse economic effects (Article 162 (2) (m)).
(ii) recommendations to the Assembly regarding rules, regulations and procedures on equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits, and recommendations regarding rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority (Article 162 (2) (o)).
(iii) amendments to Part XI.

The Council has the powers to establish such subsidiary organs as it may deem necessary. Unlike as in the case of Assembly, the Convention specifically provides for two subsidiary organs of the Council,[20] viz. the Economic Planning Commission and the Legal and Technical Commission. Both these commissions are composed of 15 members elected by the Council from among the candidates nominated by the States Parties. Members of the Commission shall have appropriate qualifications in the area of competence of that Commission.

The main function of the Economic Planning Commission are set forth in Article 164 and in general it concerns:

(a) monitoring of the metal market with a view to safeguarding the interests of land-based metal producers, and
(b) make appropriate recommendations on remedial action including the establishment of a system of compensation. In addition, Article 14 of Annex III requires that the Economic Planning Commission alongwith the Legal and Technical Commission make recommendations regarding incentives to contractors.

The functions of the *Legal and Technical Commission* is provided in Article 165. It has the main task of reviewing all plans of work submitted to the Authority and making recommendations as to whether they should or should not be approved. The Council is required to act upon each plan of work within sixty days of its submission by the Legal and Technical Commission.[21] If the Commission recommends the approval of a plan of work, *it shall be deemed to have been approved* by the Council if no member of the Council submits in writing to the President within 14 days a specific objection alleging non-compliance with the requirements for the approval of

plans of work stipulated in Article 6 of Annex III.[22] On the other hand. if the Commission recommends the disapproval of a plan of work or does not make a recommendation, it may still be approved by the Council through a three-fourths majority of the members present and voting, provided that such majority includes the majority of the members participating in that session.[23] This provision, it is submitted, somewhat whittles down the powers of the Legal and Technical Commission. It must be borne in mind that the Legal and Technical Commission functions on the basis of the expertise provided by its members who act in their *individual capacity*, whereas the representatives in the Council function on behalf of their own states. By virtue of the above provision, therefore, it is quite possible that political considerations might outweigh the legal and technical requirements in the approval of a plan of work.

The Legal and Technical Commission, in addition to the functions mentioned above, has the powers to draw up the great multiplicity of rules, regulations and procedures governing the seabed operations,[24] including powers to supervise the activities in the Area, when called upon to do so by the Council, and also prepare assessments of environmental implications.[25]

The Secretariat is the administrative organ of the Authority. It comprises of a Secretary-General and such staff as the Authority may require.[26] The Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Authority. The Secretariat is responsible for the presentation of annual report to the Assembly on the work of the Authority.

The Enterprise is the commercial arm of the Authority. It is through the Enterprise that the Authority carries out the activities in the Area,[27] for the benefit of the common heritage of mankind. But within the framework of the Convention itself it has an autonomous character. It has its own Statute[28] (which is an integral part of the Convention). Thus within the legal framework of the international legal personality of the Authority, it has its own legal personality with powers to enter into contract, acquire property, have its own finance including powers to borrow funds, sue and be sued in its own name etc. It has its own Governing Board, a Director-General and the staff necessary for the performance of its functions. The Governing Board shall be composed of 15 members elected by the Assembly.[29]

The Enterprise being the commercial competitor to other contractors is subject to the same rules and procedures for carrying out operations in areas *other than the reserved areas*. Nevertheless, it enjoys certain preferential treatment. For example, the requirement of sponsorship is not applicable; it need not submit any reservable

site; the Authority reserves to the Enterprise for its initial production a quantity of 38,000 metric tonnes of nickel.[30] It is likely to gain preferential treatment when a selection is called for among competing applications. States may provide special incentives, rights, privileges and immunities to the Enterprise without any obligation to provide such incentives, rights, privileges or immunities to other commercial entities.[31] The Enterprise is also empowered to negotiate with host countries in which its offices and facilities are located for exemption from direect and indirect taxation.[32]

The system of exploitation contemplated in the Convention is a result of protracted global negotiations based on numerous packages and compromises. In fact it has been the one issue which occupied most time of the Conference, and pratically all the time since its third session held in 1975. The negotiations on this issue have been extremely complex. The Conference worked in negotiating groups, informal groups, workshops and in numerous other ways to arrive at an acceptable solution. In the process some issues got ignored, whilst others whittled down. For example, the Convention was negotiated against the background of an emerging industry for the mining of polymetallic nodules (mainly oxides, containing nickel, copper, cobalt and managese (besides many valuable trace elements), and is, very much oriented towards nodule mining. But is is submitted, that the Convention should be interpreted to cover the whole mineral field[33] (including exploitation of polymetallic sulphides of the Area). Again, although at the beginning of the negotiation of the Convention, the living resources of the Area as part of the common heritage of mankind was discussed, the definition of the term 'resources' in the Convention makes no reference to them.[34]

On the question the system of exploitation of seabed resources, several proposals were introduced both at the Seabed Committee and at the Caracas session of the Conference. These proposals reflected five main trends which may be summarised as follows:

(1) The Group of 77 proposal [35] or the proposal of the developing countries, favouring a strong Authority capable of exercising "direct and effective" control including complete direction over all resource exploration and exploitation.

(2) The American proposal[36] which stipulated that States were to be the dominant element and other claimants were required to have a state as a sponsoring party. The Authority was to enter into contracts with States as well as individual or corporations if sponsored by a State.

(3) The Soviet proposal[37] providing for a contractual system under which States would be authorised by the Seabed Authority under

contracts to mine the Area. Each State was to be given an equal but limited number of contracts and preferences were to be accorded to the developing countries. An exception to this rule was to be made in favour of states discovering deposits, who were to be given the right to exploit them as a means of recovering investment expenditures.
(4) The EEC proposal[38] stipulated very limited powers to the Authority. Applicants were permitted to engage in prospecting or general survey work including drilling upto a depth not more than 50 metres merely upon notification to the Authority. Contracts were to be awarded upon receipt of applications by the Authority, except that no applicat would hold more than six contracts.
(5) The Japanese proposal[39] provided for registration of contracts with the Authority by states or their corporate or individual agents. The Authority was to receive bids for the areas and negotiate a contract with the party. The nationals of developing countries were to be provided employment in the projects.

The informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) drafted in 1975 taking into account the various proposals submitted until thus far proceeded on the basis that "the Area and its resources being the common heritage of mankind all rights in the resources are vested in the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole".[40] The general survey, exploratoin and exploitation activities were all to be conducted by the Authority which was empowered to enter into service contracts whenever necessary. This position, by and large, reflected the group of 77 position. The Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) drafted in 1976 contained major modifications. That text proceeded on the basis that "all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind, as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act".[41] No longer were all of the rights to the resources to be "vested" in the Authority. RSNT made prospecting free and without any time limit. As regards exploitation of the resources, it introduced a system which later came to be known as the "parallel system" or the "dual system" of exploitation. Under this system both the Authority and the States Parties, and natural or juridical entities sponsored by states would have an equal access to exploitation of the resources. The prospective miner (or the contractor) was required to bring before the Authority one large area, (which could be divided into two halves of equal commercial value), or two areas of equal commercial value to allow two mining operations. One such half was to be reserved by the Authority for its future exploitation, and as regards the other, the Authority was to enter into contract for exploitation.[42] These areas are known as the 'reserved area' and the 'contract area' respectively. The differences in the two texts were substantial. The SNT favoured the ownership and

operation of the mineral resources of the deep seabed by an International Seabed Authority. Pursuant to that text, the Authority was obliged to conduct and carry out activities by way of service contracts, joint ventures and such other forms of association as would allow the Authority to ensure its direct and effective control at all times over such activities. This model did not find favour with the multinational consortias and business interests of the advanced industrialised states. The RSNT, on the other hand, by making a distinction between conduct and control of activities in the Area more closely reflected the view of the advanced countries. The RSNT provisions are comparable to an international mining code with obvious borrowings from the national principles, standards and rules of states possessing sophisticated procedures and experiences on the subject.

The progress of negotiations in the Conference at this stage had become extremely difficult and complex. Whilst the advanced countries who possessed the necessary technology, skill and capital insisted on having the RSNT as the basis for further negotiations, the devloping countries insisted on safeguarding the principle of CHM as reflected in the General Assembly resolution. A compromise was therefore, struck to follow the pragmatic approach: namely to accept the parallel system of exploitation as an experimental system for a limited period (2025 years) under certain terms and conditions. Thereafter the Conference mainly proceeded to devise ways and means for making the parallel system of exploitation workable. Thus, at the fifth session of the Conference held in August-September 1976, a workshop was established to conduct negotiations in an informal manner. Three Workshop papers were submitted. Workshop Paper 1 submitted by the developing countries called for the Authority to have full and effective over the activities in the Area and emphasised that the Enterprise would have to be both financially viable and a concrete entity. Activities in the Area were to be conducted exclusively by the Authority either through the Enterprise or with the help of private parties under a contract. Developing countries were to given certain priorities and all parties, states and private were required to apply to the Authority for engaging in exploitation activities. Workshop Paper 2was that of the Soviet Union according to which the Authority would regulate fiscal and administrative aspects of seabed mining. The Authority would be permitted to undertake its own operations, but could not carry out activities on a scale which exceeded the area allocated to States. Individual and private entities were required to be sponsored by the State. Workshop Paper 3 of United States incorporated the gist of both Workshop

Papers 1 and 2. In essence it adopted a parallel system of exploitation so that the States Parties and other entites were placed on an equal footing with the Authority, if financial guarantees to the Authority were met. The final compromise that has emerged through prolonged negotiations and contained in the Convention is as below (see Article 153):

1. Activities in the Area shall be organised, carried out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of mankind, as a whole.
2. Activities in the Area shall be carried out by
(a) the Enterprise; and
(b) in association with the Authority by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such states, or any groups of the foregoing which meets the requirements as provided in Part XI and Annex III of the Convention.

The elements of "parallel system" is contained in Annex III, paragraph 8. Herein it is provided that each application must submit two areas, sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated commercial value so as to allow two mining operations. In the alternative, the Contractor may submit one large area which could be divided into two such halves. The applicant is required to indicate the coordinates dividing the area into two parts and submit all data in respect of the whole area. Such data would include the mapping, sampling, the density of nodules and the composition of metals in them. Within 45 days of the receipt of such application, the Authority is required to designate the reserved and the contract areas. This designation may be deferred for a further period of 45 days if the Authority requests an independent expert to assess the data submitted. It must be noted that an area becomes "reserved" only as soon as (and not before) the plan of work for the non-reserved area is *approved* and the *contract is signed*.

Having thus obtained an area duly prospected and ready for exploration and mining, the Authority may undertake its exploitation through the Enterprise. The Authority must *first* give the Enterprise an opportunity to decide whether it intends to carry out the operations in the reserved areas. This decision may be taken any time unless a notification is received by the Authority from a developing State or any natural or juridical person sponsored by it and effectively controlled by it, that it wishes to submit a plan of work with respect to the reserved area. In such an event the Enterprise is

required to make its decision within a reasonable time.[43] The Enterprise may carry out the operations through contracts, joint ventures or such other form of agreement with any party. In selecting its partner, the Enterprise is not restricted to choose the same from a developing country. If the Enterprise exercises its option not to carry out mining operations in the reserved area, any developing country or national of developing country may apply for a contract to mine and submit a plan or work.[44]

An applicant which is not a state must be sponsored by a State Party to the convention.[45] If the applicant has more than one nationality or is a partnership or consortia of entities from several states, all States Parties involved shall sponsor the application.[46] Sponsorship involves the obligation of the sponsoring state to ensure that the applicant, upon receiving the contract shall carry out its obligations in conformity with the Convention. The sponsoring state is required to take all necessary and appropriate measures within its own legal system to secure effective compliance by the contractor of his obligations. Thus, the sponsoring state is not liable for damage caused by contractor's delinquent acts in every case so long as it has taken legal and administrative steps within its legal system to secure compliance.[47]

An applicant is required to pay the Authority an amount of US $ 500,000 per application as administrative cost for processing the application. This fee is subject to review by the Council. If the cost incurred by the Authority is less than US $ 500,000, the Authority shall refund the difference to the applicant.[48] The contractor is required to pay an annual fixed fee of $ 1 million from the date of entry into force of the contract. If the approved commencement of commercial production is postponed due to delay in the allocation of production authorisation, the annual fixed fee shall be waived for the period of postponement. From the commencement of commercial production, the contractor shall pay either the production charge or the annual fixed fee, whichever is greater.[49] The rate of calculation of the financial contributions of the contractor is given in Article 13, paragraph 5 of Annex III of the Convention. In addition, the contractor shall comply with certain other important requirement. These are compliance with the production control limitations,[50] and provisions relating to transfer of technology.[51]

The Convention comes into force twelve months after sixty states have ratified or acceded to it.[52] Pending the coming into force of the Convention, it was envisaged that a Preparatory Commission would be set up which would meet within 60 to 90 days after 50 states

have signed the Convention.[53] The first meeting of the Preparatory Commission was held in March 1983. The main function of the Commission is to take all preparatory steps relating to the establishment of the International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea Tribunal. The commission adopts its own rules of procedure. Its mandate includes preparation of draft rules, regulations and procedures necessary to enable the Authority to commence its functions in addition to other routine preparatory functions such as formulating a budget for the Authority and the drafting of the agenda for its first meeting etc. Two extraordinary functions not falling within the scope of pure preparatory functions, have also been assigned to the preparatory Commission. These are the treatment of preparatory seabed investments and registration of pioneer investors, and the preparation of studies on the problems of developing land-based producers likely to be most seriously affected by seabed mining. These studies are to be submitted to the Authority which may make necessary economic adjustments including the establishment of compensatory fund. The preparatory Commission is also required to take necessary measures for the Enterprise to commence seabed mining as early as possible.

To be registered as pioneer investors, it is necessary that the states concerned should sign the Convention and must have invested prior to 1 January 1983 an amount equivalent of US $ 30 million in pioneer activities.[54] Of this amount not less than ten percent should have been expended, in the location, survey and evalution of the area in respect of which it wishes to be registered as a pioneer investor. It is also contemplated that any developing country which has signed the convention or any State undertaking or other entity possessing the nationality of such a State or is effectively controlled by it individually or as a group, could become a pioneer investor if they fulfil these requirements prior to 1st January 1985. Pioneer activities primarily relate to prospecting and exploration of polymetallic nodules in the pioneer area which shall not exceed 150,000 square kilometres. The applicant for registration as a pioneer investor is required to offer to the Preparatory Commission, a sufficiently large area which could be divided into two parts of equal commercial value, and also provide all the dates with respect to the whole of the area. The Preparatory Commission shall designate one part of the area thus offered as reserved for the conduct of activities by the Authority, and in respect of the other part, the pioneer investor shall, as from the date of registration, have the exclusive right to carry out pioneer activities. Within six months of entering into force of the Convention, the pioneer investor is required to apply to the Authority

for a plan of work for exploration and exploitation in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The Authority is obliged to approve the plan of work if it complies with the technical and other requirements as provided in Annex III of the Convention.

The most promising prime first generation mine site is the Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone in the Noth Eastern Pacific Ocean. This area was originally estimated to cover 10×10^6 square kilometres but recent research has estimated it to around 800,000 square kilometres.[55] Within this area, the Deepsea Ventures Inc. has laid a claim to 60000 square kilometres. These 'prime' sites are very large in comparison to land-based mine sites. For example, a proposed mine site would be in the order of 30,000 square kilometres, assuming an annual recovery of 3 million tonnes of dry nodules (equivalent to 4.5 million tonnes of wet nodules) spread over a life-span of twenty to twenty five years. Individual land-based mine sites seldom exceed 150 square kilometres, althourh a metallogenic province may be as large as 500,000 square kilometeres.[56] Potential mining areas have been located in South Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans but it appears that on the basis of available information regarding the distribution, concentration, grade of metal contents and weather conditions amongst other factors, the Clarion-Clipperton area will be the first generation operational area. Recently, four areas of the South Pacific were investigated by the German Research Vessel SONNE.[57] Of these four areas, it was found that nodules from the Southern margin of the equatorial Pacific zone have a high grade but low abundance whereas those from the Aitutaki passage including the Samoan Basin and the Northern sector of Southwestern Pacific basin have high abundance but low grade.[58] Both these areas, therefore, have no potential as a source of economic grade manganese nodules. Nodules from the eastern sector of the Southwestern Pacific basin at 42° S appear to be promising in terms of both grade and abundance, but their remoteness from land, great water depth (5500 metres) and extreme weather conditions of the region preclude their economic recovery in the near future.[59] Of the four areas, therefore, the Peru Basin appear to be the most promising area, where nodules combine high grade and abundance with proximity to the port and occurrence at relatively shallow depaths, and reasonably favourable weather conditions.[60]

So far, four countries have submitted their applications to the Preparatory Commission for registration as a pioneer investor. India submitted its application on 10 January 1984 for an area in the Indian Ocean, whereas the Soviet Union, France and Japan have submitted

their applications on 21 July 1983, 3 August 1984 and 21 August 1984 respectively, all in Clarion-Clipperton zone in the Pacific Ocean. None of these applications have yet been registered. This is because under resolution II of the Law of the Sea Convention, the prospective pioneer investors are required to resolve all overlapping claims in their areas of application. Whilst India has no over-lapping claim in the Indian Ocean area, France, USSR and Japan have over-lapping claims in the Pacific Ocean area. The Preparatory Commission has already had four sessions and the second part of the fourth session concluded in September 1986. The Preparatory Commission is drafting rules and regulations for the registration of pioneer investors, and the pioneer investors are trying to resolve their over-lapping claims. Several meetings have been held amongst the pioneer investors and on resolution of their over-lapping claims and after finalisation of the rules and regulations by the Preparatory Commission, it is expected that the registrations would be completed.

The law of the Sea Convention will come into force 12 months after 60 states ratify or accede to it. So far, 29 States have ratified the Convention.[61] Of these, it is interesting to note that 13 countries are from the continent of Africa, including the Council of Namibia.

The Law of the Sea Convention has several important new elements. It has, in the first place, evolved new doctrines and concepts which offer wider rights and jurisdiction to coastal states. The Convention has also codified the interests of the land-locked and the geographically disadvantaged states, otherwise refered to as states with special geographical characteristics. Unlike the Conventions of 1958, the new Convention has several new elements, notably, concepts of Exclusive Economic Zone, extension of continental shelf upto the end of the continental margin, the archepelago concept, new regime for passage through straits use for international navigation such as the transit passage, rights of States bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed Seas, provisions for the prevention of pollution and preservation of the marine environment, conduct of marine scientific research and transfer of technology. Whilst all these elements were admittedly controversial and complicated, the subject that attracted the maximum attention of the Third UN Conference was regarding the regime for the mineral resources lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and the institutional framework, namely the International Seabed Authority to regulate their exploitation. In this most crucial issue concerning deep seabed resources, in the overall

balance, the compromises made by the developing countries rank far higher than those offered by the industrialised world.

It may be recalled that when the conference began, the idea was to negotiate the establishment of an international machinery which would deal completely with all the alternatives concerning seabed mining. This was the position reflected in the 1975 text, namely the Single Negotiating Text. However, this proposition was not acceptable to the developed world who wanted a system which would allow equal access to both the States' parties and state sponsored entities along with international machinery. Thus emerged the idea of a dual or a parallel system or exploitation, a position reflected in the 1976 Text, namely the Revised Single Negotiating Text. This position was wholly unacceptable to the developing countries; yet they compromised and accepted the parallel system of exploitation on an experimental basis. Thereafter, the Conference has been devoting all its time to determining the ways and means to make the parallel system workable. This had given rise to numerous interconnected issues viz. finances technology and technical skill, transfer of technology, voting procedures in the decision-making body of the International Seabed Authority etc.

On each of these issues, the developing countries stand to gain very little. Yet nearly all the developing countries have held faith in the law making process through multilateral negotiations and have voted for the Convention. This becomes even more commendable when the country whose studies and proposals have formed the basis for the provisions on certain crucial issues such as the financial arrangements with the contractors, production ceiling formula etc. have voted against the Convention. The same country had towards the close of the ninth session, insisted on the establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority with powers far wider than any normal preparatory function. Even this was compromised by the developing countries. Furthermore, a number of countries have enabled legislation permitting their licenses entities to undertake seabed mining activities. This goes against the purposes of a law making process of an international conference. The Convention of the Law of the Sea is undoubtedly the best available compromise. This is the first step towards the establishment of a new international economic order. Law derived from the negotiations will rank as a classic example for any future international negotiations. Therfore, it is essential that the convention comes into force at the earliest possible stage with the necessary ratifications. This alone would, to say the least, restore confidence in the Law-making processes of international conferences and confidence in

Third World countries that the industrialised world is sincere in its efforts to establish a new international economic order.

1. Opened for signature in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982. For Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, see UN Publication, Sales No. E.83. V.S., New York, 1983.
2. As late as 1956, the International Law Commission concluded that the law governing extraction of minerals in the deep seabed did not require study because such mining was technologically not feasible, and "was likely to remain so for some considerable time". See the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* (Geneva, 1956). Vol.2, p.9. For similar reasons, the outer limit of the continent shelf was determined as extending upto a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit to where the superjacent waters admits of exploitation. See Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on Continental Shelf.
3. See UN Dec. A/C. 1/PV. 1515.
4. A/RES/2340 (XXII), 18 December, 1967.
5. GA Res. 2574 D (XXIV), 15 December 1967.
6. GA Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970.
7. General Assembly resolutions under certain circumstances incur binding legal obligations. The discussions relating to binding legal characteristics of General Assembly resolutions, and also as to which of the resolutions become binding is beyond the scope of the present paper. Enormous literature is available on this subject. Particular reference must be made of the following: See F. Blaine Sloan, "The Binding Force of 'Recommendations' of the General Assembly of the United Nations", *British Yearbook* of International Law, Vol. 25, p.1; D.H.N. Johnson, "The effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations", *British Yearbook of International Law* Vol. 32, P. 96; Rosalyn Higgins, *Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations* (London, 1963), Richard A. Falk, "On the Quasi Legislative Competence of the General Assembly", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 60, p. 783; see also Judge Lauterpacht in the *Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, International Court of Justice Reports 1955.*
8. See paragraph 9 of the CHM Resolution, n.6.
9. Article 136 of the Convention.
10. See Articles 136 to 149 of the Convention.
11. Article 156 of the Convention.
12. *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.
13. Article 157(1) of the Convention.
14. Article 159 of the Convention.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, para 8.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *ibid.*, para 9.
19. Article 160(1).
20. See Article 163
21. Article 162(2) j.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. See Article 165.
25. *Ibid.* paragraph 2(c) and 2(d).

26. Article 166.
27. See Article 170
28. Annex IV of the Convention.
29. *Ibid.* paragraph 5.
30. Article 151 (5).
31. Article 13(4) e, Annex IV.
32. Article 13(5), Annex IV.
33. Article 133 defines "resources" as all solid, liquid, or gaseous mineral resources in *situ* in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules. Resources when recovered from the the Area, are referred to as "minerals". According to Article 151(9), the Authority shall have the power to limit the level of production from nodules.
34. See Article 133.
35. UN Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/L.7, *Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records*, vol. 3, pp. 172-73.
36. Un Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/L.6, *Official Records, Ibid.*, pp. 169-72.
37. UN Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/L.12, *Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Officeal Records*, Vol. 4, p.182.
38. UN Doc A/Conf.62/C.1/.8, *Third Un Conference of the Law of the Sea, Official Records*, Vol.3, pp. 173-74 (combind proposal of Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kindom).
39. UN Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/L.9, *Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records*, Vol.3, pp. 175-77.
40. Annex I, paragraph (1) of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/Part 1.
41. Annex I, paragraph 1, Revised Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part 1.
42. See Annex, I, paragraph 8(d) i, *Ibid.*
43. Annex III, Article 9.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Article 153 (2), and Annex III Article 4.
46. Article 4, Annex III.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Article 13(2), Annex III.
49. Article 13(4), Annex III.
50. As contained in Article 151. This requirement, it is submitted, is taken care of at the time of production authorisation.
51. Article 5, Annex III.
52. Article 308.
53. See Resolution I, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/L.94/modified by Doc. A/Conf.62/L.132/Addl. 1 and Corr.1 adopted alongwith the Convention on 30 April 1982. The resolution is an integral part the Convention.
54. See Resolution II Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetallic nodules, adopted alongwith the Convention and forming an integral part of the Convention.
55. Information obtained at Aachen Technical University during my visit to Aachen in 1982.
56. *Ibid.*
57. The Survey was conducted in the years 1978-80 by Dr. G. Friedrich, Dr. W.L. Pluger, Dr. T. Thijasen (of the Institute Fur Mineralogie, and Lagerstattenlehre der Technischen Hochschule, Aachen) and Dr. G.P. Glasby of New Zealand Oceanographic Institute, Wellington.

58. Information supplied by Dr. Friedrich at Aachen.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*
61. **These are as follows :**
Bahamas (July 29, 1983); Bahrain (May 30, 1985); Belize (August 13, 1983) ; Cameroon (November 19, 1985); Cuba (August 15 1984);, Egypt (August 26, 1983); Fiji (December 10, 1982); Gambia (May 22, 1984); Ghana (June 7, 1983); Guinea (September 6, 1985); Iceland (June 21, 1985); Indonesia (February 3, 1986); Iraq (July 30, 1985); Ivory Coast (March 26, 1984); Jamaica (March 21, 1983); Kuwait (May 2, 1986); Mali (July 16, 1985); Mexico (March 18, 1983); Philippines (May 8, 1986); Saint Lucia (March 27, 1985); Senegal (October 25, 1984); Sudan (January 23, 1985); Togo (April 16, 1985); Trindad and Tobago (April 25, 1986); Tunisia (April 24, 1985); Tanzania (September 30, 1985); Yugoslavia (May 5, 1986); Zambia (March 7, 1983); United Nations Council for Namibia (April 18, 1983).

Voluntary Retirement by Presidents in Africa: Lessons From Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Cameroun, and Senegal

HARRY ODODA

The *coup d' etat* has been the characteristic mode of transferring power from an outgoing to an incoming administration in African politics. Even though there have been a few instances of a military government voluntarily handing over power to a civilian one,[1] there has been no instance until 1980 when a civilian administration voluntarily gave up power in an orderly transition.[2] As such, the issue of succession is an important one.

In light of the above the voluntary retirements of Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone in 1985, and of Presidents Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun in 1981 and 1982, respectively, are significant events.

The purpose of this article is to analyze these four cases in terms of their implications for the countries concerned as well as for African politics in general.

President Leopold Senghor appears to have planned his retirement carefully well in advance, and to have accordingly groomed his successor, Abdou Diouf. Speculation regarding the retirement had started as early as the beginning of the 1970's.

However, serious preparation seems to have began in 1978 even though Senghor ran again for president and won in the general

elections held that year. Both the ruling party (whose name was changed to the Socialist party or PS) and the government were reorganized. The position of Mr. Diouf, by now the obvious favorite for successor, was greatly strengthened by these changes.

Diouf had been appointed prime minister in 1970 following a constitutional amendment which reintroduced the position.[3] At the time of his appointment as prime minister, Diouf was regarded as a technocrat rather than as an aspiring politician. But his stock rose with the continued support of his mentor, the President. His primary rival was Babacar Ba, the Foreign Affairs Minister. However, Ba was fired in September 1978 following the elections held that year.[4] After Ba's removal, Diouf's responsibilities were expanded.

Although President Senghor's retirement was planned in advance, the circumstances in the country at the time of his resignation, December 1980, were not without political and economic problems. Actually the problems had started much earlier. Political problems, which had been sporadic, resurfaced in the mid-1970's in the form of demands from various groups for a multi-party system.

In response to these demands the Constitution was revised to allow a limited multi-party system. Four parties were permitted; they were the ruling Socialist Party (PS), the Senegalese Democratic party (PDS), the African Independence Party (PAI), and the Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS).[5] The parties were required by law to assume the following labels respectively: socialist, liberal, Marxist, and Conservative.[6]

The three legal opposition parties had limited support and posed no threat to the governing PS.

However, a variety of illegal organizations sprung up. Two of these were led by well known individuals, the veteran opposition figure Mamadou Dia, and the internationally renowned Pan-Africanist intellectual Sheikh Anta Diop.[7] Diop's party, the Senegalese Democratic Assembly (RND), posed a challenge of some magnitude because it sought to broaden its appeal. During the 1978 elections, for instance, a sizeable minority abstained;[8] the RND claimed a large proportion of these as its supporters.[9]

The RND had been formed in 1976 and it expected to be legalized. When it rejected the label "Marxist", it was denied legal status. The Supreme Court upheld the government's decision, but Diop defied the ruling and the party continued with its activities.

In the meantime, the general agitation for a truly open multi-party system continued. Leftist organizations were the most vocal in

this, but the Islamic fundamentalist party of Ahmed Khalifa Niasse is also worth mentioning. Niasse called for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Senegal.[10] He formed his party in September 1979 and fled to Libya immediately thereafter. Libya's backing of him led to the severing of diplomatic relations between Senegal and Libya in July 1980.

In Addition to the multi-party issue, corruption had also become an issue. Both the ruling party and the government were blamed for widespread corruption.

The political problems as well as the issue of corruption had not been resolved by the time of President Senghor's resignation.

Diouf assumed the presidency in January 1981; he also took over the key position in the party, Secretary-General. President Diouf immediately introduced reforms to deal with the problems he had inherited. Only four months after coming to power, the Constitution was revised to abolish the restrictions on political activity. A plethora of parties sprung up; as many as eight were recognized in addition to the existing four.[11] By 1984 there was total of fifteen parties.[12] The current number of political parties is.

The anti-corruption campaign led to the passage of a stringent legislation in May 1981; the legislation prescribes five to ten years imprisonment upon conviction. The governing party underwent re-organization. In the first cabinet reshuffle, in July 1981, one of those fired in connection with corruption was Adrien Senghor, the former President's nephew who had been Minister of Supply.

His first election challenge was in 1983. He won handily, receiving 84% of the votes in the presidential race; his party lost only nine seats in the National Assembly. Internally as well as externally, he has maintained the political and economic philosophy of Mr. Senghor, while attempting internally, to purge "Senghorist" old guards. Paradoxically one of the steps he has taken domestically to consolidate his position was to abolish the office of prime minister; his predecessor did the same, until he was ready to groom a successor.

President Diouf's most serious domestic problem has been the Casamance separatist movement. He dealt with this firmly and without overreacting.

In summary, while President Diouf continues to confront deep-rooted as well as new political and economic problems, he has steadily consolidated his position since assuming office. He appears quite secure; externally, his current role as OAU Chairman has given him a unique opportunity to enhance his stature as a statesman.

The second case is Cameroun where President Ahmadou

Ahidjo resigned at age 58[13] in November 1982, handing over power to the current President, Mr. Paul Biya. Althouh speculation on his retirement started as early as the 1975 election and resurfaced during the 1980 election,[14] Mr. Ahikjo's resignation was abrupt, unlike that of Mr. Senghor. There is even an allegation that he was "tricked into resignation by his French doctors, who had told him (wrongly) that he was a dying man and had persuaded him to hand over power."[15]

As for his successor, it is not entirely clear whether Mr. Ahidjo had actuallv intended Biya to be more than a temporary successor. While the events following Mr. Biya's assumption of the presidency cast some doubt on this Biya's political career under President Ahidjo is almost identical with that of Diof under President Senghor.

In 1975 President Ahidjo initiated a constitutional amendment that instituted the office of prime minister.[16] Mr. Biya was appointed to that office in June of that year. At this time President Ahidjo explained that the position "had no implications for a possible succession."[17] Actually at this time it was the president of the National Assembly who, constitutionally, would succeed the president. Before becoming prime minister Biya had held the title of secretary-general in the President's office.

In 1979 the Constitution was amended again; this amendment made the prime minister the person who would succeed the president. Thus, intended as a permanent replacement or not, Biya was poised to succeed to the presidency.

Ahidjo was easily re-elected president in 1980. Biya retained his position as prime minister.

The country had its share of political and economic problems at the time of the president's resignation; however, these were not as serious as those in Senegal. Cameroun is *de facto* one party state and the ruling party, the Cameroun National Union (UNC), had no significant organized opposition. There had been some student unrest at the University of Yaunde over tuition increase in 1981, but this was a limited issue. Furthermore an influx of Chadian refugees was causing some tension in the north, but, again, this was localized. There were also the usual regional tensions between the English speaking former West Cameroun and the French speaking former East Cameroun as well as between Muslim North and non-Muslim South. Finally there was inflation; this was perhaps the single most important problem, but it was not so serious as to topple the government.

As indicated, President Ahidjo's resignation was abrupt. He

announced it on November 4 and asked Mr. Biya to assume the presidency effective November 6.[18] However, he retained the party chairmanship.

Initially Ahidjo appeared to fully back his successor after resigning. He even expelled from the party his former right hand man, Moussa Yaya, because Yaya criticized him publicly for having handed over power to a southerner.[19]

But shortly afterwards a rift developed between the mentor and the protege as the latter moved, swiftly, to consolidate his position by replacing the former's appointees with his own. The perennial north-south tension was the undergirding factor. Unhappy with the transfer of power to a southerner, influential northerners were obviously supporting Ahidjo to regain power or reassert influence.

The climax of this struggle came with the two abortive coup attempts in 1983 and 1984, both linked with the former president. Along with the former president, the two ringleaders of the first attempt were sentenced to death, Ahidjo having been tried in absentia as he had taken up residence in France. President Biya commuted the sentence to life imprisonment and perhaps lived to regret it.

The second attempt was a bloody affair which nearly succeeded. It was led by the commander of the presidential security unit, which had been set up by Ahidjo. The official death toll was given as 70, but unofficial estimates reached 1,000.[20] This time some of those involved were quickly executed while others were imprisoned.[21].

After this Biya moved vigorously to reassert control. More purges from both the party and the government followed. In September 1983 he was elected party chairman following Ahidjo's resignation. Seeking a popular mandate of his own, he advanced the election scheduled for 1985 to January 1984 and won it with 99.98% of the votes.[22] Like Diouf in Senegal, he also proceeded to abolish the office of prime minister which had been his springing board. In March 1985 he changed the name of the political party to Cameroun Peoples Democratic Movement, CPDM. Finally he has brought the military directly under the president's office.

In Tanzania, the third case, President Julius Nyerere's retirement was as well planned as Senghor's. Nyerere confirmed his intention at the beginning of his last term in 1980, a full five years in advance.

In spite of this, there were some problems with the selection and grooming of the successor. Until his death in a road accident in April 1984, Prime Minister Edward Sokoine appeared to be the successor designate. He was appointed Minister for Defense in 1972 and Prime Minister in 1977. In 1980 he temporarily stepped down due to health

reasons; he was reappointed to that position in 1983.

After Sokoine's death there were three contenders. The best known outside the country was Salim Ahmed Salim, the career diplomat who served as the country's permanent representative to the United Nations for nearly 17 years and a leading contender for its Secretary General. He also served as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, he replaced Sokoine in the last position. The last two candidates were Rashid Kawawa and the eventual successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Kawawa had been Prime Minister, Second Vice President and also Secretary General of the ruling party.

Before becoming President of Zanzibar and Vice President of the country in January, 1984, Mr. Mwinyi, a former school teacher and civil servant, had held several cabinet positions as well as an ambassadorial one. His first one was Minister of State in the President's Office (Tanzania), to which he was appointed in 1970. He then became Minister of Health, Minister for Home Affairs, Ambassador to Egypt, and Minister of State in the Office of the Vice President.[23]

However, it was his elevation to the presidency of Zanzibar that made him a national figure and a contender for the presidency.

Salim's more limited domestic political base given his Arab background worked against him. Also there were questions concerning his commitment to socialism.[24]

This left Mwinyi and Kawawa. The overriding concern was to assure the continuity of the union between the mainland and Zanzibar. This worked in favour of Mwinyi. This was not because Kawawa is any less committed to union. Rather it was because a vocal and highly placed group of elements considered as separatists had precipitated a political crisis in 1984. The crisis led to what might be termed "dismissal-resignation" of Zanzibar's President and Tanzania's Vice President, Aboud Jumbe in January of that year.[25]

Jumbe, who would have been a key candidate had his downfall not transpired was described by President Nyerere as having been "confused" by the separatists.[26]

The separatist issue must have made Mr. Mwinyi a more suitable successor, as indeed it should have. As a Zanzibari who was strongly committed to union, he would be more effective in reducing separatist sentiment than a mainlander.

The former selection process was as follows. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ruling party, the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM)[27] nominated the candidate. He was approved by

the party's National Conference and then presented to the country in a presidential election for a popular "yes" or "no" vote.

The presidential election was held in October 1985. President Mwniyi received 92.2% of the votes cast.[28] He officially became President the following month at 60.[29]

However, like Ahidjo in Cameroun, Nyerere retained the chairmanship of the party. But in his case he specified that he would step down from this position as well when his term expires in 1987.

The most important political problem preceding the resignation was the separatist issue. On the surface, the spokesmen were demanding more autonomy for Zanzibar;[30] however as they prepared to challenge the legality of the union in court, their campaign became decidedly secessionist in character.

The leaders were : Wolfgang Dourado, Indian born Attorney General of Zanzibar till his resignation in 1977; Ramadhani Faki, Zanzibar's Chief Minister and a Brigadier in the army, and; Bashir Kwaw-Swazny who became Zanzibar's Attorney General in 1983.[31] Dourado, the intellectual head of the group who was later arrested, threatened "secession and bloodshed" if their wishes were not granted.[32] As indicated, this crisis led to the "dismissal-resignation" of Zanzibar's President About Jumbe as some of the leaders were high ranking officials in his government.

The economic problems were the perennial ones : revitalization of the economy and increasing productivity in agriculture.

Since Tanzania is sub-Saharan Africa's most ideologically committed country, Mr. Nyerere made the most blunt and explicit statement on the criteria for his successor of all the four presidents who voluntarily retired. He took into account not only domestic issues, but also an external issue on which Tanzania had played the key role under his presidency : the liberation of Southern Africa. He summarized the criteria as follows :

> "I cannot imagine the National Executive Committee selecting a candidate who will not continue with the policies of our Party and those of the liberation struggle in southern Africa".[33]

As can be expected, President Mwinyi has continued the same general policies.

Like Presidents Senghor's and Nyerere's retirement, President Siaka Stevens' retirement was planned in advance; however, the process of selecting the successor produced the most surprising result of all the four presidents who voluntarily retired : the designation of the Commanding Officer of the armed forces as the successor.

Although Mr. Stevens had dropped hints about his desire to retire as early as three years in advance,[34] the confirmation of this came only three months or so before he actually stepped down.

The delay and uncertainty were evidently caused by the difficulty in finding an appropriate successor. Up to the end of 1984, speculation had focussed on the two vice presidents, Sorie I Koroma and Christian Kamara-Taylor although a variety of other names had been mentioned. The latter was fired in 1984; he eventually died.

By early 1985 the name of General Joseph Momoh, the armed forces Commander and the eventual successor, joined the list of possibilities. Apparently the President started giving him serious consideration at this time.[35] Another name was that of former Attorney General, Francis Minah, who had replaced Kamara-Taylor as second Vice President. However, Koroma and General Momoh dominated.

It had also become increasingly clear that the President did not favour Koroma who, as first vice president, would automatically become acting president for 90 days pending an election. As the year progressed, so did the president's determination to keep Koroma out and advance General Momoh's candidature. The official reason against Koroma was his poor health; this was also the reason given against former second vice-president Karama-Taylor.[36]

Koroma pressed on with his candidacy in spite of his lack of Mr. Stevens' support. At times he seemed to adopt the strategy that his chances would be enhanced if the President continued until he died in office; referring to Stevens he stated at one point: "we want him to lead us till death.[37] To counter the argument of his poor health he was reported to have "led the funeral procession [of former second vice president Karama-Taylor] almost eight miles on foot . . . "[38]

The political and economic problems confronting the country will help illuminate the complexity of the selection process. Though Sierra Leone was legally a one party state, and, as such, no organized opposition existed, there were severe problems. The sole party, the All Peoples Congress, lacked the organization, discipline and cohesion of the ruling parties in Senegal and Tanzania. The President was 80 years old and could not be expected to continue much longer. In addition corruption was rampant; a scandal referred to as "vouchergate" symbolized this.[39]

From January to May 1985 there had been three instances of student unrest at Fourah Bay College.[40] During the previous year, there had been similar unrests leading to the closing of the College for two months.[41] Teachers had gone on strike in March 1985 and were joined by municipal workers.[42] Economic conditions were

severe: smuggling, unemployment, inflation and a shortage of foreign exchange had reached serious proportions.

Not insignificant was the rift between the President and his constitutional successor and long time political colleague, first vice president Koroma. The President publicly admitted this by divulging in an interview that Mr. Koroma had put him "in a very difficult position"[43] by his quest for the presidency, in spite of Mr. Stevens' contention that he was not healthy enough for the job.

Capping the foregoing problems was the threat of a military coup. This threat seemed inevitable as 1985 wore on; it was not seen as directed against Stevens, but rather as prompted by a combination of the pervading problems, the uncertainty over succession, and the event of an unacceptable successor.

The aversion of a coup or instability after his retirement would seem to have been the overriding concern in President Stevens mind as he went about selecting a successor. He admitted as much when, in reference to Koroma's persistence in pursuing the presidency, Mr. Stevens stated:

> The line he is taking can bring difficulties in the party and the Government when you consider what has happened in Guinea and other places.[44]

As the stalemate over succession continued, two steps were taken. First, at the President's request, him term which was to expire on June 14, 1985, was extended for six months. Secondly a bill was passed establishing a Presidential Council to run the government until the election should the need arise. The Presidential Council was to be comprised of the following three members: William Conteh, the Speaker as Chairman; E.T. Kamara, the Administrative Secretary of the party, and; Pierre Boston, the Solicitor-General.[45] Significantly, the vice presidents were excluded from the Presidential Commission.

Shortly after these the Constitution was amended, on the President's initiative, to permit General Momoh to run for election to the parliament.

In July 1985 the suspense and uncertainty over President Stevens' successor officially came to an end: the national delegates' convention of the party unanimously selected General Momoh. As mandated by the Constitution, General Momoh ran for a "yes" or "no" election in October of that year. The official figures are that 99% of the eligible voters cast their ballots; of these 2,784,491 voted in the affirmative while 4,096 voted in the negative.[46] General Momoh was declared President elect on October 5,[47] in on November 28, 1985,[48]

and formally inaugurated on January 26, 1986,[49] he was 48 years old at the time he was sworn into office.[50]

President Momoh retired from the military. He has also assumed the position of Secretary General of the party.

Upon becoming president, Mr. Momoh pledged to fight corruption and re-invigorate the economy. He has taken steps to do these. The first parliamentary elections under him were held in May this year, 1986. This election brought new elements into the political system and retired some old ones, giving him a reservoir for possible personnel change.

Besides the challenges for reforms, one coup attempt has been reported. This involved a Panamanian registered ship, with a British captain and crew, which was intercepted by French customs officials before it arrived in Sierra Leone. The ship was linked to the Sierra Leone Democratic Party (SLDP), a small London based opposition party which had been formed in 1984.

President Momoh stated that "the ship was definitely coming to Sierra Leone on an invasion."[51] The Captain of the ship admitted that his ship was "undertaking the transportation of military equipment on behalf of the SLDP."[52]

In spite of the above incident, President Momoh had been enthusiastically received when he became President and, so far, seems popular and well on his way to establishing his leadership.

The first issue concerns generational change. That is, to what extent has the retirement resulted in the transfer of leadership from the older to the younger generation? Except for Tanzania, there was a transfer to younger leaders. Presidents Senghor, Ahidjo and Stevens were seventy-six, fifty-eight, and eighty years old, respectively, when they retired.[53] Their successors, Presidents Diouf, Biya, and Momoh were forty-four, forty-nine, and forty-eight, respectively, when they assumed power.[54]

In Tanzania there is no significant age difference between former President Nyerere and his successor, President Nwinyi. The former was 63 years old while the latter was 61 at the time of the power transfer, virtually the same age.

To those in the younger generations in Tanzania in particular and in Africa in general, who aspire for leadership, this must be discouraging. A key indicator of the legitimacy and long term is the stability of a political system is the ability of the system to pass on leadership roles from older to younger generations. This creates a longitudinally stable political culture.

However, this criticism is mitigated by Tanzania's special circumstances. This is the only case in Africa where two formerly sovereign countries united to form one.

The second issue is : did the successor represent a change in the ethnic, regional, and religious background? Theoretically, such changes help promote national integration as well as legitimacy and political culture. Practically, domination by a given ethnic group has been at the root of political problems in sub-Saharan Africa.

On this issue all four cases reflect significant changes. In three of the countries, Senegal, Cameroun and Tanzania, the successor is from a different religious background from that of the predecessor. In Senegal and Tanzania power passed from a Christian to a Muslim; in Cameroun it was the reverse. The political significance of religion is relevant for both Senegal and Cameroun.

Ethnic backgrounds changed in all four cases, and, significantly for Cameroun, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone regional origin also changed. In Cameroun President Biya comes from one of the southern ethnic groups; there had always been a power struggle between these groups on the one hand the northern ones on the other. In addition, the new president is bilingual, a factor which also helps ease the tension between the English speaking former West Cameroun and the French speaking majority.

In Tanzania President Mwinyi is from Zanzibar. As noted, the separatist movement among some influential elements in Zanzibar was a major crisis in 1984. In Sierra Leone President Momoh comes from the northern part of the country.

A third and final issue concerns stability, that is : how stable are the governments of the successors ? In Senegal and Cameroun, with the longest time periods, the governments of Presidents Diouf and Biya have firmly established themselves on their own merits in spite of serious initial challenges for the latter. Presidents Mwinyi and Momoh also appear to be quickly establishing themselves.

One peculiarity of Sierra Leone must also be briefly discussed. This is the selection of the Commanding Officer of the armed forces as the successor. Reference has been made to former President Stevens overriding concern to avert a coup. This concern must have been in his mind throughout his presidency. Momoh was nominated to Parliament as early as 1973 and made a Minister of State. This was a shrewd tactic to give the military a stake in the political process and institutions, and thereby reduce the chances of a coup. Alternatively, if President Stevens had decided on Momoh as his eventual successor this early, then it was an equally shrewd move to start grooming and "civilianizing" him this early.

In either case, unlike Presidents Senghor, Ahidjo or Nyerere, and for that matter, unlike any other African president, Mr. Stevens had a special reason to be particularly sensitized to the military. Although his party had won the election against the ruling Seirra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) of Sir Albert Margai back in the late 1960's, it took a military coup to give back the office he had won. This, in addition to the factors discussed earlier, help explain Mr. Stevens' choice.

What are the lessons and implications from the four cases covered in this article as far as African politics in general are concerned?

A first lesson is that voluntary retirement with peaceful transition of power is indeed possible in African politics. The very novelty of this makes it a lesson. A second lesson is that if well planned, voluntary retirement may work in the best interests, not only of the country as a whole, but also of the retiring president personally. Senegal, Tanzania and Sierra Leone bear this out; in these countries no disruption followed retirement and the former presidents continue to exert some influence.

A third lesson is that voluntary retirement is perhaps the best way to help assure not only political stability, but also continuity of the retiring president's political philosophy and programmes. Retiring voluntarily enables the president to either designate his successor or strongly influence the selection process. Also it gives him some influence over his successor; the cases of Senegal, Tanzania and Sierra Leone support this. A fourth lesson is that for stability and continuity to follow, there must be continued cooperation between the retiring and the incoming presidents; this is only possible when retirement is well planned, unlike in the case of Cameroun.

A fifth and final lesson is that voluntary retirement can be used as an effective peaceful mechanism for engineering redistribution of power in the society, thereby promoting national integration and political stability.

Two implications must be added to the foregoing. First, theoretically the four cases have raised the study of government change in Africa to a new level of sophistication. They have introduced a new concept: voluntary retirement. This enriches the literature and dignifies African political processes.

Secondly, both theoretically as well as practically, they have set a landmark in African politics and will serve as examples and a challenge to other African leaders. The landmark and examples are enhanced by the stature of the former presidents Senghor, Ahidjo,

Nyerere and Stevens. All four gained continental esteem and influence as among Africa's elder statemen during their rule. They had all served with distinction as chairmen of the OAU. Two of them, Senghor and Nyerere, had also gained international recognition as philosopher-statemen.

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[1]For example in Ghana and Nigeria.
[2]President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania temporarily stepped down at one point; but he remained in control of the government through the party.
[3]It had been abolished following a dispute between the President and the incumbent.
[4]*Africa Contemporary Record*, 1981-82. p. B592.
[5]*Africa Contemporary Record*, 1981-82, p. B535.
[6]*Idem.*
[7]Dia's party eventually adopted the name the Democratic Popular Movement (MDP).
[8]See *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1978-79.
[9]He claimed 37%. *Africa Contemporary Record 1981-82*, p. B536.
[10]His party was called *Hizboulahi* meaning God's Party (*Africa Contemporary Record 1981-82*, p. 540).
[11]For names see *Africa Contemporary Record 1981-82 p. B*
[12]*Ibid*, 1983-84, p. B537.
[13]*Africa Contemporary Record* (1981-82), p. B339.
[14]*Africa Confidential* London, November 1981.
[15]*Africa South of the Sahara* 1986 (London : Europa Publication, 1985), p. 302.
[16]Actually the office had existed when the country was a federation; each of the two federal units had its own prime minister elected by that region. The new office was to be occupied by an appointed person.
[17]*Africa South of the Sahara 1986* (London : Europa Publication, 1985), p. 302.
[18]*Africa Contemporary Record* 1982-82 p. B341.
[19]*Africa* (London : Africa Journal) No. 143 July 1983.
[20]*Africa South of the Sahara 1986* (London : Europa Publication, 1985), p. 303.
[21]A total of 1,205 people were questioned, of whom 491 were tried. At least 46 were executed. See *Idem.*
[22]*Africa Contemporary Record* 1983-84, p. B330.
[23]*Africa Research Bulletin* September 15, 1985, p. 7736.
[24]*Africa Report* (September-October 1985), p. 46.
[25]According to *Africa Confidential* 25 No. 8 (April 11, 1984) he was "dismissed but allowed to resign for appearance's sake" p. 5.
[26]*Africa* (London : Africa Journal) 151 March 1984, p. 15.
[27]The official name of the party is in Swahili, the national language. It means : The Revolutionary Party.
[28]*Africa Research Bulletin* November 15, 1985, p. 7822C.
[29]*Africa Research Bulletin* (September 15, 1985) gives his date of birth as 1925, p. 7736.
[30]Their short range objective was the institution of three governments, one each for Zanzibar and the Mainland and one for the country instead of the two that

currently exist. See "Strains in the Union" *Africa* (London : Africo Journal) March 1984.

[31]*Ibid* and *Africa Confidential* (25 No. 8 April 1984).

[32]Africa Confidential 25 No. 7 (March 1984) "Pointers". The threat was made on a trip to England in 1983 to seek support for his cause.

[33]*Africa* 168 (August 1985), p. 29.

[34]*Africa* 143 (July 1983).

[35]*Africa Confidential* Vol. 26 No. 4.

[36]*Africa* 183 (March 1985) p. 29.

[37]*Ibid.*, p. 30.

[38]*West Africa* April 29, 1985, p. 820.

[39]Vouchers were given for non-existent companies; at least three Cabinet Ministers were implicated.

[40]*West Africa* May 13, 1983.

[41]*Africa South of the Sahara* (London : Europa Publications, 1985), p. 822.

[42]*Idem.*

[43]*Africa* 169 (September 1985) p. 33.

[44]*Idem.*

[45]*Africa* 169 (September 1985).

[46]*Africa Research Bulletin* November 15, 1985.

[47]*West Africa* October 14, 1985.

[48]*Africa* 173 (January 1986) p. 34.

[49]*West Africa* February 3, 1986.

[50]*Africa* 169 (September 1985).

[51]*Africa Report* May-June 1986, p. 50.

[52]*Idem.*

[53]See the following source for Senghor's age. *Africa Contemporary Record* 1981-82, p. B593

[54]See the following sources for Diouf's and Biya's ages, respectively, *Africa Contemporary Record* 1970-71, p. B434 and *Africa Contemporary Record* 1982-83, p. B342.

The Common Concerns

A.K. SINHA

"What are Africans really like?

This question is not one bit easier to answer than a similar one about Europeans would be. We speak of European civilization, even though we are aware of the many significant differences between, say, Russians and Englishmen, Spaniards and Germans, or Italians and Frenchmen. As for the American transplant of the European tree, how remarkably new and different have been its fruits. Nevertheless, serious inquiry does not hesitate to trace the main streams of the European heritage to their sources, nor to seek the common cultural ground on which western men stand.

So too there are great diversities among Negro African cultures. The search for common elements among them is still in its beginnings, however. One great difficulty here is the absence until the last hundred years of a written literature by negro Africans. This lack has now begun to be supplied by the new African writers and thinkers".[1]

This observation of Jacob Drachler makes us look at the entire issue of the African point of view with the right perspective. Just as we speak of an "European civilization", we speak of an "African culture". And although "the search for common elements" is reported to be "in its beginning", it is indeed worthwhile to locate some of these common concerns on the basis of the "written literature" supplied by "the new African writers and thinkers".[1]

Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti jointly portray the results of the contact between the African and the European cultures. This contact produces numerous hangovers and obsessions. Eliza in Peter Abrahams' "Mine Boy" becomes a psychological

wreck. Okonkwo in Achebe's "Things Fall Apart" finds a cataclysmic collapse all around him. Medza in Mongo Beti's "Mission to Kala" realizes an internal tearing apart.

And through this projection of the adverse after-effects of the contact between the African and the European cultures, these artists mirror the trials and tribulations of the African community and the historical experiences of Africa. The writings of these artists are based on the living heritage of the African people. These writers reflect African history as a background to today's events and the crises of tomorrow. From these artists, the readers obtain a critique of the present-day society of Africa as well as a projection into the future.

The African literature as put across by Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti is committed and not an expression of art for art's sake. These artists identify themselves with the people of Africa, their aspirations, failures, hopes, frustrations, their culture, history, and soul. Their art can be rightly called "applied art" as distinguished from "pure art".

The colonial experience is reflected by all these artists as a criss-cross of attractions and revulsions between the blacks and the whites. "Mine Boy" has Xuma set against Paddy. "Things Fall Apart" has Okonkwo passionately fighting against the intrusion of the white man into Umoufia. In "No Longer at Ease", Obi finds himself critically commenting on the "love" Mr. Green has for the Africa of Charles the messenger. "Arrow of God" unfolds the direct confrontation between Ezeulu and Captain Winterbottom. "A Man of the People" presents corruption as a hang-over of the colonical rule, breeding mischievous politicians like Chief Nanga. "Mission to Kala" comments on the way in which the Colonial system of education has paralysed young people like Medza.

Thus by exposing the harmful effects of the colonial experience, all these works of art make the readers conscious of a genuinely African setting in which the natural desires of the original people find their expressions. The focus of attention in all these novels is on a protagonist who symolically represents the desires, dilemmas and frustrations of the African community.

Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti succeed in asserting the Africanness of their people by highlighting the subtle nuances of their protagonists' personalities. These artists take upon themselves the stigma of the colonialists' rejection and return it as a proud declamation of honour. They assert the validity of their African culture to a world which has rejected it across three centuries.

These African writers have something vital to offer to the world, for they have retained the humanity and warmth that seem to have been deliberately excluded from the Western ways of thinking where intellectualism has obtained perhaps too great a prominence.

Through the works of these artists, one can note an underlying philosophy that asserts a totality of Africanness in the philosophical spirit of the rejected imperial power. These writers come out as heirs to their own tradition, and yet they are conscious of the aberrations from the ideal in that tradition itself.

The main purpose of these writers becomes to educate and reconstruct their contemporary African society by making it conscious of the numerous corruptions and dilemmas which threaten to break things into a heap of broken images. They try to lose themselves in their people and with their people and try to shake them out of their lethargy. They make themselves the mouthpiece of a new reality of action. Their literature is important as a reinstatement of the dignity and pride which the black man lost through slavery in the New World and colonialism in the old. African culture is re-establihed in the modern world through the works of these writers. Chinua Achebe has the following thoughts on the African novel:

> The first is that the African novel has to be about Africa. A pretty severe restriction, I am told. But Africa is not only a geographical expression; it is also a metaphysical landscape—it is in fact a view of particular position.. As for who an African novelist is, it is partly a matter of passports, of individual volition and particularly of seeing from that perspective....[2]

So the African writer is one who can look at the social reality with a certain "perspective", and the African novel has to be "about Africa". This Africa is not merely a "geographical expression" but also a "metaphysical landscape" and "in fact a view of the world and of the whole cosmos perceived from a particular position". This "perspective" and the "particular position" are things that Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti share as their common concerns.

Peter Igbonekwu Okeh in his essay entitled "Two Ways of Explaining Africa" observes:

> "Opinions vary about what the 'essential' elements in African Literature should be. Some expect the African writer to produce literary works that are aesthetically impeccable; others want him above all to try to contribute to a better knowledge of the black world. Obvisously any work claiming to be classed as literature must first of all be well written. But I am the last man

> to blame a black man writing in French or English because he happens to stumble in a language that is not his own. Rather, I will be suspicious of him if I come to the conclusion that he is falsifying or misrepresenting the image of Africa. This is a duty, all the more so because Africa was, and still is, in spite of the great efforts being made today, an unknown, a despised and an underestimated world. Is it not therefore the responsibility of a black writer, taking into account what he owns to his people and to his race to deal first and foremost with all facets of the African civilization?[3]

Peter Abrahams, Chinua Acnebe and Mongo Beti do indeed take into account what they owe to their people and to their race by dealing first and foremost with different facets of the African civilization.

In his "Mine Boy, Peter Abrahams focusses his attention on bringing to light the miseries and frustrations of the black people living in the slum area of the cosmopolitan setting of Johannesburg. Leah aptly tells Xuma:

> Listen to me Xuma. I will try again to make you understand. In the city it is like this: all the time you are fighting. Fighting. Fighting! When you are asleep and when you are awake. And you look only after yourself. If you do not you are finished. if you are soft everyone will spit in your face. They will rob you and cheat you and betray you. So, to live here, you must be hard. Hard as a stone. And money is your best friend. With money you can buy a policeman. With money you can buy somebody to go to jail for you. That is how it is, Xuma. It may be good, it may be bad, but there it is. And to live one must see it.[4]

This "fighting" hints at a brutal struggle for existence in which there is a survival only of the fittest. Xuma has to make himself hard as a stone. And the slum area of Malay Camp is made up of narrow, dark streets crossing each other with dark houses leaning over each other. In this dark and dismal setting, live the black people huddled together in perpetual awe of the "policeman" and the "jail". Paddy, the white man, tries to be kind towards Xuma. but Xuma, and all the black people he symbolically represents, do not want kindness. people like Paddy do not know how it feels to be stopped by a policeman on the street. Paddy will never be told, "Get out! White people only".

And in the context of these yawning depths of difference bet-

ween the whites and the blacks, how tragically moving does Eliza's obsession for the white man beocme? Eliza is indeed chasing a crooked shadow when he fails to respond to the genuine love given by Xuma and pines for a white man instead. This "white man" is only a figment of her imagination. Xuma touchingly tells Eliza:

> Those things you want, what of them? The things of the white man and a man who can read books and talk in the white man's language with you? The things I can give you if I work hard, may be. But I cannot read books and speak the white man's language.[5]

Eliza admits that it is madness, because she loves Xuma and is his woman. And yet the madness for the white man's image is so strong and irresistible in Eliza that she is not abe to accept her lover Xuma and becomes a psychological wreck and runs away never to be found agian.

Eliza becomes a tragic character who excites our terror and pity. She unfolds the facet of the African civilization in which the fascination for the white man's aura seems to have become all-consuming. Eliza becomes destroyed by this infatuation with and uncontrollable obsession for the glittering image of the white man. And the educational system seems to have been held as considerably responsible for this emotional warping of her basic point of view. The false gleam of the West appears to have enchanted her, and she has lost her individual African heritage.

Peter Abrahams tries to affirm his faith in the genuinely African characters by putting all his trust in Xuma, the unlettered but alive mine boy who is not at all afraid to tell the white people how the blacks feel. In fact, Xuma becomes a dynamic, full blooded symbol of the black consciousness who tells the black people how they feel and what they want. In Xuma, the blood and flesh seem to become much wiser than the intellect. He becomes an individual who puts across a natural code of conduct which contrasts so sharply with the proper code of conduct put up by the whites. Xuma is a man bereft of all pretensions creatively guided by his instincts. He has no hangups like Eliza. he is not afraid of Paddy. The fearlessness, clarity of approach and inner strength of character make Xuma a person who conveys the correct attitude of the African writer towards the contemporary setting. Xuma represents the broad masses of Africa somewhat as the man represents the general people in Ayi Kwei Armah's "The Beautyful Ones are not yet born".

Chinua Achebe in his "Things Fall Apart", effectively drama-

tises the various stages of the process whereby a homogeneous society under the pressure of external and internal forces is destroyed. Both peter Abrahams and Chinua Achebe are concerned to tell the white people how the blacks feel, and to tell the black people how they feel and what they want. Both these artists present a genuinely African setting with fundamentally authentic African characters. Let us look at the following discourse in which the various characters put across a generally shared point of view in "Things Fall Apart":

> 'The world is large', said Okonkwo. 'I have even heard that in some tribes a man's children belong to his wife and her family.'
>
> 'That cannot be', said Machi. 'You might as well say that the woman lies on top of the man when they are making the children.'
>
> 'It is like the story of white men who, they say, are white like this piece of chalk,' said Obierika. He held up a piece of chalk, which every man kept in his *obi* and with which his guests drew lines on the floor before they ate kola nuts. 'And these white men, they say, have no toes.'
>
> 'And have you never seen them? asked Machi.
>
> 'Have you?' asked Obierika.
>
> 'One of them passes here frequently', said Machi. 'His name is Amadi'.
>
> Those who knew Amadi laughed. he was a leper, and the polite name for leprosy was 'the white skin.[6]

The pleasant ribaldry that can be noticed in this village talk artistically puts across the common viewpoint that these African characters have towards the white man.

The underlying comedy exemplified in this naturalistically presented village chatter assumes a more serious dimension in the following conversation started by Obierika and followed up by Okonkwo:

> 'Does the white man understand our custom about land?
>
> 'How can he when he does not speak our tongue? But he says that our customs are bad. How do you think we can fight when our own brothers have turned against us? The white man is very clever. He came quietly and peaceably with his religion. We were amused at his foolishness and allowed him to stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no longer act

> like one. He has put a knife on the things that held us together and we have fallen apart.[7]

Eliza in "Mine Boy" had presented a pitiable fascination for the tongue to the white man and had been won over by the image of the white man. Xuma had unfolded a clarity of perception which had just gone against any such fascination for the white man. Like Xuma, Okonkwo here also projects a clear insight and fearlessness that protest against the falling apart brought in and caused bythe white man.

"No Longer at Ease" has a similar exposure of the behaviour of the white man presented now in the modern cosmopolitan setting of Lagos. Miss Tomlinson describes Mr. Green to Obi:

> 'I had tea with the Greens. ...They are a most delightful couple, you know. He is quite different at home. Do you know he pays school fees for his steward's son ? But he says the most outrageous things about educated Africans.'
>
> 'I know', said Obi, 'He will make a very interesting case for a psychologist. Charles—you know the messenger —told me that some time ago the A.A. wanted to sack him for sleeping in the office. But when the matter went up to Mr. Green, he tore out the query from Charles's personal file. He said the poor man must be suffering from malaria, and the next day he bought him a tube of quinacrine.[8]

Mr. Green here makes" a very intersting case for a psychologist", and becomes for us a replay on Eloza who also makes a very interesting case for a psychologist. Mr. Green does not like educated Africans, and yet he has lots of charity and sympathy to dole out to poor Africans like his steward's son and Charles, the messenger.

"Arrow of God" has another white man, Capt. Winterbottom, informing his junior Mr. Clarke about the subtleties of his thinking about the natives:

> 'I went into the question of the ownership of the piece of land which was the remote cause of all the unrest and found without any shade of doubt that it belonged to Okperi. I should mention that every witness who testified before me—from both sides without exception—perjured themselves. One thing you must remember in dealing with natives is that like children they are great liars. They don't lie simply to get out of trouble. Sometimes they would spoil good case by a pointless lie.[9]

So, the natives, according to Capt. Winterbottom are "great liars," and all the witnesses "perjured themselves".

Thus through all these novels, Chinua Achebe subtly exposes the depth of difference between the African point of view and the White man's point of view of looking at the problems of native Africa. The earlier gap pointed out so neatly between Xuma and Paddy by Peter Abrahams in "Mine Boy" is developed further with its various permutations and combinations by Chinua Achebe.

Both Peter Abrahams and Chinua Achebe delineate the destructive influences of such a clash of viewpoints on the moral, psychological, social and religious health of the people of Africa. Eliza is only one symptom of the entire disease which has been spread due to the clash of the two viewpoints. Okonkwo finds things to have fallen so apart that he kills himself. Obi becomes a poor victim of this clash of cultures and starts taking brides to maintain himself in this terrible whirlpool. Ezeulu finds himself so much unable to resolve this clash that he ends up as a demented priest.

And in "A Man of the People", Chinua Achebe presents this destructive process as having become complete. Chief Nanga is the "man of the people" who is given the charge of being one of the caretakers of post-independent Nigeria. But the colonial system of the recent past is still casting its shadows on the entire setting:

> Apparently the Minister insisted that his children must be taken home to their village at least once a year...
>
> 'Without it', said Mrs. Nanga, 'they would become English people. Don't you see they hardly speak our language. Ask them something in it and they reply in English. The little one, Micah, called me, 'a dirty, bush woman'.[10]

Chief Nanga sends his children home to their village at least once a year as a matter of policy, but Mrs. Nanga is genuinely concerned about her children becoming "English people". The earlier story of Eliza in "Mine Boy" seems to have now reached its culminating point in the little one, Micah, calling her mother "a dirty, bush woman". Is not this attitude a pointer for all the Africans who should not regard their mother Africa as "a dirty, bush woman"?

"A Man of the People" presents the post-Independence Nigerian society which is not able to guard its hard-won freedom properly. Mother Africa had pinned so much hope on her infant son to come of age and comfort her by repaying her for the years of shame and neglect. This son turns out to be Chief Nanga, a corrupt politican.

Chinua Achebe with a remarkably sardonic irony has the following remarks to make in his eassy entitled "Thoughts on the African Novel":

> In our own time a preoccupation with Europe has seemed almost equally inevitable despite the passage of nearly two hundred years. In the colonial period and its aftermath our preoccupation with Europe took the form of protest. Then a bunch of bright ones came along and said: 'We are throught with intoning the colonial litany. We hereby repudiate the crippling legacy of a Europe-oriented protest. We are tough-minded. We absolve Europe of all guilt. Don't you worry, Europe, we were bound to violence long before you came to our shores'. Naturally, Europe, which was beginning to believe the worst about itself, is greatly relieved and impressed by the mental emancipation, objectivity and sophistication of these newcomers. As if any intelligent writer of protest had ever taken a starryeyed view of Africa or doubted the reality of evil in Africa, the new anti-protest, broad-minded writer will now endorse the racist theory that Africa *is* evil, *is* the heart of darkness.
>
> It is this illusion of objectivity, this grotesque considerateness, this perverse charitableness which askes a man to cut his own throat for the comfort and good opinion of another that I must now address myself to.
>
> Quite often the malady (for it is indeed a sickness, shows fairly mild symptoms and is widespread; at other times it comes in its virulent forms. But mild or severe it manifests itself as self-disgust and an obscene eagerness to please our adversary.[11]

Indeed through his works of art, Chinua Achebe does successfully address, himself to this "illusion of objectivity, this grotesque considerateness" and this "perverse charitableness" by exposing the problems faced by Africa due to its "preoccupation with Europe". Chinua Achebe and Peter Abrahams do not ask a man to cut his own throat for the comfort and good opinion of another.

Mongo Beti in his "Mission to Kala" also unfolds yet another facet of the way in which Africa was to suffer because of its preoccupation with Europe. Medza becomes an emotionally paralysed "student" torn apart by the two Fathers (one at home and the other at the school). Although the men in Kala are presented as people with 'natural impulses', they seem to have been changed into quintessen-

tial caricatures of the colonized African. Mongo Beti aptly presents the tragedy of the nation to lie in the people being left to their own devices in a world which does not belong to them, which they have not made and do not understand.

Thus it is evident that Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti have some common concerns in their writings and approach their society with a basically similar point of view. These artists are the teachers for their society, and they point their fingers at the destruction of traditional African values and the African personality by European colonialism. They confront their community as individuals whose aim is to contribute to a better knowledge of the black world. Their literature can aptly be called a genuine literature because through it the Black Man expresses his temperament and his needs, thereby revealing the particular Universe belonging to his race.

Colonialism is supposed to have been a source of inspiration perhaps the most dominant inducement of Africans to write. Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti have also taken the same source of inspiration without playing down what is wrong with the African society and the African people. They have not averted their eyes from whatever is wrong in the main current of the African society.

These artists protest against the physical pain and humiliation brought in by the brutality of colonialism and the dogmatism of its cultural arrogance. At the same time they affirm the natural and original value of the African people as human beings. The black man and the white man are equal. This is being said and re-said over and over again through the novels of Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Monogo Beti.

These artists, each in his own way, have worked towards a better Africa where problems will be minimised and a world where the people of Africa will say that all is well as far as they are concerned. The following poem "African Realism" of Richard Kiya-Hindiza adequately sums up the common concerns of African writers:

We are not alone
On this continent of Africa,
Riddled with ideologies unpractised before
And many more yet to be brought
To this land: once a single land—
Now partitioned into colonies
By sons and daughters
Not registered within the family

Of a father whose will we read.
Migrant birds detect before dawn
Where to nest and where not to rest,
On a land not meant for them.

The black soul enjoys the blackness
Of a gloomy forest meant for him:
The secret arts of his voodoo cults,
Inspirit his enchantment well at home.
But the black chain of African nationalism
Is now patched in gold, copper and bronze,
And the fathers gone now feel restive
When their minds in retrospective digression
See a modern kind of Africa'...

We are not alone
On this continent once nicknamed
The Dark continent (perhaps ever night)
And the 'White-Man's Grave'—perhaps not white meant.
For the black bats that bark in Congo forests
Do not invite the seagulls to share
In their joy or their unique fate;
Nor will the date-palms of Sahara oases
Sympathise with the oak trees
Who choose the same floor to dance
To the unfamiliar tunes of desert drums.

Yet we are not alone,
Never are we alone on this land—
A modernized kind of upturned Africa,
Where mongrel offspring challenge
The ingenuity of the landowners,
And aliens now on unending holidays
Prefer soon to turn Africaners,
Never to go, never to go back home–
Until that radical time
When a revolution of all Africa
Shall explode in distension;
A time when our hearts shall reach
A point of non-tolerance and belligerency,
A point where the young and the unborn
Will know the cheated and the cheating,
And those forces that intrigue and generate

Inter-state and ethnic tensions exposed
To the judgements of our great forefathers,
The jubilation of our tribesmen,
and the patriotic awareness of our kinsfolk.

We are not alone
In this fight for initative knowledge.
We have had our national share
Of the wisdom that suits Africa.
While men still relegate us to primitivity,
We ourselves have seen life-samples
Of eskimoes and coloured Indians
Below the grades of semi-civilization.

We are not alone,
We are not alone in Africa-
Never are we not alone in this world
Where the sea and the oceans connect us
With the so-called discovering nations
Living under the same sun, moon and rain.
Let every nation be at its home,
Let every bird in its own nest dwell,
Let the African be free in his home,
And let the searching parties that roam
Stop their search for a lost Africa.[12]

Yes, Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti are not alone on this continent of Africa, because their hearts have reached a point of "non-tolerance" and "belligerency".

Words are like oyster shells
Many see only their outer hardness
But the wise hold and open them
And sometimes find within them hidden pearls.

Words are like lightning strokes
Many see only frightening flashes
But the wise pause and wait
And hear the echo of their great thunder...

So, Africa, when you say to me
In quiet urgency you love me
(Oh you are a torn confused and ravaged land.

Your strange uncertain love like shifting tides)
That I must stay and serve your needs
I pause and ponder
I stop and wonder

Perhaps you hold within you
Some hidden gleaming pearl
Some future majesty
Some strange sweet fragrance of moonlit nights
I walk along your foam-flecked shores
Your words hold promise
And are not empty
I have gained wisdom and shall wait.[13]

In this poem entitled "Words of Wisdom and Love", Abioseh Nicol effectively hints at the "hidden gleaming pearl" and "some future majesty" held by Africa. Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti indeed, prove to have successfully realized and brought out this hidden gleaming pearl and the future majesty of Africa. These artists have devotedly served the needs of Africa by artistically delineating the intricacies of this supposedly "torn confused and ravaged land."

They have successfully projected the trails and tribulations of the African consciousness through their authentically realized characters presented in a genuinely African setting. Xuma, Okonkwo, Obi, Ezeulu, Odili and Medza are typically African protagonists who are out to unfold an African point of view set neatly against a Eurocentric perception. Okonkwo kills himself, Obi is arrested, Ezeulu is demented. But Xuma, Odili and Medza go on with their own ideas of life; and even the sad ends of Okonkwo, Obi and Ezeulu produce a certain cathartic effect in the readers.

These protagonists therefore make the readers conscious of a thought provoking and insightful exposition of the hopes, fears and frustrations of Africa. They educate the people through their varied and symbolically suggestive reactions to the cricumambient universe. They are not mere embodiments of theoretical categories. They are men of flesh and blood, susceptible to the pulls and pressures of common humanity. They do not act according to abstract theories or doctrines. In fact, their inner urge seems to be to give expression to their fury and the mires of the human veins.

Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti seem to have chosen for themselves the role of an artist as the teacher. This tone of the teacher permeates every part of the universe presented by these

artists. The sense of human nature, the understanding of social behaviour patterns-are all viewed through this perspective.

The Ghanain novelist Ayi Kwei Armah comes out with a similar Afrocentric point of view in his novel entitled "The Beautiful Ones are not yet born". Here the un-named hero "the man" is a worker on the railways. He has been born and brought up in the town and has no rural roots to escape to. He has gone to school but has not been able to make the comfortable heights. The man symbolises the "masses" of Africa, and yet he is not an ordinary worker because he has a mind and body which together constitute the centre of a searchlight which seems to investigate into all that is supposed to be Ghana. And through this investigation, the artist, through the man, exposes the nauseous essence of the cosmpolitan setting of Africa:

> Past the big public lavatory the stench claws inward to the throat. Sometimes it is understandable that people spit so much, when all around decaying things push inward and mix all the body's juices with the taste of rot. Sometimes it is understandable, the doomed attempt to purify the self by adding to the disease outside. Hot smell of caked shit split by afternoon's baking sun, now touched by still evaporating dew... Sounds of moist fish frying in open pans of dark perennial oil so close to the public lavatory. It is very easy to get used to what is terrible.[14]

The sense of nausea created by this description startles the reader. The "rot" and the "smell of caked shit split by afternoon's baking sun" remind us of the "Augean stable" and "mess" that Obi notices around him in "No Longer at Ease".

Like Obi, the man in this novel is also obsessed with the theme of corruption (which is symbolically presented by the horrifying filth in the social setting). The man tries to retain his honesty by refusing to take the bride offered by Amankwa the "great" Timber Merchant and Contractor. But the man finds that all around him the whole world seems to never tire of saying that there are only two types of men who take refuge in honesty-the cowards and the fools. Very often the man feels burdened with the hopeless impotent feeling that he is not just one of these but a helpless combination of the two.

This external and internal corruption that the protagonist of "The Beautiful Ones are Not yet born" finds himself challanged with are neatly juxtaposed against a yawning chasm between the blacks and white people in Ghana:

> There was no way out visible to us, and out on the hills the white men's gleaming bungalows were so far away, so unreachably far that people did not even think of them in their suffering. And for those who did, there were tales of white men with huge dogs that ate more meat in a single day than a human Gold Coast family got in a month, dogs which could obey their masters' voices like soldiers at war, and had as little love for black skins as their white masters.[15]

This "unreachably" great distance between the "white men's gleaming bungalows" and the "people" suffering on the streets and plains takes us back to the point of view projected by Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti.

Mwagi Ruheni's novel entitled "The Future Leaders" also presents a similar attitude towards the "white man's burden." The setting is Kenya:

> People who used to cook for Europeans those days were interesting. Most of them had gone through a certain degree of exposure to the civilization which was now descending upon the whole of East Africa from other places such as Europe. Kaiga, for example, had gone through four years of what could be called education.
>
> He could write letters and divide one hundred by five. He had heard of David Livingstone and Lord Lugard. Somebody had told him why he should avoid eating dirty food and why dirty water is only fit for cows. But above all, he was introduced to the Bible, and he appeared to be genuinely convinced that this world was created in six days, after which somebody just had to have rest and a cold shower.[16]

The tongue-in-the-cheek irony is obvious here.

Kiama and the observer-narrator-protagonist have started life off as labourers, carrying water from the river, or uprooting tree-stumps for use as firewood. The protagonist grows up with the necessary academic qualifications and presents himself in an interview for the post of the Assistant Secretary:

> 'Do you belong to any particular culture? Now now, I was not really prepared for this.'
>
> I guess if I had lived a hundred years ago, when there was a stable indigenous society, I would have belonged to a distinct culture. I guess in a hundred years to come we may have a society with distinct, stable and well-accepted norms. Then we

shall be able to talk of a distinct African culture. But I think our society is changing very much today. I would hesitate to say that we have a distinct African culture here and now. Nevertheless, there are basic cultural characteristics which the black man will always carry along with him. You could call this the basic cultural heritage of the black man.' That was a long answer. Perhaps too long. I cannot even remember what I said at the beginning of it.

'Such as?'

'Rhythm, cheerfulness, hardiness, respect for parents and the elderly, responsibilities beyond the household family, an athletic constitution, not to mention the strong white African teeth.' They all laugh. But one of them does not laugh. He talks.

'I see, I myself would not'..... The following Wednesday I got a letter. I had passed the interview. I was offered the post of Assistant Secretary, and I would be going for training after working for six months in the office of the President.[17]

The novel ends. But the way in which Mwangi Ruheni has presented Kaiga's "certain degree of exposure to the civilization... of Europe" unfurls the sardonic humour of the artist. Kaiga has "heard of David Livingstone and Lord Lugard" and has been properly introduced to the Bible". Does this not remind us of the world of Chinua Achebe's "Things Fall Apart"?

Mr. Ruoro's interview has been recorded with an analytical vigour and delicate balance. The African culture has been defined in an entertaining and enlightening manner. It is aptly asserted that "there are basic cultural characteristics which the black man will always carry along with him". And these characteristics are supposed to make up "the basic cultural heritage of the back man".

James Ngugi's "The River Between" takes us to a world reminiscent of Chinua Achebe's "Things Fall Apart". The setting in "The River Between" again is Kenya:

The two ridges lay side by side. One was Kameno, the other was Makuyu. Between them was a vally. It was called the valley of life. Behind Kameno and Makuyu were many more valleys and ridges, lying without any discernible plan. They were like many sleeping lions which never woke. They just slept, the big deep sleep of their creator.

A river flowed through the valley of life... When you stood in the valley, the two ridges ceased to be sleeping lions united by

> their common source of life. They became antagonists. You could tell this, not by anything tangible but by the way they face each other, like two rivals ready to come to blow in a life and death struggle for the leadership of this isolated region.[18]

So Kameno and Makuyu here remind one of Umuaro and Okperi at war with each other in "Things Fall Apart". And as in "Things Fall Apart", the white missionaries here too find a good base for their activities. Waiyaki, the protagonist of "The River Between" vanishes from the hills to the missionaries:

> When the time came Waiyaki vanished from the hills without the knowledge of any but his father. He went to Siriana where, one term later, and almost by a miracle, he was joined by Kamau and Kinuthia, his fellow herdboys.
>
> The three were destined to live and learn together under the Reverend Livingstone of Siriana Mission, which had now grown into a big institution. Many boys from the hills and beyond, from Kiambu and Muranga, came there for a portion of the white man's magic.
>
> For many seasons they learned and worked hard. Waiyaki made quick progress and impressed the white missionaries, who saw in him a possible brave Christian leader of the Church. But who knew that things were changing faster than the vision of Livingstone, than the boy's expectation and imagining?[19]

The Siriana Mission has "now grown into a big institution". Waiyaki has impressed the white missionaries as "a possible brave Christian leader of the Church". But things are supposed to be "changing faster than the vision of Livingstone."

Waiyaki wants to bring about a reconciliation between the two opposing groups of Kameno and Makuyu. He wants to spread education to the people around him. But he meets a crushing opposition in the figure of Kabonyi and so the protagonist is defeated in his noble aims. Things fall apart once again in this setting, and the protagonist is betrayed by his own people:

> An elder stood up. Waiyaki could not hear what he was saying for his mind was full of many thoughts and doubts that came and went. Waiyaki and Nyambura would be placed in the hands of the Kiama, who would judge them and decide what to do. It was the best thing and the crowd roared back 'Yes' as if the

> burden of judging their Teacher were removed from them. They went away quickly, glad that he was hidden by the darkness. For they did not want to look at the Teacher and they did not want to read their guilt in one another's faces. Neither did they want to speak to one another, for they knew full well what they had done to Waiyaki and yet they did not want to know.
>
> The land was now silent. The two ridges lay side by side, hidden in the darkness, And Honia river went on flowing between them, down through the valley of life, its beat rising above the dark stillness, reaching into the heart of the people of Makuyu and Kameno.[20]

The novel ends. Mutual dissension, open rivalry, secret intrigues have once again made things fall apart. The people have not been able to come together and bring Africa on the right lines. Waiyaki's dream has not been realized, and the river goes on flowing between Mukuyu and Kameno. Perhaps "the heart of the people" will be stirred against all this.

Kobina Sekyi (whose full name is William Essuman-Gwira Sekyi) is a Ghanain nationalist whose play "The Blinkards" comically satirises the nouveaux-riche of the Western oriented Fanties of Cape Coast who accepted European standards uncritically. Mrs. Brofusem is a leader of Fashions who has instructed her cook that if he does not serve up European sweets with any dinner he prepares, he will be dismissed. Mr. Onyimdzi is a young barister who represents the playwright's point of view and stands for everything that is native (almost, like Xuma in "Mine Boy"). Mr. Onyimdzi praises the geunine Fanti old men who are proud of in every way of their nationality and are wiser, healtheir, and infinitely more respectable and dignified than those who are anglicised. Mr. Onyimdzi aptly describes education as the training of the young in each community to take their places as useful members of their respective communities. The white people seem to have established their supremacy here in such a way that black people, no matter how qualified they are, are disowned by the people. Dr. Onweiyie, a physician and a surgeon, tells Mr. Onyimdzi :

> When you think of the difficulties I have passed through before I could have patients to operate on, you will get a headache. At first some said they were afraid. others said I couldn't do it, because only white men could operate, black surgeons being scarce... When a white surgeon is unfortunate in an operation, nothing is said. If it had been a black man who had

such bad luck, the outcry would be loud and long.[21]

The black surgeon, therefore, is treated as a second class surgeon and has to work on a razor's edge.

So when Mr. Onyimdzi wins the case of Okadu's daughter in the play, he rightly observes:

> I am glad I won that case. It could knock a good deal of nonsense out of our young men and women, who had been taught by half-educated missionaries to despise the native form of marriage, and to hanker after this foreign form which they know as 'Holy Matrimony' with all the show and fuss attached to it in these parts.[22]

The "half-educated missionaries" teaching the "young men and women" to "despise the native form of marriage" exposes brilliantly the very heart of the matter.

And when the play ends, Mr. Brofusem, the merchant proclaims the wisdom not of the white people but of Mr. Onyimdzi :

> Onyimdzi was right all along the line. If only we were national, we should be more rational and infinitely more respectable. Our ways and our things suit our climate. For one thing, our drinks have not the same maddening effect on our people as European drinks have. The people of the old days were wise indeed: if only we would follow the customs they left us a little more, and adopt the ways of other races a little less, we should be at least as healthy as they were.[23]

Mr. Brofusem, therefore, asserts his full faith in being "national" to be more "rational". He rejects the European drinks" and accepts the rich customs left by the tradition, and he wants the ways of other races to be adopted a little less. This is a sure way to a healthy nation.

Although "The Blinkards" was written in 1915, the message it carries has a great significance for the Africa of today. Indeed, asserting the rich cultural heritage left by the tradition is of immense importance in the present situation of Africa. The blind imitation of Europe has to stop. Is it not ironic that the playwright, Kobina Sekyi, died in 1956, only one year before the independence of Ghana?

In his comic play entitled "Marriage of Unequals" published in 1968, Menghistu Lemma provides an insightful glimpse into the setting of Ethiopia. Baharu is a foreign educated young man who loves his maid servant Belete. Bogale is the twelve year old adoptive son of Baharu. Lady Alganesh Dubida is Baharu's aunt, who is a big landowner and a childless widow. Abba-Mamito is a diviner, Ayya-Lizzebu is a professional astrologer. Alaka is the head of the village church and Hadji is a Moslem divine

So Baharu is a young man set against an intricately realized feudal.backdrop. He chooses to go to a village and start a school for the rural people. His will to educate the prople reminds us of Waiyaki in "The River Between". Lady Alganesh is unable to understand her nephew's plans. Let us look at the following scene in which Lady Alganesh is addressed to by Alaka and Nadji:

ALAKA : On your return from Kulubi, we hope your Ladyship will honour our village with a brief stay. You might also visit Master Baharu's village school.

NADJI : He was determined on personally teaching all the village children. The villagers obliged with wood for the walls, and gran for the roof. The result is a handsome little school.

LADY ALGANESH : He wrote to me about it. He says it's the greatest thing he has even done, the only one of its kind.

ALAKA He was simply amazing. He would listen to no one. With his bare hands he toiled on the lattice-work of walls; with his bare feet he trod the fermenting clay. And when the day came to apply the plaster to the walls-you would not recognize him at all his face, hair and all smudged with yellow clay. How shall I describe him? If anyone there is who saw Adam in the morning of his creation while still on the clay stage, just before the Almighty blew the breath of life into his nostrils-well, Master Baharu looked exactly like that. Nadji and myself had a good laugh contemplating him...

LADY ALGANESH : One can no longer make head or tail of what the young people think these days. My own idea was to have him settle near me in Addis

> Ababa in a cosy government job, and then to get him married to one who is his social peer – to a daughter of the proper people. But no! He had to go to the rural parts, or he would die![24]

Baharu, therefore, is a young man whose foreign education has not gone to his head. He has not become a person merely aping the west. Like Waiyaki, he wants to give the acquired education to the service of his village people. Like Mr. Onyimdzi, Baharu stands for the native traditions of his country, and therefore his aunt cannot understand him. Baharu does not become the Obi of "No Longer at Ease", although both the individuals have gone abroad.

Thus it is evident that the concerns presented by Peter Abrahams, Chinua Achebe and Mongo Beti are actually shared by the other African writers like Ayi Kwej Arm, Mwangi Ruheni, James Ngugi, Kobina Sekyi, Menghistu Lemma. And it will be appropriate to yet another African writer James Baldwin who observes in his book "Nobody knows my Name".
Name":

> And yet it became clear as the debate wore on, that there was something which all black men held in common, something which cut across opposing points of view, and placed in the same context their wildly diseimilar experience. What he held in common was their precarious, their unutterably painful relation to the white world. What they held in common was the necessity to remake the world in their own image, to impose this image on the world, and no longer be controlled by the vision of the world, and of themselves, held by other people. What in sum, black men held in common was their ache to come into the world as men. And this ache united people who might otherwise have been divided as to what a man should be.[25]

Yes, there is something which all black men hold in common. It is the precarious relation to the white world that unites all the black people. It is the necessity to remake the world in their own image that can be called the common concern. This ache to come into the world as men can be pointed as the dominant mood of African Literature today.

1. Ed. Jacob Drachler "African Heritage" P. 13.
2. Ed. Rowland Smith. "Exile and Tradition". p. 2.
3. *Ibid.* p. 74.
4. Peter Abrahams "Mine Boy" pp. 75-76.

5. *Ibid.* p. 167.
6. Chinua Achebe, "Things Fall Apart", p. 67.
7. *Ibid.* p. 160.
8. Chinua Achebe, "No Longer at Ease", p. 95.
9. Chinua Achebe, "Arrow of God", p. 45.
10. Chinua Achebe, "A Man of the People", p. 38.
11. Ed. Rowland Smith, "Exile and Tradition, p. 3.
12. Ed. Howard Sergeant "African Voices".
13. Ed. Howard Seargent "African Voices".
14. Ayi Kwi Armah, "The Beautyful Ones are not yet born", pp. 47-48.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Mwangi Ruheni, "The Future Leaders", p. 3.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 213 - 125.
18. James Ngugi, "The River Between", p. 1.
19. *Ibid.* p. 25.
20. *Ibid.* p. 175.
21. Kobina Sekyi, "The Blinkards", p. 76.
22. *Ibid. p. 127.*
23. *Ibid.* pp. 147 - 148.
24. Menghistu Lemma, "Marriage of Unequals" pp. 27 - 28, 31 - 32.
25. James Baldwin, "Nobody Knows My Name", pp. 28 - 29.

Book Review

L'Autre Giscard (Valéry Giscard d' Estaing vu par un anglais) Charles Hargrove, Les Editions J.A., Paris, 1981, pages 212 :

L' Autre Giscard (The Other Giscard) is the biogaraphical study of Valéry Giscard d' Estaing written in French by Chareils Hargrove, a British journalist who has lived in France for a number of years. The author feels that Valéry Giscard d' Estaing has not been properly understood, he has been rather misunderstood and has been unjustly criticised. That is one of the reasons for his undertaking to write the life history of Giscard d' Estaing. He has tried to describe Giscard d' Estaing's complex personality which is paradoxical at the same time. He also believes that Giscard is strictly liberal but his desire to reform the society was confronted with real economic and political difficulties. The author has not only had occasions to meet Giscard d' Estaing personally, he has met and discussed with several personalities and has read many works for writing this book.

May 27, 1974 is a memorable day in the annals of the political history of France. On that day, Valery Giscard d' Estaing at the young age of 48 only took over the reigns of administering France. He ruled over France for more than eight years till he was succeeded by President Mitterand, the socialist leader.

Eldest Son of Edmond Giscard d' Estaing and May Giscard d' Estaing, Valérry Giscard d' Estaing was born on Feb. 2, 1926 at Coblence in France.

Valéry Giscard's mother May Giscard d' Estaing had from the very beginning, great faith in her son's destiny. And although Valery's father used very often to take him to task, lot of indulgence was given to him by his mother. With much affection and deep psycological insight, she would encourage him in his studies.

At the age of seven only, he started learning the piano. Even today he loves to play the piano for diversion and relaxation-Mozart, Chopin, and Beethoven being his favourities.

He was undoubtedly very gifted and intelligent. As a young man, Valéry Giscard started writing a sentimental novel and composing verses. One of his favourite authors is Gaston Flaubert. He is also a great admirer of Maupassant. He has profound knowledge of eigh-

teenth century France and would proudly refer to that century as an era when France served as a model to all the neighbouring countries.

Valéry Giscard d' Estaing has been accused of snobbery and bourgeois habits. In his private life he loves to be surrounded by descendants of illustrious families like Clermont-Tonnerre, La Tour d' Auvergne, Brogolie and others. In fact, he is very found of his ancestry and his parentage, his relation with Admiral d' Estaing, and his descendance, although indirect from Louis XV-the King for whom he has great admiration. By his marriage with Anne-Aymone he linked himself with the Royal family, Claiming descendancy from Charles X. He was also deeply fascinated by Louis XI with whom he claimed to have many traits in common. He is equally fond of tracing his origin to a hero of the American War of Independence.

It is intersting to note that during the Second World War, Giscard d' Estaing took active part in the Resistance movement.

When Giscard d' Estaing took over as President of France "from that day a new era started". It was the return of liberalism in France after more than a centuray. This liberalism was, however, progressive, pluralistic, modern and social.

In 1976, Giscard's *Démocratic Francaise* was published. Giscard realised that France was a modern society economically and industrially, but politically and socially it was not yet so. He felt that inequalities old and new should be reduced, rather eliminated. The individual free from the constraints of bureaucracy should be made free and reponsible.

Giscard d' Estaing's writing is primarly a scientific one—clear, precise, pedagogic—with a very controlled form of lyricism. Change, Equality and Security—these three terms have been most frequently used.

Commenting on the Giscardian style the author has pointed out that his orginality depended on the personalisation of the French society taken as a living organism.

An intersting aspect of Giscard d' Estaing's style of working was that unlike his predecessors General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou who used to make very little use of telephone, Giscard would make use of the same. He would contact foreign dignitaries like Chancellor Schmidt and Juan Carlos. He would exchange views with his Ministers. He would even contact journalists (despite his contempt for the Paris Press) over the phone, to discuss, give his comments and express his satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Referring to the President's men in Chapter VIII, the author

has said that Giscard d' Estaing had the good fortune of being sourrounded by men of high calibre devoted to him. In fact, many of them had great admiration for him. His striking intelligence and wonderful memory and his gifts for synthesis and pedagogical sense were known to all.

Giscard reduced the President's team from 27 to 17. Persons like Dominique de La Martiniere, Renaud de la Genière, André de Lattre would sometimes express frank opinions. Giscard had also personalities like Claude, Pierre Brossolette, Gacques Calvet, Jean-Fransois Poncet, Jacques Wahl, Jean Serise, Jean Riolacci and others were represented in the President's team. They were men of rare qualities and varied experience having gained and demonstrated expertise knowledge in foreign affairs, international monetary system, administration etc. Another personality who succeded to be a greatly effective collaborator of the President was Jean Marie-Poirier. These people and others were responsible in the sucessful running of the administration.

In chapter IX, the author has discussed how under Giscard d' Estaing as President, France gradually developed into a presidential system and how Prime Minister Chirac could not function effectively. The *de facto* Prime Minister was Michel Poniatowski, the Home Minister confidant, counsellor and friend of Giscard for more than twenty five years.

With Raymond Barre stepping into the shoes of Jacques Chirac, a real division of responsibility between the President and the Prime Minister was of course instituted. The Prime Minister was entrusted with the management of day-to-day affairs, enjoying a good deal of liberty in matters of economic and social policy, Giscard d' Estaing occupied himself mainly with political strategy, defence and foreign affairs.

Chapter X of the book makes interesting reading. One of the innovations conceived by Giscard d' Estaing was his bid to take into confidence the Opposition leaders and Deputies. Besides consulting them on vital matters like defence etc., he allowed the Opposition to interrogate the Government even on delicate issues like military intervention in Africa etc. Opposition members were included to form part of French delegations to U.N. and the other foreign countries. Despite all these gestures, erosion of Parliamentry power was alleged by Fransois Mitterand, Jacques Chirac and others. The author however, thinks that Giscard d' Estaing wanted the French Parliament to play a role comparable to that of the Westminster in the political

life of France.

In chapter XI, the author has discussed the social and economic reforms envisged by Giscard d' Estaing. He had in his mind the changing of old established orders. Social reforms like the attainment of majority at the age of 18 years, abortion, contraception, adoption, divorce were all envisged in 1975.

Administrative and judicial reforms were also simplified. Social justice was aimed at. The aged, the handicapped, the immigrants, the labourers, the prisoners drew special attention. Elimination of misery, abolition of previleged groups and fight against discrimination were the main objectives. social security measures were extended to all possible sectors including labourers, immigrant workers, women and the aged. Prison reforms were envisaged and open prison system was also introduced.

Since August 1976, the global restructuring of the French economy was envisaged. Re-establishment of equillibrium in currency, foreign trade, balance of payment, fight against inflation, modernising the French industrial sector were aimed at for coming up the economy of the country. But Giscard was an apostle of organised liberalism, rather than State control. Giscard d' Estaing was convinced that market trends were best advisors in matters of economic policy than the direction up most intelligent persons.

The book as a whole makes interesting reading, but perhaps the most important part of the same is Chapter XII where the author has described and analyzed his foreign policy on detente, his ideas on defence, his intimate relations with the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and finally his special diplomatic monoeuvre towards the African problem. Although Giscard d' Estaing never questioned the foreign policy of General de Gaulle and George Pompidou, he realised that the world today was no longer bipolar but a multi-polar one. Thus in addition to the two super powers, the US and USSR, China and Japan have also entered the world scene including the petrol-producing countries and the European community as well. Giscard d' Estaing realised that the solution of big problems affecting the economic development or the security of the world could no longer be sought within the limits of the national sphere. Giscard re-oriented his foreign policy as per the needs of the modern times and hence the problem of mankind.

The author has observed that in his *Démocratic Fransaise*, Giscard d' Estaing has stated that detente was the only way for peaceful evolution. Giscard noted with regret that the

world was dominated by force and ideological adherence ultimately takes the form of an intervention. Thus the Soviet intervention in Afganisthan appeared to Giscard to be very serious nay "irresponsible". Despite the fact that with Leonid Brezhnev Giscard had very friendly terms he reminded Brezhnev that they should not forget that detente could only be global. His analysis of the Soviet position was in fact unique and original in many respects.

Although a British journalist the author has objectively and dispassionately pointed out that Giscard d' Estaing looked at Great Britain to be a country of economic decline unable to face the challanges of modern times. To Giscard d' Estaing, Great Britain is of the past, the future belongs to Germany.

In fact, Giscard d' Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt were attracted towards each other because they shared common traits—personal, intellectual and ideological. They also shared common ideas on economic and foreign policies.

The concluding part of the Chapter has been devoted to Giscard d' Estaing's diplomatic manoeuvres towards Africa. The author has not failed to bring to light that Giscard has great love for Africa and her people. In this *Democratie Fransaise* Giscard has evoked those "partnerships to which we are united by privileged bonds of culture and affections." Leopold emphasized that Giscard d' Estaing used to be straight forward to African problems.

How much deep was the involvement of Giscard d' Estaing with the African problem has been very elaborately dealt with and analysed by the author. Despite the close cooperation—military, technical or cultural—between France and the Francophone countries which enjoyed privileged bonds, Giscard d' Estaing realised the need for cultivating relations with the Anglophone countries and encouraged his Foreign Minister to visit Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania.

Political circumstances forced Giscard d' Estaing to engage France in limited military interventions. This was the case in African countries like Mauritania, Zaire, Chand, Tunisia and finally in Saudi Arabia. These steps convinced the African regimes that the French government was ready to honour its pledge towards them.

There is some novelty in the concluding chapter. The author has imagined two aspects of Giscard d' Estaing's post-Presidentship career— the other Giscard—one pessimestic, the other optimistic. Looked at from the point of view of a pessimist Giscard's bid to reform the society would result in failure.

His liberal economic policy would not help him overcoming the crisis and would compel him to revert to traditional "dirigisme". After his defeat in 1983, he would retire at Chanonat to devote his time to writing his Memoires and would announce his re-entry into politics in 1988.

Viewing optimistically, Giscard d' Estaing tried to perpetutate General de Gaulle's policy of national independence. He took steps for far-reaching reforms of the society and modernise the economic policy. Due to his initiative the political organisation of Europe would continue, thanks to the setting up of the European Council leading to his final elections to the Presidency of the United States of Europe.

It remains to be seen what actually would take place.

As it is known to many, Giscard d' Estaing has a complex personality. Denying that he has never been a conservative Giscard d' Estaing stated that he was a liberal traditionalist. He always favoured evolution and the change of social and human structures.

Contradictory statements and judgements have been made on Valery Giscard even by people who have known him intimately.

Raymond Aron has characterised Giscard d' Estaing to be temparamentally Orleanist and would behave like a king.

Pierre Mendès-France said that Giscard was a man of the right and the most intelligent person on earth. Fransois Mitterand would prefer describing Giscard to be the man of a clan, of a caste and of a class.

Georges Marchais would go to the extent of characterising Gistard d' Estaing as Enemy No. I of the working class, of democracy and of the progress of France.

In the image of the Britishers, Giscard d' Estaing is "simply an intellegent conservative, who wants to evolve things without disturbing the structures of the society."

The author has, on his part tried to show that in Giscard d' Estaing's character, the passions, the sentiments the generous ideas were dominant by conviction, exceptional intelligence and will. Undeniably, Giscard d' Estaing is very much reserved, jealously guarding his secrets and disclosing his mind only to those whom he would known intimately.

The author would also prefer observing that Giscard d' Estaing is a "past-master in the art of coldly analysing the motives, the ambitions, the cleverness of politicians and to exploit thereby the errors and weaknesses".

Another aspect of Giscard's character which the author has highlighted is that Giscard was fascinated by King Louis XI with

whom he claimed to have many things in common. A great feeling for the State, anxiety for spreading the glory of France, love for authority and taste for reflection.

Objective and comparative analysis is one of the distingushed features of the book. The presentation of facts is simple and sympahtetic. Charles Hargrove's dispassionate approach becomes palpable when one notes that the author has evoked in his narration, even delicate things like Giscard's nightly escapades and his alleged weakness for the weaker sex, particularly African women. These were topics of household gossips. The "affair diamant" has also been described in a very masterly but subtle manner.

Some of the special traits of Giscard's character have been painted in just a few words or a few sentences producing far-reaching and lasting impact on the readers. For instance, after the break with Jacques Chirac, Giscard d' Estaing said in private "How many great things we would have been able to do together".

Despite not agreeing with General de Gaulle and his wounded soul confessing "I have been dismissed as a servant", Giscard d' Estaing would express his admiration for General de Gaulle and flatter himself to be "One amongst those who have known de Gaulle best". He would recall that he was personally received 170 times by the General.

The reader has also a glimpse of the compassionate, sympathetic mind and humane approach of President Giscard, when one reads that on July 14, 1980, Giscard took the initiative of releasing all criminals undergoing imprisonment for less than a year. In fact, he was a protagonist of the abolition of corporal punishment.

The book is thus a rich tribute to President Giscard d' Estaing who in the image of the author had to brave criticisms from his opponents, particularly becuase of his complex personality. Conservative but liberal—a man of conviction and great courage, a visionary, Giscard d' Estaing made sincere efforts to give practical shade to his dream by introducing social and economic reforms in France.

L'Autre Giscard is thus more than a biographical study of Valéry Giscard d' Estaing. It takes us back to the recent past history of France and the contemporary social, political and economic changes that have been envisaged by Valéry Giscard and his predecessors. His collabrators emerge as lively personalities and their amazingly fascinating personal traits and achivements have been painted in such an intelligent manner that they leave lasting impres-

sions.

There was a long—felt need for a correct and first hand appraisal of the life and work of Giscard d' Estaing. By presenting *L' Autre Giscard* to the readers, the author has thus done a unique service. This will also help people in having a correct perspective of the contemperary French life and politics. The portions on the delicate but diversified relations of France with the U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Germany and particularly with Africa will be of absorbing interest to many.

Although the author Charles Hargrove is a British journalist, he has been bold enough to write the present volume in French. His language is lucid and the style is refreshingly neat.

The biography of a President or a Prime Minister is generally profusely illustrated. One wonders how the author, with his easy access and close contacts with the President and his entourage, could resist the temptation of giving some beautiful plates that would have certainly enhanced the attractiveness of the volume under review. Of course, the front cover is embellished with a beautiful portrait of Valery Giscard d' Estaing.

The bibliographical note containing references to 112 books and articles regarding Valéry Giscard d' Estaing is more or less a complete one. This would be of great help for further study and research.

But what one misses most is an index which serves as an indispensible guide to the readers as a ready—reckoner for finding out any reference to any important aspect or item of the book.

The paper is good and the printing is attractive and faultless.

TRILOCHAN DAS

Mengistu Woube, Problems of Land Reform Implementation in Rural Ethiopia—A Case Study of Dejen and Welmera Districts. Geografiska Regienstudier Nr. 16. Uppsala, 1986, pp. 174.

Land reform is a significant feature of our times and is considered a necessary pre-condition for economic and social progress in underdeveloped countries. The main aim of the land reform is to create a strong peasant class which should put in utmost efforts to improve production with the knowledge and certainty that the fruits of such efforts will remain with them.

During the emperor's regime the importance of land reform was realised by the government and measures such as regulation of tenancy relationships, redistribution of immovable property, tax on unused land, etc. were proposed. But

such measures were considered revolutionary by the upper class people. The authorities who were to execute these laws were the very people the laws were to affect. The spirit of the laws came into conflict with their personal interests.

The demand for a radical land reform for the transfer of land to those who till it became the basic national slogan in the course of the revolutionary events that started in early 1974. The Military Government after realising the importance of land reforms for Ethiopia's modernisation announced agrarian reform in 1975. Under the Agrarian Reform Proclamation which is a historical act in the life of the Ethiopian people, all rural lands were declared collective property of the Ethiopian people. All land was to be distributed among those who tilled it Old landlord-tenant relationships were abolished. The establishment of Peasant Associations for the distribution of land were also announced.

The study under reference deals with the problems regarding implementation of land reform in rural Ethiopia since 1975. Two districts namely Dejen and Wolmera have been selected for this study. These districts represent two major types of land tenure system—communal and private found in Ethiopia before the land reform. Data were collected through a survey of a sample population. According to this study, the average cultivated land area per household was 3 hectares in Dejen and 1.5 hectares in Wolmera in the pre-reform period. After the re-distribution of land the average cultiavted area per household in both the districts is about 2 hectares. The reform has indeed resulted in more equitable distribution of land. Secondly, the peasants now receive more government attention and efforts are being made to provide maximum inputs to the peasants at reasonable prices. Thirdly, small farmers are re-organised in peasant association but are free to decide about crops to be grown.

But in both the districts, agricultural output has decreased relative to population growth upto 1983. This was mostly due to lack of inputs in sufficient quantities, marketing and transport faclities caused by political conflicts. The study also observes that the limited area of arable land available relative to the size of farming population and fragmentation of land remain as the major obstacles to rural development. The demand for oxen is much higher than the supply and this is not only a local but a national problem.

The study suggests that in the face of increasing pressure on land, co-operative forms of agricultural production and the

introduction of intermediate agricultural technology are needed if the development of rural sector in Ethiopia is to be achieved. Recently, the number of co-operatives has increased significantly and the total area under cultivation has also gone up. But more systematic efforts are needed to convince peasants about the advantages of co-peratives. The study contributes to a better understanding of many questions regarding land reform in Ethiopia. Such studies should also be conducted in other districts. This will give an overall view of the problems being faced in the implementation of land reform in Ethiopia.

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